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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Most would agree that parental schooling will play positive roles on the health of 
their children. The degree of these effects and the mechanisms by which the cause 
brings about these effects are not, however, very clear. An understanding of these 
effects and the underlying mechanism can be helpful in: (a) knowing whether the future 
“would-be parents” have schooling premium in the form of better health benefit to their 
“would-be children”; (b) identifying which demographic and socio-economic strata 
warrant more attention than the rest, and thereby providing an economic justification for 
differential supports, such as education subsidy, to  the targeted strata; and (c) 
formulating more comprehensive and effective health and education policies, given the 
limited resources. Under the presumption that parental schooling (a) increases the 
household income; (b) helps the family obtain better health insurance; and (c) brings 
forth other intangible but important health benefits (called, here non-monetary benefits 
as opposed to the monetary benefits in the form of income and insurance), the objective 
of this study is to isolate the three channels, namely income, insurance, and the non-
monetary, that may transmit the favorable health benefits of parental schooling to the 
children, and to examine the relative importance of these channels. 
 Income determines the ability of the parents to spend on medical goods1 (e.g. 
doctor visit) and other goods (e.g. food) having health enhancing effects to the children. 
Health Insurance alters the effective price of medical goods, thereby determining the 
access to and quality of health care. In terms of choosing between the medical and 
                                                          
1
 While discussing the parental optimization problem in chapter 3, I use the term „medical goods‟ to 
describe the health care inputs purchased exclusively for the children only. Similar goods if purchased for 
the adult members including the parents are put in the „other goods‟ category.     
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other goods, the income and the insurance together determine the parental budget 
constraint (a change in the former shifts, and a change in the latter rotates the 
constraint). Hence for simplicity, I call the income and the insurance „monetary‟ (or 
„tangible‟) factors, while I call all other factors stemming from parental schooling and 
having health enhancing effects to the child non-monetary (or intangible) factors. As will 
be explained later, the non-monetary factors largely stem from parental access, analysis 
and implementation of relevant information attributable to their schooling, and having 
beneficial effects on child health. We can also understand these non-monetary effects 
as the increased productive (technical) and allocative2 efficiencies resulting from higher 
level of knowledge. 
 Defining and measuring health is a complex job. The World Health Organization 
(WHO) defines health as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and 
not merely the absence of disease or infirmity (WHO, 2004). Physical and mental health 
are however strongly related, and they reinforce (or undermine when it works in the 
opposite direction) one another. Rather than one being the permanent cause or effect of 
the other, the causality between the physical and mental health may switch the direction 
any time. Also, although some factors are peculiar to physical health and others are to 
mental health, same set of many favorable (or adverse) factors may affect both physical 
and mental health favorably (or adversely) with varying degree. For instance, nutritious 
food; healthy lifestyle (physical activity, adequate sleep, healthy routine); absence of 
substance abuse; peaceful environment and mutual care (as opposed to abuses and 
                                                          
2
Productive efficiency implies that a given level of output is produced at the lowest cost (or the largest 
amount of output is achieved given the inputs, also called technical efficiency). This occurs when the 
production takes place at a point on the production possibility frontier. Allocative efficiency implies the 
inputs are chosen such that the marginal benefit and marginal cost of the last unit of input used are equal. 
This occurs when the budget constraint is tangent to the indifference curve.    
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violence); and access to and timely utilization of health care services may have 
favorable effects on both measures of health. In the case of children, the parents have 
control over most of these factors, and many of them stem from parental schooling.  
In this study, I use the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data set, and 
consider two measures of health, namely (a) perceived physical health status and (b) 
perceived mental health status of the children 17 years or under, rated by the adult 
respondents, presumably the parents. Different opinions prevail as to the validity of 
such self-rated health measures. For instance, Miilunpalo et al (1997) claim that such 
measures are good and stable, whereas Zajacova and Dowd (2011) claim that they can 
be erroneous. Nonetheless, self-rating of health is among the most frequently used and 
widely considered as a valid measure, often more effective than clinical measures, and 
despite being subjective, may include aspects that are difficult to capture clinically 
[Statistics Canada (2010)]3. I assume that the parents carefully observe their children‟s 
health, and their assessments as used in this study are reliable.  
 As the explanatory variables, I consider three categories of parental schooling, 
namely No Degree (without any formal degree); HSD/GED (a High School Diploma or a 
General Educational Development), and College Degree (Bachelor, Other, Masters or 
Doctorate degrees). Another option could be to use the years of schooling, a more 
continuous measure. Because most of the visible benefits of schooling such as 
employment prospects (which determines income and other benefits) are more likely to 
be determined by degree achieved rather than years spent in school, the three 
categorical measures as opposed to the number of years are more appropriate 
                                                          
3
Statistics Canada, 2010 (http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/82-229-x/2009001/status/phx-eng.htm, accessed 
07/14/2015) 
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measures of schooling, and are used in this study. I use maximum likelihood estimation 
(MLE) techniques, mainly the bivariate probit model using the physical and mental 
health of child simultaneously for the analysis. In particular, I justify why bivariate probit 
fits better than the individual probit models for the two health outcomes. For 
comparison, I also report the results from separate probit models as well as the ordered 
probit models. 
 Past literatures on parental schooling and child health relate mostly to developing 
countries [Cochrane (1982), Caldwell et al (1982), and Cleland et al (1988) study a 
number of developing countries; Thomas et al (1991) consider Brazil, Basu et al (2005) 
consider India; Aslam et al (2012) consider Pakistan], and there are very few studies 
that relate to the developed countries [Lindeboom (2009) and Chou et al (2010) study 
United Kingdom and Taiwan respectively using old data]. Similar studies that pertain to 
the US are somewhat rare and there are no recent studies, although there are some 
that look mostly at parental characteristics, such as parental behavior, maternal 
employment, parental job loss, and family income, which are all arguably influenced in 
some way by their schooling. This study attempts to address this vacuum in the US 
context, whereupon I explicitly look at the effects of parental schooling on both physical 
and mental health of child using the recent data (2001-2011) and try to explore the 
underlying mechanism.  
1.2 Causality from Parental Schooling to Child Health 
Grossman (1972) in his seminal work argues that education can improve the 
health production technology by enhancing the productive efficiency, whereas 
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) attribute allocative efficiency as the real factor for this 
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health benefit. Other literatures show that there are pervasive ethnic and racial 
disparities in education, and that these disparities mirror the disparities in socio-
economic status (SES), as well as health outcomes and healthcare (APA-2012); that 
widening educational disparities have the strongest effects on mortality compared to 
other SES indicators (Miech et al, 2010); and that the association between SES and 
mortality has persisted despite radical changes in the diseases and risk factors that are 
presumed to explain it, mainly because of an array of resources, such as money, 
knowledge, prestige, power, and beneficial social connections embodied in SES that 
protect health (Phelan et al, 2010).  
Researchers have made numerous efforts in the last four decades to estimate 
this causal effect from schooling to health of the individuals. As noted by Grossman 
(2004, 2008), there is compelling evidence of this causality, but establishing the causal 
link has always been a formidable task to the health economists because of two 
econometric issues. The first issue relates to the well-known reverse causality - that 
healthy people are more likely to acquire higher schooling [Edwards and Grossman 
(1979) and Case et al (2005)], and in turn would become healthier. The second issue, 
as argued by Fuchs (1982), relates to the omitted time preference, that people with 
modest discount rates (more future oriented) make larger investments in both health 
and schooling, the result being that the observed effects of schooling on health can be 
biased. It is reasonable to assume that the schooling premium on health may transcend 
well beyond the individuals and may accrue, even strongly, to their children. With child 
health as the dependent variable and parental schooling as the independent variable 
among others, the reverse causality (from child health to the parental schooling) 
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however seems unlikely in statistical sense, but there are other potential sources of 
biases to consider. 
 To start with, including only one parent‟s schooling as a predictor of child health 
can potentially give rise to biased estimates. This is because the effects might actually 
be arising from the schooling of the other parent who is missing in the equation, while at 
the same time their levels of schooling might be highly correlated4. This can be 
particularly problematic as (a) the labor market participation and reward (income and 
other benefits including health insurance) may depend largely on schooling, (b) some 
inputs such as income of father and mother are largely substitutes as regards their 
effects on child health, and health insurance of the children is usually tied with the 
employment of one of the parents, and (c) the couples after all do not just marry at 
random, but marry largely on the basis of schooling and work behavior [Pencavel 
(1998)]. Many earlier studies include the schooling of both parents in the child health 
equation, although some such as Cleland et al (1988), Bicego and Boerma (1993), and 
Basu and Stephenson (2005)] include only the mother‟s schooling. As the main sample 
in this study (called “Sample 1” henceforth), I analyze 31,756 children having both 
parents present at home, and I include both parents‟ schooling simultaneously as the 
regressors for this sample. This allows not only to compare the relative importance of 
the two parents‟ schooling, but also to address any bias that can result when only one 
parent is considered5. In addition to this sample, I also use another sample (called 
                                                          
4
 The correlation coefficient is about 0.65 in my sample. 
5
 Another option would be to develop and use a common measure of the parental schooling, which would 
capture the relevant information of both parents‟ schooling in terms of their possible roles in determining 
child health. Measures such as the highest (Flores et al, 1999), lowest, or average level of parental 
schooling are easy to think of, but they work only under restricted assumptions-that only the highest level 
matters regardless of the lowest, or only the lowest level matters regardless of the highest, or the effects 
are same as long as the total level of schooling is same.  
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“Sample 2” henceforth) with 13,524 children with single mother. For this sample, I 
include only the mother‟s schooling, and this would clearly not cause any biasness 
issue. 
 Another important issue to consider is that healthy parents, both physically and 
mentally, are more able (and possibly willing) to take better care of their children, than 
unhealthy parents. For instance, healthy parents have more productive time (such as 
time not spent on bed) available for both labor market participation and for addressing 
the special needs of the children. At the same time, parental health and their schooling 
are likely to be associated positively. In such a case, the observed effects of parental 
schooling on child health might overestimate the true effects if parental health is missing 
in the child health equation. To address this issue, I include a summary health score of 
each of the parents available in the data source (MEPS). These scores were 
constructed by the MEPS based on the individuals‟ response to the twelve questions 
that pertain to their physical and mental health. Also, as discussed in the ensuing 
paragraphs, the inclusion of parental health in the child health equation can have other 
advantageous byproducts relevant for this study. 
 Many have documented that the parents and their offspring may share health 
determining genetic traits. For instance, obese parents are more likely to have obese 
children due to obesity-predisposing genotype present in them [Herbert et al, (2006)]. 
The genetic factors can have even stronger roles due to assortative mating among the 
parents [Hebebrand (2000)]. Inheritable conditions such as type-2 diabetes, 
hypertension, heart-diseases, breast cancers in women and many others largely do not 
appear during the childhood, but others such as hemophilia, sickle-cell disease, color 
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blindness, and neurofibromatosis can be observed among the children6. Unfortunately 
information about the genetic factors (and health endowment from the past) are not 
available in this data set. As Grossman (2008) has pointed out, uncoupling the causal 
links associated with genetic and behavioral factors is very difficult, and breaking into 
this complicated bundle is a challenge for future research. Given that genetic factors 
can simultaneously influence the parental health and child health, and that parental 
health and parental schooling are positively associated, including parental health in the 
child health equation becomes even more crucial. Fortunately, parental health is not a 
major explanatory variable in this study, but one should be cautious while interpreting 
the observed effects of parental health, as they may actually be capturing some of these 
genetic effects (rather than the effects of productive time available because of better 
parental health). Data permitting, use of an appropriate instrument or studying identical 
twins could be some options to segregate the genetic effects from the time effects7, but 
this is beyond the scope of this study. 
 The unobserved „innate ability‟ (which is usually conceived in terms of 
intelligence, smartness, or peoples‟ “better” production functions) might also make some 
people be simultaneously better at several things with least costs expended. For 
instance, innate ability may help them achieve higher level of schooling during their 
school age, and be good at raising the kids and achieving better child health later. 
Although „innate ability‟ among individuals is widely regarded as a potential source of 
                                                          
6
 These inheritable conditions are broadly categorized into four groups-(1) Autosomal Recessive; (2) 
Autosomal Dominant; (3) X-linked Recessive; and (4) X-linked Dominant. The term “Recessive” refers to 
the case where both parents must carry the abnormal genes for the conditions to be present in a child, 
and “Dominant” refers to the case where only one parent‟s carrying the abnormal genes is sufficient to 
cause the condition. “X” refers to the X-chromosome (one of the two sex-chromosomes) and “Autosomal” 
refers to the other 22 pairs of human chromosomes.  
7
 A panel data analysis can be another option, but is not applicable in this case as many variables 
including the major explanatory variable (parental schooling) are observed only once in the MEPS.  
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bias in the study of monetary returns to schooling, the importance of parental „innate 
ability‟ in determining the child health is not very clear. But given that innate ability 
somehow matters, parental health variables should already capture some of these 
unobserved „ability‟ traits (because those who can take better care of their children can 
also take better care of themselves). In any case, the inclusion of parental health in the 
child health equation is likely to account (at least partially) for this „innate ability‟ bias.   
 Another key factor that may simultaneously influence the level of schooling of the 
individuals and the health of their children is their general preferences or attitudes 
towards life. Optimistic and prudent individuals are likely to be more future oriented 
(have modest time discount rates), and may strive for the best things in life. By nature, 
they may invest more resources for the acquisition of higher schooling, and later on the 
better health of their children, among others. If this is the case, then the observed 
positive effects of their schooling on their children‟s health may not be causal, and 
rather be a matter of their choice. In contrast, preferences and attitudes are not static, 
and are rather developed and polished in the course of and as a consequence of 
schooling and experience (due to change in their values, resulting optimism, better 
reasoning, or a sense of knowing what is expected of oneself in the home and society), 
then the observed effect of schooling on child health is largely causal. There is some 
evidence that preferences and attitudes are largely shaped by the level of schooling and 
experience8. The data set used in this study lacks suitable variables to control for the 
preferences or attitude, but along the same line of the argument made previously, it can 
be said that some of these unobserved factors will be captured by the parental health 
                                                          
8
 “….schools and individual teachers within schools are a major influence, alongside the family, the media 
and the peer group, on developing values of children and young people, and thus of society at large”- 
[Halstead et al (1996)].   
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variables themselves (those who value schooling and the health of their children highly, 
probably also value their own health highly). I presume that the resulting biases due to 
these unobserved factors, if any, are not too large. 
 Researchers also argue that family background might influence both the parental 
schooling and the child health. The notion of family background is not easy to put in 
words, but it may include place of origin, race and ethnicity, history and general 
practices (religious, occupational, financial, educational, clinical, criminal, marital, food, 
health care etc.), family structure (joint, nuclear, household size, fertility rate etc.), and 
essentially everything that pertains to the family. For instance, better schooling, and 
better nutritional and healthy practices may just be a matter of tradition for some 
families, in which case the observed effects of parental schooling on child health may 
not be purely causal. To explore this issue further, I conceive the family background in 
terms of an ever evolving continuum, rather than a static entity. For convenience, I split 
the family background into two compartments: (a) as what is inherited by the parents 
prior to their adulthood, over which they do not have any significant control or influence; 
and (b) as what is modified or acquired by themselves henceforth - such as in the latter 
stages of their schooling and after.  
The various practices developed relatively recently, current associations with the 
people, current neighborhood characteristics, and even what is consciously carried over 
from the first compartment as being „worth retaining‟ belong to the second compartment. 
Unlike the people in less developed countries, where the life style remains relatively 
static in terms of occupation, practices, values and even location throughout a longer 
period, the US societies are more dynamic and individuals are likely to make a lot of 
11 
 
 
changes over what they had inherited. Thus, after already accounting for some socio-
demographic, geographic and parental behavioral (such as smoking) and health factors, 
I presume that little will be left in the former compartment of the background continuum 
to affect both the parental schooling and current child health significantly. This would 
mean that most of the working of the unobserved background on child health, if any, 
should be recent in origin, and should belong to the latter compartment of the 
background continuum. Clearly, if schooling has some influence over this part of 
background continuum, this will be captured by and reflected in the non-monetary 
effects of parental schooling. Under these scenarios, I presume that the unobserved 
family background would not significantly distort the observed effects of parental 
schooling on child health.   
 Lastly, it is reasonable to assume autocorrelation on the error terms as the 
siblings may share wide range of these family characteristics - demographic, economic, 
genetic (which may determine their initial health endowment), environment, family 
background, parental preferences, parental health, parental behavior, and most 
importantly the perception of their health status by the parents. To address this issue, I 
cluster the regressions at the household level. Also, the non-linear nature of the model 
specifications and the estimation technique (MLE) used in this study are inherently 
heteroskedastic, which I address by obtaining the robust standard errors.  
1.3 Data, Estimation Techniques and Main Findings 
The study uses ten panels (6-15) of the MEPS that cover the years 2001-2011, 
and employs maximum likelihood estimation technique under bivariate probit model 
(along with the estimation of probit and ordered probit models for comparison). The two 
12 
 
 
dependent variables used namely the „perceived physical health status‟ and „perceived 
mental health status‟ of the child are originally available in five categories, namely Poor, 
Fair, Good, Very Good, and Excellent.  I merge these into two categories, namely Very 
Good/Excellent (very good or excellent) and Poor/Fair/Good (poor or fair or good) for 
the bivariate probit (and probit) specification9. For the ordered probit specification, I 
consider three categories of child health, namely Very Good/Excellent, Good and 
Poor/Fair. 
 The bivariate probit model, which uses both the physical and mental health 
status of child simultaneously, addresses a very crucial issue pertinent to this study. As 
discussed earlier, physical and mental health of a child are likely to be jointly 
determined by many common factors - both observed (parental schooling, child‟s age 
and gender, parental income, child‟s health insurance etc.), and unobserved (genes, 
family background, lifestyle, community characteristics, parental preferences and 
perceptions etc.). Technically, this means that the errors in the two child health 
equations (with the physical health status and the mental health status as the 
dependent variables) are likely to be correlated. In such a case, instead of estimating 
the two separate probit equations for the two dependent variables, estimating a 
bivariate probit model makes more efficient use of the available information - that a 
common set of observed factors and unobserved factors in the background play a role 
in influencing the two dependent variables. A bivariate normal distribution of the two 
error terms is assumed, which yields a more appropriate joint density. This allows to 
measure the joint and conditional probabilities pertaining to the different levels of the 
                                                          
9
 Flores et al (1999) use similar merging. Another option would be to merge „Good‟ with „excellent or very 
good‟, but doing so highly skews the distribution, with most of the observations in this category and less 
than 3% in the other category in the data used. 
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two dependent variables (such as probability that a given child has best physical health 
status, given that he/she has best mental health status), should such a correlation 
between the errors exist. The likelihood ratio or Wald or Lagrange multiplier statistic can 
test for the significance of this correlation. Failure to reject the null hypothesis (that the 
correlation in the error terms is statistically zero) would indicate no need for a joint 
bivariate model, and instead separate probit models would suffice. The estimated 
correlations in this study are very large (well above 0.8. in all the regressions involved), 
and highly significant, implying that bivariate probit model is more appropriate than 
estimating the two probit models separately.  
 Finally, I draw the conclusions about the relative importance of the monetary 
(income and insurance) and the non-monetary effects of parental schooling on child 
health by analyzing (a) the estimated magnitudes and significance of the parental 
income and child‟s health insurance type in the model equations, and (b) the changes in 
the marginal effects of parental schooling with the successive inclusion of these two 
monetary factors in the equations.  
The results indicate significant positive effects of parental schooling on both 
measures of child health, and that the non-monetary effects of parental schooling are 
far more important (about four-fifths of the total effects) than the monetary effects. 
Furthermore, consistent with some earlier studies, maternal schooling plays a bigger 
role on child health than paternal schooling. For instance, relative to having No Degree, 
mother‟s having an HSD/GED (and a College Degree) increases the probability that the 
reported physical health status of her child is very good or excellent by about 5.2% (and 
8.6%) respectively in terms of the non-monetary effects. Similar probabilities for the 
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father‟s schooling are about 3.6% (and 5.6%) respectively. For mental health, these 
probabilities are about 4.6% and 7.1% for mother‟s schooling, and 2.5% and 3.6% for 
father‟s schooling respectively. The total effects of parental schooling are about 2 
percentage points higher than these non-monetary effects, implying that the combined 
monetary effects of income and insurance stemming from parental schooling are about 
2% in terms of raising the probability that the child health is Very Good/Excellent. Also, 
the effects of parental schooling on child health are particularly highest for the Hispanic, 
followed by Black. 
1.4 Study Limitations  
This study has several limitations. First, it considers only the parents-rated child 
health outcomes as the dependent variables and ignores other possible measures such 
as outcomes measured clinically by the health care professionals. If possible, it would 
be a good idea to have measures that incorporate both the parental perceptions as well 
as clinical measures for more reliable results, both of which are beyond the scope of 
this study.  
Second, I consider only formal schooling of the parents.  This assumes that 
schooling is a homogeneous attribute in terms of their effects on child health, which is 
surely not the case. For instance, parents in health care professions would probably 
have greater impacts of their schooling on the health of their children than those in other 
professions. Even among the parents not in health care area, the impacts of their 
schooling would still be diverse based on their personal inclinations and skills.  
Third, the study presumes that the more important non-monetary effects of 
parental schooling operate through better access to and use of relevant health care 
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information and the resulting efficiency in the allocation of health care inputs. Due to 
lack of relevant variables pertaining to the acquisition of information and the complexity 
involved in this process, the study is unable to delineate the exact mechanism by which 
this non-monetary channel operates.  
Fourth, the data set lacks many relevant explanatory variables such as the health 
endowment of child, family background, and parental tastes and their innate ability. The 
presence of these variables could enhance the results.  
Fifth, it is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the mechanisms of the 
observed effects of various other factors included in the equations. For instance, the 
racial and geographical differences on child health as well as the favorable effects of 
time (benefits of being in the recent panels) are not explored here.  
 Lastly, the magnitudes of the beneficial effects of parental schooling as 
observed in this study pertain only to this specific data set for U.S. population. It cannot 
be generalized for other societies and contexts.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW   
Most of the available literatures on the effects of parental schooling on child 
health are based on the developing countries, although two relatively recent works 
analyze old data from United Kingdom [Lindeboom et al (2009)] and Taiwan [Chou et al 
(2010)]. Studies based on the data from the United States are not available, although 
one [Flores et al (1999)] addresses it as a byproduct of a broader project analyzing 
ethnic disparities. Many do look at the effects of some parental or household 
characteristics, which are arguably closely influenced by parental schooling in one way 
or other. 
Cochrane et al (1982) extensively review earlier studies and data on 33 
developing countries, and find that maternal education in those countries is closely 
related to child health, measured either by nutritional status or by infant and child 
mortality, and that the effect of father‟s education is about one half that of mother‟s. 
Using cross tabulation and stepwise regressions, they suggest  that  income  
differences  among the educated parents cannot  explain  all the  health effects  to the 
children, or  perhaps even  as much  as  half of, and more of these effects are 
attributable to the increased in information through schooling.  
Caldwell and McDonald (1982) use multiple classification analysis on the data 
from the World Fertility Survey in ten third world countries to test the  conclusion based 
on a Nigerian study,  that  maternal  education  is  important  in  reducing  child  
mortality. They find that the impact of parental education in reducing the probability of 
dying by age 2 in those countries is greater than both income factors and access to 
health facilities combined, maternal education is more important than paternal 
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education, the step from primary to secondary schooling is more important than that 
from illiteracy to primary schooling, and rural/urban differentials are of small importance 
once parental schooling has been controlled. They further note that the age and sex 
differentiations in power, decision-making and benefits within the larger family are 
reduced when schooling brings about a new family system in which women and children 
are allocated higher priorities in terms of care and allocation of food and in which 
parents can make decisions about health and child care without reference to their 
elders. 
Wolfe and Behrman (1987) use standard individual reduced-form estimates on a 
special adult sister sample to study the impact of mother‟s schooling on child health and 
nutrition in Nicaragua. In order to explore the question of whether the unobserved 
mother‟s childhood background related characteristics (such as motivation and ability) 
influence the estimated impacts of mother‟s schooling, they control for the 
characteristics shared by the adult sisters. For the child health outcome, they use the 
infant and child mortality rate; and three anthropometric measures, viz. height, weight, 
and upper arm circumference standardized for age and gender for a randomly-selected 
child five or younger. For the nutritional intake, they use the household intake of calories 
for the week preceding the survey, and the average number of months the woman had 
breastfed her children, standardized for age and gender composition. Their findings 
suggest that the mother‟s schooling does not improve substantially their children‟s 
health outcomes, though it does increase their nutrient intakes. 
Cleland and Ginneken et al (1988) review the earlier studies and analyze the old 
and new data pertaining to a wide range of developing countries to assess the various 
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mechanisms which could explain how mother‟s education influences the health and 
survivorship of her children. Using the multiple classification analysis, they find that on 
average each one-year increment in mother‟s  education corresponds with a 7-9% 
decline in under-5 mortality, and that education  exercises  a stronger influence in early  
and  later  childhood  than in infancy. Two of the possible intervening variables, namely 
reproductive health patterns and more equitable treatment of sons and daughters play 
relatively minor roles, and economic advantages associated with education (income, 
water and latrine facilities, housing quality etc.) account for about one-half of the overall 
education-mortality relationship. They report that the influence of the use of preventive 
and curative health services as a group of intervening variables is complex and variable, 
and that there are countries whose primary health services are so weak that they have 
no effect on the health of mothers and children, and there are others whose health 
services may tend to accentuate educational disparities because of differential access. 
Thomas et al (1991) use the data from the 1986 Brazilian Demographic and 
Health Survey to explore the mechanisms through which the maternal education affects 
child health conditional on age and sex. In particular, they use the reduced form 
regression of child health on the parents‟ educational level, and investigate three ways 
maternal education might affect child health: income augmenting effects, information 
processing effects, and interactive effects with community services. They find that 
almost all the impacts of maternal education on child height can be explained by 
indicators of access to information, namely reading papers, watching television, and 
listening to the radio. In urban areas, whether the mother is semi-literate accounts for 
some of the education effects, and there are significant interactions between maternal 
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education and the availability of community services, indicating that education and 
community health services are substitutes. 
Using the survey data from seventeen developing countries, Bicego and Boerma 
(1993) examine the effects of mother‟s education on neonatal mortality, postneonatal 
mortality (l-23 months), stunting (3-23 months), underweight status (3-23 months), and 
non-use of selected health services namely non-use of tetanus toxoid during pregnancy 
and non-use of antenatal services. They employ Cox hazards regressions (for 
postneonatal mortality) and multivariate logistic regressions (for the rest of the 
dependent variables) as their estimation techniques. Consistent with earlier studies, 
they find that education advantage in survival is less pronounced during the neonatal 
period than after. They find strong but varying education effects on post-neonatal risk, 
undernutrition during the 3-23 month period, and non-use of health services, and that a 
large  part of these associations are the result of education‟s strong link to household 
economics. Differential use of basic health services is closely tied to a mother‟s 
educational level, but does little to explain the education advantage in child health and 
survival. 
Shariff and Ahn (1995) use two-stage ordinary least squares method to evaluate 
the effects of mother‟s education on long-term and short-term health measures (namely 
height-for-age and weight-for-height respectively) of the children less than five years of 
age in Uganda. They report significant positive effects of mother‟s schooling on long-
term height-for-age measure, and that the effects are stronger in urban areas than in 
rural areas, and benefits are greater for sons than for daughters. However the effects 
are not significant with the short-term weight-for-height measure, although there are 
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positive effects of radio ownership on weight-for-height, which are much greater among 
the uneducated mothers. 
Using the 1978 Intrafamily Food Distribution and Feeding Practices Survey 
dataset and the census data from Bangladesh, Bishai (1996) employs a two stage least 
squares fixed effects model to explore how parental schooling affects child health 
through its interactions with child care time. They use lagged childcare time, resource 
allocation and child health as the instruments for the first differences of these same 
endogenous variables. They report that the schooling of teenage brothers and fathers 
has the highest marginal productivity for child health, than that of mothers and 
grandmothers. If economic opportunity draws mothers away from childcare, the 
presence of other household members with higher schooling levels offers the potential 
for an improvement in the overall quality of childcare time. They further note that the 
households in their study failed to set the marginal labor product of child health for each 
of the caregivers equal, implying that the quality of childcare may not be the 
household‟s sole concern in determining time allocation. 
Flores et al (1999) analyze the US data from National Health Interview Survey to 
explore whether the ethnic disparities for children in demographics, health status, and 
use of services are explained by differences in family income and the highest level of 
parental education at home. Using a sample of 99,268 children from 1989-91 NHIS 
surveys, they employ a logistic model for the health status, and ordinary least squares 
on the number of days on bed as the dependent variables. They report that non-white 
children average fewer doctor visits and more likely to have excessive intervals between 
visits, and that Native American, Black and Hispanic children are poorest, least healthy, 
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and have least well-educated parents. They find that a parent‟s having graduated from 
high school (as opposed to not graduated) is associated with an odds ratio of 0.89 
(implying a probability of 0.47) for having a suboptimal health status, and is associated 
with an additional 0.018 days (about 26 minutes) in bed in the past 12 months. They 
conclude that major ethnic groups and subgroups differ strikingly in demographics, 
health and use of services, and that most disparities persist even after adjustment for 
family income, parental education, and other covariates. 
Using the data from the 1992/93 Indian National Family Health Survey, Basu and 
Stephenson et al (2005) investigate twenty-two child health outcomes in India 
representing child mortality and morbidity, illness management, service utilization and 
health behaviors. They employ ordinary least squares for continuous outcomes and 
logistic regression for binary outcomes, and find that maternal education is a significant 
correlate of each of the outcomes, and even low levels of education increase child 
survival prospects and health-related behaviors, except for neonatal mortality and the 
effective management of diarrhea. Speculating on some of the possible mechanisms, 
they suggest that it may be the „hidden curriculum‟ values of discipline and obedience of 
authority rather than female autonomy that account for these impressive findings. 
Using the data from the National Child Development Study, which is a 
longitudinal study of 17,000 babies born in Great Britain in the week of 3–9 March 1958, 
Lindeboom et al (2009) explore the effects of parental schooling on child health at birth, 
namely the birth weight and an indicator for whether the child experienced an illness in 
the first week of life. They exclude twins from their sample since their birth weight is not 
comparable with singletons. To identify the causal impact of parental schooling on child 
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health, they use the regression-discontinuity techniques looking at the exogenous 
variation in parental education induced by the schooling reform in the UK in 1947, which 
raised the minimum school leaving age. The schooling reform provided a natural 
experiment to them, whereby the individuals close to the reform could be regarded as 
similar except for exposure to the reform. They find that increasing the school leaving 
age by 1 year in UK had little effect on the health of their offspring, although it did 
improve economic opportunities by reducing financial difficulties among households. 
Chou et al (2010) use two-stage least squares method on the data from Taiwan 
to analyze the causal effects of parental schooling on child health. After Taiwan 
extended the policy of compulsory schooling from six years to nine years in 1968, many 
new junior high schools were opened at a differential rate among regions of the country 
in the period 1968-1973. The authors form the treatment and control groups of women 
or men who, in 1968, were age 12 or younger on the one hand and between the ages of 
13 and 20 or 25 on the other hand. Within each region, they exploit variations across 
cohorts in new junior high school openings to construct an instrument for schooling, and 
use it to estimate the causal effects of mother's or father's schooling on the incidence of 
low birthweight and mortality of infants born to women in the treatment and control 
groups, or the wives of men in these groups in the period 1978-1999. They find that the 
parents' schooling caused favorable infant health outcomes, and that the increase in 
schooling associated with the new policy and opening of 150 new schools saved almost 
1 infant life in 1,000 live births. 
Aslam and Kingdon (2012) use ordinary least squares and instrumental variable 
techniques on the survey data from 2006 and 2007 in Pakistan to investigate the 
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relationship between parental schooling on the one hand, and child health outcomes 
(height and weight) and parental health-seeking behavior (immunization status of 
children), on the other. In particular, they use a set of “pathways” variables through 
which parental education impacts child health, such as whether the mother is a labor 
force participant, her family‟s per capita income, whether she has exposure to the 
media, and her extent of autonomy within the household as the proxy for the mother‟s 
unobserved traits such as the independence, attitudes, values, and preference. They 
find that father‟s education is positively associated with the immunization decision which 
works through the channel of increased health knowledge, and that mother‟s education 
and empowerment is more critically associated with longer term health outcomes such 
as child‟s height and weight. 
As mentioned earlier, literatures that explicitly examine the effects of parental 
schooling on child health using the US data rare, but there are a few that look at 
parental or household characteristics, which are arguably closely influenced by parental 
schooling. For instance, Case et al (2002) finds that a broader set of policies, that target 
parents‟ health related behavior, are as important as health insurance coverage and 
advances in medical treatment. Dooley et al (2007) find that there is little evidence of an 
effect of income on behavioral–emotional scores of the children, but parenting style is 
found to have a consistent impact on child outcomes. Fairbrother et al (2010) finds that 
children with private health insurance are more than six and a half times as likely to lose 
coverage in the three months after one or both of their parents loses a job, compared to 
children whose parents remain employed. The likelihood of losing the coverage is 
particularly high for the poorest and Hispanics. Lindo (2011) finds that father‟s job 
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losses have significant negative effects on their infant children‟s health, and that they 
reduce birth weights by approximately four and a half percent. Some studies that 
particularly look at the work-time tradeoffs and the effect of mother‟s employment on 
child health have interesting findings. For instance, Anderson et al (2003) report that a 
child is more likely to be overweight if his/her mother worked more hours per week over 
the child‟s life, and the intensity is somewhat higher for family of higher socioeconomic 
status. Gennetian et al (2010) observes that maternal employment has a modest 
adverse effect on the health of low-income, elementary school-aged children. Morril 
(2011) shows that maternal employment increases the probability of adverse health 
events such as overnight hospitalizations, asthma episodes, and injuries/poisonings for 
children ages 7–17 by nearly 200 percent. It is noteworthy that all of these studies 
consider only maternal employment, not her education, and therefore do not rule out the 
net benefits of the maternal education arising from the additional monetary and non-
monetary inputs, even after allowing for their work time. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
I propose that parental schooling can influence child health through three major 
channels, namely Income, Insurance, and Non-monetary, and the beneficial effects they 
carry are hence termed as Income, Insurance, and Non-monetary effects respectively. 
Income determines the ability of the parents to spend on medical goods (e.g. a doctor 
visit or a prescription medicine) and other goods (e.g. food or internet) having health 
enhancing effects to the children. Health insurance alters the effective price of the 
medical goods thereby determining the access to and quality of health care. Not to be 
confused with the error term in the regression model, all other factors stemming from 
parental schooling and having health enhancing effects to the children are collectively 
termed as non-monetary factors. Thus, non-monetary effects here are essentially the 
effects of parental schooling on child health when the parental income and health 
insurance type of child are already accounted for.  
In terms of choosing between the medical and other goods, the income and the 
insurance together determine the parental budget constraint either by shifting or rotating 
it respectively. For this reason, I call the income and the insurance factors „monetary‟ (or 
tangible). As I will explain, the non-monetary factors are largely intangible and are 
related to parental access, analysis and implementation of relevant information 
attributable to their schooling and having beneficial effects on child health. The ensuing 
sections elaborate these three factors and their effects, and possible interaction 
between them. 
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3.1.1 Income Effects 
Empirical studies pioneered by Mincer (1974), and developed by countless 
others including Griliches (1977), Card (2001), Psacharopoulos (2004), and Carneiro et 
al (2011) all reaffirm the importance of human capital theory, and establish that 
schooling has positive monetary returns. An increase in parental income shifts the 
household budget constraint outward, so that more of all necessary resources can be 
purchased. Higher income can manifest as better child health in several ways. The 
households can consume nutritious, organic, and fresh foods, as opposed to relatively 
cheaper fast foods with little nutritional value, often high in fat, sugar, salt, and calories. 
The households can afford to pay for the health care inputs for prevention and treatment 
of diseases such as the prescriptions and over-the-counter medicines, first-aid kits, and 
various services of the health care providers (to be purchased either with co-pays 
and/or deductibles in the presence of health insurance, or out-of-pocket expenditure in 
the absence).  
Higher income can make private health insurance affordable in the absence of 
other public or employer sponsored health insurance. Living in a healthy community, a 
clean home, and high quality schools for the healthy development of the kids may be 
affordable. Conceivably, parental income should have positive impacts on child health in 
general. It is also true that income above some threshold can make some marginal 
households ineligible for public health insurance, resulting into some negative effects. 
Higher income is nonetheless desirable as it opens up other avenues by making other 
resources accessible. 
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3.1.2 Insurance Effects 
According to the US Census Bureau, about 55% of people had employment-
based health insurance in 2012, while 9% had other private health insurance, 33% had 
public health insurance (mainly Medicaid and Medicare), and 15% were without any 
health insurance. The Kaiser Family Foundation reports that 57% of all firms, 99% of all 
large firms (with 200 or more workers), and 57% of all small firms (with 3-199 workers) 
offered health benefits in 2013. The share of employer sponsored health insurance in 
the total health insurance is thus substantial. According to College Board,  68% of four-
year college graduates in 2008 working at least half-time in the private sector were 
covered by employer-provided health insurance, whereas only 50% of high school 
graduates had this benefit. The Economist (Sunday, April 15th 2012) reports that when 
the economic downturn hit the OECD countries in 2009, on average 84% of university 
graduates were in work, compared with 74% of those who did not go to university but 
studied beyond the minimum school-leaving age, and 56% of those who did neither10. 
Based on the US data from the CPS and the 1980 Census, Riddell and Xueda (2011) 
find that schooling significantly increases re-employment success for unemployed 
workers. Considerable such evidence indicates that schooling increases the job 
prospects, and consequently increases the probability of acquiring an employer 
sponsored health insurance. In many cases, the employer-sponsored plans cover for 
the spouse and the dependent children.11   
                                                          
10
 Retrieved from http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/data/incpovhlth/2012/highlights.html; 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/8466-employer-health-benefits-
2013_summary-of-findings2.pdf ; https://trends.collegeboard.org/education-pays/figures-tables/health-
insurance-coverage-education-level-1979-2008; and http://www.economist.com/node/21529095 
 
11 
The age of the dependent children covered under the parent‟s plan has increased from under 18 years 
to 26 years under the new Affordable Care Act. 
28 
 
 
Health insurance lowers the effective price of the medical goods such as office 
visits and tests, emergency visits, and prescription medicines for both prevention and 
treatment of conditions. The extent of the reduction in the price of these inputs is a 
function of many factors such as premium, copays, and deductibles. A lower (or even 
zero under some public coverage such as Medicaid and CHIP) price of the medical 
goods means a higher effective income that can be spent on both medical and other 
goods. Technically, the role of a health insurance is to rotate the household budget 
constraint outward in such a way that more of the medical and other goods (a) become 
affordable and (b) will be purchased, whenever needed. The consequence of such a 
price change in one good on the household‟s overall consumption bundle is usually 
illustrated by splitting the total effects of price change into the income and substitution 
effects. 
3.1.3 Non-Monetary Effects 
The non-monetary effects, by definition, are the beneficial impacts on child health 
of everything else directly attributable to the parental schooling, but other than the 
parental income and the child‟s health insurance type. As the results will show later, 
these effects are larger than the first two combined. I presume that the non-monetary 
effects, in one way or other, relate to parental information stemming from their schooling 
and its translation into better child health through three distinct processes - (a) parental 
access to relevant information, (b) their ability to analyze or process the information, 
and (c) their willingness to implement the information. Access to information in this 
regard is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition. For instance, many alcoholics 
presumably know the adverse effects of alcohol on their own health and the 
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psychological impacts to their children. However, only those who do not drink or have 
already quit drinking can gain effectively from this information. Similarly, merely the 
knowledge of the unhealthy effects of junk food does not yield any benefit to the 
children, unless it is practiced at home.   
 The purview of information is large. It may encompass the nutritional content in 
food, human physiology, prevalent and seasonal health conditions, preventive and 
curative cares available in the market, printed medicinal instructions, a television talk 
show and so forth. The mechanism of the acquisition and use of information is complex, 
and is beyond the scope of this study. Here I simply assume that formal schooling 
(through the course material as well as through the entire process and as a byproduct of 
schooling) is a major source of information that can be relevant to child health. Similarly, 
I assume that schooling enhances the ability of the individuals to analyze available 
information and state of affairs surrounding them, and thus prioritize the issues at hand.  
Finally and most importantly, I assume that schooling brings about positive 
attitudes and tastes/preferences among the individuals in terms of developing healthy 
behaviors and willingness to implement the acquired information in day to day life in 
accordance with their priorities. For instance, the parents with higher levels of schooling 
may be better informed of the health care system; may know how to seek services 
when in need; may read, understand, and follow the instructions; may pick up relevant 
ideas from a casual television show; may explore necessary resources in the internet; 
may take appropriate preventive care and seek timely care for their children in the event 
of any health shocks; and may help their children develop healthy habits and eat 
healthy food.   
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 Whereas parental income and health insurance type of child determine the 
parental budget constraint, the non-monetary factors influence the parental utility 
function12 - either by influencing their tastes/preferences directly, or by affecting the 
child health production function (which yields utility to the parents). In other words, the 
non-monetary factors are responsible for determining the parental indifference curves 
and the corresponding effects reflect the increased productive (or technical) and 
allocative efficiencies that originate in the parental schooling and manifest into better 
child health. Here, productive (or technical) efficiency refers to a situation, whereby a 
given level of child health is produced at the lowest cost (or highest level of child health 
is achieved given these inputs are affordable and available to the parents). This occurs 
when the child health production takes place at a point on the production possibility 
frontier. Similarly allocative efficiency refers to a situation whereby the medical and 
other inputs (including time) are allocated by the parents in such a way that the marginal 
benefit (in parental utility) and marginal cost of the last unit used are equal. This occurs 
when the parental budget constraint is tangent to the indifference curve through the 
efficient allocation of all inputs. In other words, the parents with higher level of schooling 
are assumed to have better knowledge of the true nature of the child health production 
function, value child health highly, and are better at optimization. 
3.1.4 Interplay between Income and Insurance Effects  
 It is crucial to understand that the income and insurance effects of parental 
schooling can overlap or interact in subtle ways. For instance, an increase in parental 
income (which shifts the budget constraint outward) can be spent on necessary items, 
                                                          
12
 For simplicity, the budget constraint and the utility function of both parents are combined into one. 
Furthermore, as explained in the next section, child health forms an input to the parental utility, and the 
parents aim at maximizing their own utility, rather than maximizing child health, given the constraints.   
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including possibly a private health insurance for the family members in the absence of 
other health insurance. The number of individuals without a health insurance has been 
declining, and it is mandatory to have health insurance under the current Affordable 
Care Act. But pertaining to the data set used in this study (2001-2011), choosing not to 
have a health insurance could sometimes be a matter of parental choice (decided 
possibly based on income and other factors), as they could still visit the emergency 
room, or just pay out-of-pocket when they faced serious medical issues. Given health 
insurance, a higher income on the other hand makes the co-pays, and the deductibles 
more affordable, so that more of the medical goods can be purchased when needed. 
Similarly, health insurance reduces the effective price of medical goods (which rotates 
the budget constraint outward and manifests into income and substitution effects), so 
that more of both medical and non-medical goods can be purchased. On the other 
hand, the public health insurances such as Medicaid and CHIP are typically available 
only to low income households. Thus marginal households with income just above 
some threshold may be ineligible for public health insurance and lack private health 
insurance simultaneously, and thus have decreased access to medical goods relative to 
their counterparts who have slightly low income and have public health insurance. Or 
they may face a severe tradeoff with other goods because of reduced purchasing 
power, should they decide to buy a private insurance. To put it simply, many attributes 
of income and health insurance tend to overlap and interact in terms of their effects to 
child health.  
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3.1.5 Diagrammatic Illustrations 
Omitting the details which I more fully discuss in section 3.2, Figure 1 below 
succinctly summarizes the mechanism just described above. The parents spend their 
budget on the medical goods „M‟ and all other goods „X‟. They get utility directly from „X‟ 
but only indirectly from „M‟ in the form of better child health „H‟ resulting from these latter 
inputs. The child health is a function of medical goods „M‟, parental schooling „Sch‟, and 
other factors „Z‟. 
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Figure 1: Effects of Higher Parental Schooling on Budget Constraint and 
Child Health 
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The parents with lower level of schooling „Sch1‟ are at equilibrium where the 
lower indifference curve „U1‟ is tangent to their budget constraint (lower panel), and end 
up with a lower level of child health H1 (upper panel) as determined by their schooling 
and allocation of their available budget. Similar parents but with the higher level of 
schooling „Sch2‟ would have higher income, and would face lower effective price of the 
medical inputs „M‟ (due to the access to health insurance), and thus would have a 
budget constraint shifted outward as shown (lower panel). This would not only allow 
them to buy more of both goods „M‟ and „X‟ as they attain equilibrium at the tangency of 
higher level indifference curve „U2‟ and the corresponding higher level (outer) budget 
constraint, but also their child health production curve would shift outward (upper panel) 
due to the non-monetary effects of schooling, and eventually they would attain a higher 
level of child health „H2‟. 
Figure 2 below (not drawn to the scale) illustrates the theoretical decomposition 
of the total effects of parental schooling on child health into the income, insurance, and 
non-monetary effects. The rectangle represents the effects of theoretically all possible 
factors responsible for child health, whereas the circle inside it represents the total 
effects of parental schooling only. The two overlapping ovals represent the role of 
income and health insurance, where the figure accounts for the fact that some of the 
factors contributing to income and insurance may actually originate outside the purview 
of parental schooling. For clarity, the terms income and insurance effects in this study 
refer to the effects of income and insurance attributable to the parental schooling only, 
represented by the parts of the two ovals lying inside the circle. Also, in line with the 
foregoing discussion, the overlapping of the two ovals reflects the fact that income and 
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insurance effects may actually overlap due to their interactive and substitutive nature in 
certain ways. Thus the measured income (or insurance) effects may actually capture a 
small portion of the insurance (or income) effects. In other words, the sum of the 
separate income effects and insurance effects may be greater than the total monetary 
(income and insurance) effects of parental schooling by the amount of the overlapping 
parts of the two ovals. Clearly, the non-monetary effects are represented by the portion 
of the circle not included in either oval. Therefore, the sum of the separate income, 
insurance, and non-monetary effects may be greater the total effects by the overlapping 
effects of income and insurance. However, the sum of the monetary and non-monetary 
effects is equal to the total effects of parental schooling.  
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Figure 2: Theoretical Decomposition of Total Effects into Income, Insurance, and  
Non-monetary Effects 
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All other factors not attributable to parental schooling (part of the rectangle not in 
the circle) may affect child health either through their impacts on the income or health 
insurance (parts of the ovals not in the circle) or on other factors (part of the rectangle 
not in the circle or the two ovals). Correspondingly, these other factors contribute 
partially either in the parental budget constraint or the parental indifference curves (by 
affecting parental utility). For instance, non-labor income, family inheritance, and prices 
of medical and other goods may affect the parental budget constraint. The time and 
geographical location may affect the budget constraint by affecting both income (via 
general labor market prospects) and the relative prices, whereas demographic 
characteristics (race and gender for instance) may affect both budget constraint (via 
income) and indifference curves (via preference/tradition and child health production). 
The behavioral factors of the parents and the community characteristics may largely 
affect the indifference curves (via child health production).      
3.2 A Household’s Optimization Problem 
I use a variation of the conceptual model developed by Huffman et al (2006) to 
study the economics of obesity-related mortality among high income countries. 
Consider a hypothetical household which gets utilities from various sources, and has a 
utility function13 - 
U = U (N, S, L, H)  (1) where, 
N = Aggregate health neutral goods, which comprises all goods consumed by the 
household that give utility to the parents, but are health neutral to the children, such as 
a movie show or an ipod.  Neutrality in this context is used in a narrow and relative 
sense - for example, a good is health neutral if it does not directly affect the health of 
                                                          
13
 It is assumed that these factors are measured for a given period, such as in daily or weekly basis. 
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the children, although it may affect the health of other family members. For instance, 
purchased medical goods for the adult family members (over 17 years) such as a 
prescription for cholesterol consumed by the father, are also included in „N‟. Without the 
loss of generality, I assume that UN > 0; and UNN < 0.  
S = Aggregate health sensitive goods, which comprises all goods consumed by the 
household other than the medical goods consumed by the children (described shortly), 
and which affect the health of the children favorably (e.g. food moderately eaten by a 
child or flu shot taken by her mother) or adversely (e.g. smoking by the parents). I 
assume that US > 0; and USS < 0. 
L = Productive leisure times available to the two parents. „L‟ includes the time that can 
be used to enhance the parental utility directly or indirectly through the enhancement of 
health of the children. It includes the time available for a normal sleep, rest, cooking, 
cleaning, social gatherings, groceries, regular health checkups and so on. It excludes 
the time that doesn‟t add to the parental utility, such as work time (tw), time spent on 
taking care of a child less than 5 years of age (contrasted with the time spent with a 
child for pleasure), and the time they spend on bed due to illness. The idea is that it 
excludes all the times which are spent on the events which are undesirable by 
themselves, and do not add to the utility directly, but still committed merely because of 
necessity. I assume that UL > 0; and ULL < 0. 
H = Overall health status of each of the children in the household measured in some 
continuous scale, where higher value represents higher level of child health. I assume 
that UH > 0; UHH < 0. It should be noted that the parental utility function is constructed in 
such a way that the utility coming directly from the consumption of any good/service, as 
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well as indirectly in the form of better health of the adult members (including the parents 
themselves) through these consumptions are already captured by either „N‟ or „S‟.  
The child health production function is given by- 
H = H (S, M, L, Sch, μ, Z1)  (2) where, 
S = Aggregate health sensitive goods as described above, which serve as either the 
inputs or dis-inputs. I assume that HS   0. 
M = Aggregate medical goods consumed by one or more children in the household. As 
mentioned above, purchased health inputs for the adults are already included in S or N, 
depending on whether they affect the health of the children directly or not. I assume that 
HM > 0 for appropriate/moderate use, and HM <0 for inappropriate/overuse; and  
HMM < 0. 
L = Productive parental leisure times as described above. More leisure would allow the 
parents to prepare fresh and nutritious food, maintain a sanitary environment, and 
provide home care and needed checkups for the children. I assume that HL > 0; and  
HLL < 0 
Sch = Aggregate formal schooling acquired by the parents. I emphasize that schooling 
enters in the child health production function as an input in the form of technology 
(access to, analysis of and implementation of relevant information, and healthy 
preferences and behavior for instance), but not through its effects on income and child 
health insurance. The role of schooling through its effects on income and insurance 
enters in the budget constraint, by either affecting the income, or by reducing the 
effective price of the medical good (M), as shown in the equation (5) below.         
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μ = Aggregate health “endowment” of the child(ren). μ may capture the genetic pre-
disposition for good health, health in womb, birth weight etc., largely unobservable and 
uninfluenced by parental behaviors once the child is born.      
Z1 = Other factors that may affect child health directly – age (via accumulation of 
external health shocks), gender (for biological reasons), demography (via various 
practices), and community (via sanitation and facilities) etc. Some of these factors are 
observed while others are unobserved. 
Time Constraint: The time constraint faced by the parents is- 
T (μ, Z2)  = L + Tw  (3) where, 
T = Potential time available to the parents, that can be allocated between work (TW), 
and leisure (L). T has a maximum of 365 times 24 hours in a year, but can be less as 
determined by the factors such as health endowment of the children (μ), and other 
factors (Z2) such as parents‟ general health status, presence of a child less than 5 years 
at home, commute time for work etc.  
Budget Constraint: The budget constraint of the household is- 
W (Sch, Z3)TW + V = PNN + PSS + PM (Sch, Z3, V, Z4)M (4) where, 
W = Aggregate parental wages in the labor market, determined by Sch (formal 
schooling), and other factors (Z3) such as area of focus in formal schooling, previous 
experience, age, sex, race, primary language, and time lived in the U.S. It is assumed 
that WE > 0.  
TW = Time worked  
V = Aggregate non-labor income and assets of the household.  
PN = Market Price of good „N‟  
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PS = Market Price of good „S‟ 
PM = Effective price of medical good „M‟, largely determined by availability and nature of 
the health insurance, which itself is largely determined by the nature of job (determined 
by schooling „Sch‟, job related characteristics „Z3‟and non-labor income/assets „V‟, and 
all other factors „Z4‟ such as location, time, technology and factors that may pertain to 
demand and supply in health insurance market. Thus parental schooling can influence 
the price of medical good „M‟ in terms of increased access to employer sponsored and 
private health insurance (and sometimes reduced eligibility for public health insurance 
due to higher income). 
It is important to note that the parents maximize their utility function U, and not 
the health production function H. That means, at an interior solution, the optimum value 
of H* sought by the parents is less than the maximum H that can be acquired given the 
material resources including time.  
The optimization problem of the parents can now be described by using the 
Lagrangian as-  
F = U (N, S, L, H (S, M, L, Sch, μ, Z1)) 
   + λ[W (Sch, Z3){T (μ, Z2) – L} + V - PNN – PSS 
   – PM (Sch, Z3, V, Z4)M]    (5) 
The arguments are: N; S; M; L; and λ 
The first order conditions give- 
FN = UN – λPN = 0  UN = λPN     (6) 
FS = US + UHHS – λPS = 0  US + UHHS = λPS   (7) 
FM = UHHM – λPM (Sch, Z3, V, Z4) = 0 
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  UHHM = λPM (Sch, Z3, V, Z4)     (8)   
FL = UL + UHHL – λW (Sch, Z3) = 0 
  UL + UHHL = λW (Sch, Z3)     (9) 
And finally, Fλ = 0 
  W (Sch, Z3){T (μ, Z2) – L}  + V  
= PNN + PSS + PM (Sch, Z3, V, Z4)M    (10) 
The equations (6) – (10) can be solved for the five unknowns (N; S; M; L; and λ). 
Equation (6) shows that the health neutral good „N‟ affects the parental utility directly, 
but has no indirect effect on utility via the children‟s health „H‟. Equation (7) shows that 
the health sensitive good „S‟ affects the parental utility directly as well as indirectly 
through its effect on „H‟. Equation (8) shows that the medical good „M‟ affects the utility 
indirectly by affecting „H‟, but has no direct effect on utility. Equation (9) shows that 
leisure „L‟ directly affects the utility, and also affects the utility indirectly through it‟s 
effects on „H‟.  
Solving the equations (6) - (10) yield the reduced form household demand 
functions for the goods „N‟, „S‟, „M‟, and the leisure time „L‟ as, 
θ* = Dθ (PN, PS, Sch, V,  μ, Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4)    (11) 
where  θ = N, S, M, and L.   
Thus the household demand for the child health determining resources (S, M, 
and L) that enter the children‟s health production function are determined by the market 
prices of the goods „N‟ and „S‟, level of parental schooling „Sch‟, non-labor income „V‟, 
health endowment „μ‟, and other exogenous factors (Z1, Z2, Z3, and Z4) as defined 
above.  
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Furthermore, the optimum work time (TW*) can be determined from equations (3) 
and (11) as- 
TW* = T (μ, Z2) - L*  
= T (μ, Z2) – DL (PN, PS, Sch, V,  μ, Z1, Z2, Z3 , Z4)   (12)      
With demand functions given by equations (6), and health production function as 
described in equation (2), we get the parental demand or supply function for child health 
as- 
H* = H (PN, PS, Sch, V, μ, Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4)    (13) 
3.3 The Model 
In this section, I discuss the probit model followed by the bivariate probit model, 
and the econometric tests that can be used to infer whether the bivariate probit is a 
better fit than two separate probit models for our purpose14. The discussions and 
derivations are based on Greene (2003). 
3.3.1 Probit Model 
3.3.1.1 Defining the Model 
In line with the reduced form equation (13) in section 3.2 describing the child 
health production function, consider the following standard model under probit 
specification- 
    H* =  X′ β + ε,  where 
X is a vector that includes an intercept term and other variables of interest, as will 
be discussed shortly. β denotes the vector of the relevant coefficients on each of the 
                                                          
14
 The ordered probit model differs from probit model in having more than two (three in this study) 
categories of a given dependent variable instead of two, and is largely similar to probit, which I skip in this 
section.  
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regressors included in X and ε denotes the error terms, assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean zero and variance 1.  
    i.e.  ε ~N (0, 1) 
H* is an unobserved latent variable between -∞ and +∞, capturing either the 
perceived physical health status or perceived mental health status of the child. H 
(without the star) represents the corresponding observed physical health status (HLTH) 
or observed mental health status (MLTH), each of which is a an indicator variable taking 
the values- 
0 (Poor/Fair/Good); and  
1 (Very Good/Excellent) 
The observed value of H depends on where the unobserved value H* stands in 
the scale from -∞ and +∞, as marked by the cut point (0)15. Specifically, following rules 
apply as regards the observed values of H: 
H = 0 if H* ≤ 0;  and  H = 1 if H* > 0 
Pertaining to the objective of exploring the channels that may transmit the 
beneficial effects of parental schooling on child health, X may represent one of the 
following four vectors, thereby giving rise to four different equations under this model- 
    Equation (I):  X = (1 MoSch FaSch Z) 
    Equation (II):  X = (1 MoSch FaSch Pinc Z) 
    Equation (III): X = (1 MoSch FaSch Insur Z) 
    Equation (IV): X = (1 MoSch FaSch Pinc Insur Z) 
                                                          
15
Considering a non-zero cut-point (μ) is equally valid, but this can be normalized to make 0 as the cut point, if the 
model contains a constant term (Green, 2003, p. 669).    
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where MoSch and FaSch denote the mother‟s and father‟s schooling, each observed in 
three ordinal categories - 0 (No Degree); 1 (HSD/GED); and 2 (College Degree), as 
defined earlier. Pinc denotes total parental income (during their two years in MEPS, 
adjusted for inflation and expressed in log). Insur denotes the health insurance type of 
the child observed in three categories - 1 (Any Private); 2 (Only Public); and 3 (None). Z 
is the vector of other regressors (demographic, geographic and others including 
parental health). Inclusion of parental income and health insurance type of child 
successively in the regression equations inform us of the importance of income and 
insurance themselves, and to what extent the effects of income and insurance stem 
from parental schooling.  
3.3.1.2 Response Probabilities 
The estimated response probabilities are distributed as:  
Prob (H = 0 | X) 
= Prob (H* ≤ 0 | X) 
= Prob (X′β + ε ≤ 0 | X) 
= Prob (ε ≤ - X′β | X)  
= ∫  ( )  
      
  
 , which is denoted as Φ(-X′β) [or 1- Φ(X′β)  because of the 
symmetry], where φ (z) is known as standard normal density, defined as- 
φ (z) = exp(-0.5z2) / (2π)0.5,  and „Φ‟ is the standard normal cumulative distribution.  
Similarly,  
Prob (H = 1 | X) 
  = Prob (H* > 0 | X) 
 = Prob (X′β + ε > 0 | X)  
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= Prob (ε > - X′β | X) 
= Prob (ε < X′β | X) 
= Φ(X′β) 
 The model is then estimated by the method of maximum likelihood. For this, a 
joint probability (or likelihood) function is first defined using these response probabilities, 
and the values of the parameters that maximize this function are then obtained. 
 As discussed earlier, the siblings within the household share many common 
family characteristics - demographic, economic, genetic (which may determine their 
initial health endowment), environment, family background, parental preferences, 
parental health, parental behavior, and the perception of child health status by the 
parents. In order to address potential autocorrelation on the error terms arising from 
these sibling effects, all the regressions are clustered at the household level. Also, I 
obtain the robust standard errors instead of the regular ones to address the inherently 
heteroskedastic nature of the non-liner form of model specifications and the maximum 
likelihood estimation technique. Under the validity of the model assumptions, the 
estimates thus obtained are asymptotically efficient.  
3.3.1.3 Marginal Effects 
It is noteworthy that the parameter vector β in these models, unlike in the linear 
regression models, does not give the marginal effects of the predictors on the observed 
value of H, but merely gives the contributions of the predictors on the unobserved H*. 
More precisely, the estimated regression coefficients give the change in the z-score or 
probit index for a one unit change in a given predictor, other things same. Therefore, 
these parameters, at the time they are estimated, are less insightful and only indicative 
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of the direction of their contributions. However these estimated coefficients form the raw 
materials for the marginal effects of their respective regressors on the probability of 
observing a particular value of the dependent variable H. The expressions for the 
estimation of marginal effects are as below- 
The marginal effects, which measures the ratio of the change in the probability of 
observing H = 1 to a small change in X, are generally computed using the following 
expression-  
     
     (     )
  
 = φ (X′β)β 
Clearly, the marginal effects are functions of X, and therefore their interpretations 
are not straightforward. This is made easier either by evaluating these expressions at 
sample means of the data (the method used in this study), or the marginal effects are 
evaluated at every observation and their sample average is computed. In large samples 
like the current one, both approaches will give similar results. 
The above expression is typically appropriate for a continuous variable (say x), 
where a „small change‟ in x is conceivable. But in many cases such as in this study, X 
may include dummy (or categorical) variables. The appropriate marginal effect 
associated to a dummy variable, say d, which now measures the change in the 
probability of observing H = 1 when d changes the values from 0 to 1, is expressed as- 
Marginal effect = Δ Prob [H = 1|  ̅(d)] = Prob [H = 1|  ̅(d), d = 1] - Prob [H = 1|  ̅(d), d = 0], 
where  ̅(d) denotes the means of all the other variables except for d in the model.  
 Similar marginal effects for a variable, say MoSch in this study, which can take 
three values 0, 1 or 2, can be expressed as- 
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Marginal effect (1) = Prob [H = 1|  ̅(MoSch), MoSch = 1]  
   - Prob [H = 1|  ̅(MoSch), MoSch = 0], and  
Marginal effect (2) = Prob [H = 1|  ̅(MoSch), MoSch = 2]  
   - Prob [H = 1|  ̅(MoSch), MoSch = 0], 
where the first marginal effect (1) corresponds to the change in mother‟s schooling from 
level 0 to level 1, and the second corresponds to change in the schooling from level 0 to 
level 2. 
3.3.2 Bivariate Probit Model 
3.3.2.1 Defining the Model 
Bivariate probit model estimates two equations involving the two dependent 
variables (perceived physical and mental health of child in this study) simultaneously. 
Under the assumption that same set of unobserved factors may affect the observed 
physical and mental health status of the children in the sample, consider the following 
bivariate probit model- 
    H1* =  X1′ β1 + ε1 
    H2* =  X2′ β2 + ε2 
where the subscript 1 and 2 respectively refer to the physical health status equation and 
mental health status equation pertaining to the child. Also, the error terms (ε1 and ε2) are 
jointly normally distributed with mean 0, variance 1, and correlation ρ.  Symbolically, it is 
written as-  
    { ε1 , ε2} ~ φ2 (0, 0, 1, 1, ρ) 
where φ2 denotes a bivariate standard normal distribution, distributed as- 
  φ2 (u, v, ρ) = exp{-0.5(u
2+v2-2ρuv)/(1-ρ2)} / {2π(1-ρ2)0.5} 
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Both of the vectors X1 and X2 include an intercept term and other variables of 
interest, which can be same in both equations or can be different depending on the 
objective of the study and the nature of the variables. For simplicity, I use the same set 
of explanatory variables as in the probit (and ordered probit) models, and assume that 
these variables jointly affect the physical and mental health status of the child.     
H1* and H2* are unobserved latent variables between -∞ and +∞, capturing 
respectively the perceived physical health status and perceived mental health status of 
the child. H1 and H2 (without the star) represent the corresponding observed physical 
health status (HLTH) or observed mental health status (MLTH), each of which is an 
indicator variable taking the values 0 (Poor/Fair/Good), and 1 (Very Good/Excellent). 
The observed value of Hj (j = 1 or 2) depends on where the unobserved value Hj* 
stands in the scale from -∞ and +∞, as marked by the cut point 0 according to the 
following rule- 
Hj = 0 if Hj* ≤ 0;  and  Hj = 1 if Hj* > 0. 
As in the case of probit model, Xj may represent one of the following four vectors, 
thereby giving rise to four different equations under this model- 
    Equation (I):  Xj = (1 MoSch FaSch Z) 
    Equation (II):  Xj = (1 MoSch FaSch Pinc Z) 
    Equation (III): Xj = (1 MoSch FaSch Insur Z) 
    Equation (IV): Xj = (1 MoSch FaSch Pinc Insur Z) 
where MoSch, FaSch, Pinc, Insur and Z are defined as earlier.   
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3.3.2.2 Response Probabilities  
The estimated response probabilities in the bivariate probit model are distributed 
as under- 
Prob (H1 = 1 , H2 = 1 | X1 , X2) 
= Prob (H1* > 0,  H2* > 0 | X1 , X2)    
= Prob (X1′β1 + ε1 > 0 , X2′β2 + ε2 > 0| X1 , X2) 
= Prob (ε1 > -X1′β1 , ε2 > -X2′β2 | X1 , X2) 
= Prob (ε1   X1′β1 , ε2   X2′β2 | X1 , X2) 
= ∬  
          
    2
(z1, z2, ρ) dz1 dz2 , which is denoted as Φ2 (X1′β1, X2′β2, ρ), 
where Φ2 denotes the bivariate standard normal CDF. 
Similarly, the other joint probabilities can be expressed as- 
Prob (H1 = 1 , H2 = 0 | X1 , X2)  
= Φ2 (X1′β1, -X2′β2, ρ) = Φ (X1′β1) - Φ2 (X1′β1, X2′β2, ρ); 
Prob (H1 = 0 , H2 = 1 | X1 , X2)  
=  Φ2 (-X1′β1, X2′β2, ρ)  
= Φ (X2′β2) - Φ2 (X1′β1, X2′β2, ρ); 
Prob (H1 = 0 , H2 = 0 | X1 , X2)  
= Φ2 (-X1′β1, -X2′β2, ρ)  
 = 1 - Φ (X1′β1) - Φ (X2′β2) - Φ2 (X1′β1, X2′β2, ρ) 
The marginal probabilities are expressed as, 
Prob (H1 = 1 | X1, X2) = Φ (X1′β1) 
Prob (H1 = 0 | X1, X2) = Φ (-X1′β1)  = 1- Φ (X1′β1); 
Prob (H2 = 1 | X1, X2) = Φ (X2′β2); 
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Prob (H2 = 0 | X1, X2) = Φ (-X2′β2) = 1 - Φ (X2′β2). 
Similarly, the conditional probabilities are expressed as- 
Prob (H1 = 1 | H2 = 1, X1, X2)  
 = Prob (H1 = 1 , H2 = 1 | X1 , X2) / Prob (H2 = 1 | X1, X2) 
 = Φ2 (X1′β1, X2′β2, ρ) / Φ (X2′β2);  
Prob (H1 = 1 | H2 = 0, X1, X2)  
 = Prob (H1 = 1 , H2 = 0 | X1 , X2) / Prob (H2 = 0 | X1, X2) 
 = Φ2 (X1′β1, -X2′β2, ρ) / Φ (-X2′β2);  
Prob (H2 = 1 | H1 = 1, X1, X2)  
 = Prob (H1 = 1 , H2 = 1 | X1 , X2) / Prob (H1 = 1 | X1, X2) 
 = Φ2 (X1′β1, X2′β2, ρ) / Φ (X1′β1); 
  Prob (H2 = 1 | H1 = 0, X1, X2)  
 = Prob (H1 = 0 , H2 = 1 | X1 , X2) / Prob (H1 = 0 | X1, X2) 
 = Φ2 (-X1′β1, X2′β2, ρ) / Φ (-X1′β1). 
Other four conditional probabilities, namely Prob (H1 = 0 | H2 = 1), Prob (H1 = 0 | H2 = 0), 
Prob (H2 = 0 | H1 = 1), and Prob (H2 = 0 | H1 = 0) can be obtained by deducting their 
respective complements from 1. The model parameters are then estimated by the 
maximum likelihood method. 
3.3.2.3 Implication of and Testing for Zero Correlation 
The zero correlation (ρ = 0) between the error terms ε1 and ε2 implies that the two 
dependent variables (physical and mental health status of child) in the two equations 
are independent, and the function Φ2 reduces to the simple product of the two 
respective standard normal CDF. For instance, if ρ = 0, then  
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Prob (H1 = 1 , H2 = 1 | X1 , X2) = Prob (H1 = 1 | X1)   Prob (H2 = 1 | X2)  
i.e.,  Φ2 (X1′β1, X2′β2, ρ = Φ (X1′β1)   Φ (X2′β2),  
and similarly for other joint probabilities. When the error terms ε1 and ε2 are plotted in a 
graph with their axes orthogonal to one another and their densities along the third axis, 
the hill formed by the density will look round and symmetrical in all directions when 
viewed from the density axis, as shown in Figure 3. 
But, if the correlation between the two error terms is not zero (ρ   0), then the 
two dependent variables in the two equations are not independent, and are 
simultaneously affected by some unobserved factors. In other words, the probability of 
observing a given level (0 or 1) of physical health status of the child will be dependent 
on what level of mental health status has been observed, and vice versa. In such a 
case, the joint probability of observing given levels of the two dependent variables can 
be computed only by using the respective Φ2 function which is not a simple product of 
the separate marginal probabilities involved. For instance,  
Prob (H1 = 1 , H2 = 1 | X1 , X2)           Prob (H1 = 1 | X1)   Prob (H2 = 1 | X2) 
or  Φ2 (X1′β1, X2′β2, ρ)           Φ (X1′β1)   Φ (X2′β2),  
The similar hill formed by the density will look like a ridge, and not round or 
symmetrical when viewed from the density axis, and the intensity increases as ρ 
increases. Figures 4 portrays the situations when ρ = 0.5 and 0.9 respectively.  
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Figure 3: Bivariate Standard Normal CDF when ρ = 0  
 
 
Figure 4: Bivariate Standard Normal CDF when ρ   0 
 
 
 
  
ρ = 0.5 ρ = 0.9 
ρ = 0 
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3.3.2.4 Marginal Effects 
As in the case of probit and ordered probit models, the estimated vector    ̂(j = 1, 
2) are not the marginal effects of the predictors on the observed values of Hj, but merely 
show the directions of influence of the respective predictors on observed Hj. These 
estimated coefficients are used to compute several marginal effects of interest, such as 
change in the joint, conditional, or marginal probabilities as a result of the change in a 
given regressor as under- 
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 , where H1 and H2 can take the values 0 or 1. 
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Further derivations for the computations of these marginal effects are 
cumbersome, yet are available. Also, for the ordinal categorical explanatory variables 
such as the schooling levels of the parents, marginal effects are derived not as partial 
derivatives, but as the difference in the predicted probabilities when value in the 
explanatory variable changes from one level to the next, other things same (computed 
at their means in general). I use the readily available commands in STATA for the 
computations of these marginal effects. In particular, I focus on the following two 
marginal effects-  
  
     (       )
  
 ; and  
     (       )
  
 
These marginal effects can be directly compared with those obtained from the 
probit (and ordered probit) models. 
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3.3.3 Assessing Income, Insurance, and Non-monetary Effects 
The equations (I-IV) under all specifications contain parental schooling (MoSch 
and FaSch) as predictors of child health. The equation (I) excludes both the total 
parental income (Pinc) and the health insurance type of the child (Insur). The equation 
(II) includes the parental income, but does not include the health insurance, whereas 
equation (III) includes the health insurance but does not include income. Finally, the 
equation (IV) includes both the income and the health insurance. In light of this, the 
income, insurance, and the non-monetary effects of parental schooling on child health 
are then defined and discussed.   
 The coefficients on MoSch and FaSch in equation (I) measures the total 
contribution of respective parent‟s schooling on the unobserved latent child health 
(either physical or mental) measure, H*, controlling for the variables described by X. 
The marginal effects on MoSch and FaSch therefore measure the total effects of 
parental schooling on child health, measured in terms of partial contribution of parental 
schooling in the probability that Very Good/Excellent child health status is observed as 
opposed to Poor/Fair/Good status, as the level of parental schooling changes. 
The coefficients on MoSch and FaSch in equation (II) measures the contribution 
of respective parent‟s schooling on the unobserved H*, controlling for the parental 
income and the other variables in X. Therefore, the marginal effects on parental 
schooling here measure the effects of parental schooling on child health transmitting 
through the channels other than income. This is essentially the sum of the insurance 
and non-monetary effects, less the joint effects of income and insurance (represented 
by the overlapping portion of the income and insurance ovals in Figure 2, section 3.1.5). 
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As a matter of fact, the contribution of income and insurance are found to be very small 
compared to the non-monetary factors. Therefore, I make it simple by defining the 
income effects as the difference in the marginal effects on the parental schooling 
variables between the equations (I) and (II), which by construction includes some 
contribution of insurance too (by the amount of the joint effects of income and 
insurance).        
The coefficients on MoSch and FaSch in equation (III) measures the contribution 
of respective parent‟s schooling on the unobserved H*, controlling for the health 
insurance type of child and the other variables in X. Therefore, the marginal effects on 
parental schooling here measure effects of parental schooling on child health 
transmitting through the channels other than health insurance. This is same as the sum 
of the income and non-monetary effects, less the joint effects of income and insurance. I 
then define the insurance effects as the difference in the marginal effects on the 
parental schooling variables between the equations (I) and (III), which clearly includes 
some contribution of income too.  
Finally, the coefficients on MoSch and FaSch in equation (IV) measures the 
contribution of respective parent‟s schooling on the unobserved H*, controlling for 
parental income, health insurance type of child, and other variables in X. Therefore, the 
marginal effects on parental schooling here measure effects of parental schooling 
transmitting through the channels other than the income and health insurance, which 
are the non-monetary effects of parental schooling on child health. 
To summarize these effects vis a vis the nature of these factors (as discussed in 
chapter 3) and their relative importance, I further define the monetary effects of parental 
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schooling on child health as the effects of schooling transmitting through the channels of 
either the parental income or child‟s health insurance type. This is measured as the 
difference between the total effects and the non-monetary effects of parental schooling, 
which clearly is not equal to the sum of the separate income effects and insurance 
effects as defined above (by the amount of the joint effects of income and insurance). 
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CHAPTER 4. DATA AND VARIABLES  
4.1 Description of the Data  
I have used the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data set, which is a 
set of large-scale surveys of families and individuals, their medical providers, and 
employers across the United States. The first panel of MEPS began in 1996, and every 
year it adds a new panel to its data set, where each panel is observed in five rounds of 
interviews during the span of two years. The analysis in the current study is based on a 
total of 45,280 children aged 1-17 years from 22,624 households observed by MEPS in 
the ten panels numbered from 6 to 15. Of this total, 31,756 children (70%) have both 
parents present, and make the major sample (Sample 1), while the remaining 13,524 
children (30%) are brought up by single mother16 and make the other sample (Sample 
2). Also, to clarify, panels 6 (and 15) enter MEPS in 2001 (and 2010), and leave in 2002 
(and 2011) respectively. The term „panel‟ can give a misleading impression here, as this 
study in fact treats each observed child as a cross-sectional unit, rather than a panel 
unit. This is because many variables considered in the study are not observed in all five 
rounds by MEPS, and specifically, the major factor of inquiry (parental schooling) and 
other demographic and geographic characteristics, are observed only once (or do not 
change). Thus, this is in essence a cross sectional analysis of the pool of individuals 
observed by MEPS in different years from 2001-2011. 
The relevant variables measured throughout the two years (or five rounds) for 
each child are either averaged or summed (adjusting for inflation by using the consumer 
price index wherever relevant), depending upon the nature of the variables, and the 
                                                          
16
 Another subsample with 1,182 children brought up by single father is not considered in this study 
because of small sample size.   
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purpose of the study. This in fact does not exacerbate the results, but rather enhances 
them, for the study of this kind. For instance, the outcome variables „perceived physical 
or mental health status of each child‟ are rated by the parents in an ordinal scale of five 
categories and reported in each of the five rounds. For these two dependent variables, 
the medians are taken, which provide relatively better descriptions of child health during 
their two years in MEPS, as opposed to single snapshots observed at a particular 
round. Similarly, incomes of each parent are summed up (after adjusting for inflation) for 
the two years17, which are used as the proxies to their permanent income, as opposed 
to using the snapshot hourly wages in the current main job in a single round.   
4.2 Variable Definitions 
The variables used in the analysis are: 
HLTH: Perceived physical health status of child [0 (Poor/Fair/Good) and 1 (Very 
Good/Excellent) for probit and bivariate probit models; and 0 (Poor/Fair), 1 (Good) and 
2 (Very Good/Excellent) for ordered probit model].  
MLTH: Perceived mental health status of child [0 (Poor/Fair/Good) and 1 (Very 
Good/Excellent) for probit and bivariate probit models; and 0 (Poor/Fair), 1 (Good) and 
2 (Very Good/Excellent) for ordered probit model].  
MoSch: Mother‟s schooling [0 (No Degree); 1 (HSD/GED); 2 (College Degree, meaning 
Bachelor, Other, Masters, or Doctorate)]  
FaSch: Father‟s schooling [0 (No Degree); 1 (HSD/GED); 2 (College Degree, meaning 
Bachelor, Other, Masters, or Doctorate)]  
Age: Age of child (in years)  
Female: Gender of child [0 (Male); 1 (Female)]  
                                                          
17
 Incomes in MEPS for each person are measured only two times, in annual basis.  
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Brthrd: Child‟s birth order [1 (First born); 0 (Otherwise)]  
Chldrn: Number of children less than 17 years in the house  
Child_5: Presence of a child below 5 years of age at home [1 (Present); 0 (Absence)  
MSA: Location variable [0 (non-MSA18); 1 (MSA)]  
Region: Location variable [0 (NE); 1 (MW); 2 (S); 3 (W)]19 
Race: Race of the child [0 (White); 1 (Black); 2 (Hispanic); 3 (Other)] 
MoHlth: Mother‟s health index (Range: 4-75)  
FaHlth: Father‟s health index (Range: 7-72)  
Pinc: Log of parental total income during their two years in MEPS, adjusted for inflation 
Minc: Log of mother‟s total income during the two years in MEPS, adjusted for inflation 
EcoSt: Economic status of household [0 (Low) meaning Poor/Near Poor/Low Income; 1 
(High) meaning Middle/High Income] 
Insur: Health insurance type of the child [0 (Any Private); 1 (Only Public); 2 (None) 
Msmok: Smoking habit of mother [1 (Smokes)); 0 (Otherwise) 
Fsmok: Smoking habit of father [1 (Smokes)); 0 (Otherwise) 
Panel: Panel number (6 to 15) 
  
                                                          
18
 MSA stands for Metropolitan Statistical Area 
19
 NE, MW, S, and W stand for North-East, Mid-West, South, and West respectively. 
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CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES AND MAIN FINDINGS  
5.1 Summary Statistics  
Table 1 below shows the summary of the variables used in this study for the two 
samples. Sample 1 includes children with both parents.  Sample 2 designates children 
with a single mother. Average age of the children is 8 years, and number of male and 
female children are almost symmetrically distributed in both samples. Number of 
children in the household are practically equal (about 2.7), and over half of the 
households have at least one child below five years of age in both samples. 
 Whites are a majority followed by Hispanics in the first sample, and these two 
races together represent about four-fifths of the observations. In contrast to this, Blacks 
are the majority, followed by Hispanics in the second sample, and these two races 
represent about seven-tenths of the observations. Over four-fifths of the children live in 
MSA in both samples, and the largest portion (around two-fifths) are from South, 
followed by West, Midwest, and Northeast.  
 In Sample 1, while mother‟s schooling is somewhat better than father‟s, about 
two-thirds of the fathers and mothers have an HSD/GED or are without any formal 
degree, and only one-third has a College Degree. In contrast to this, mother‟s schooling 
is significantly lower in Sample 2, where more than four-fifths are without degree or 
have an HSD/GED, and only 15% (half as much as in Sample 1) with College Degree. 
Incomes of mothers and fathers are highly skewed and vary greatly both within and 
between the groups. Average income of fathers is about 80% higher than the mothers in 
Sample 1, and the average income of mothers in Sample 2 is still 10% lower than in 
62 
 
 
Sample 1. Over half of the households (56%) in Sample 1 are in middle or high income 
category, as opposed to less than one fourth in Sample 2.  
 More than four-fifths of the children have „Very Good‟ or „Excellent‟ physical and 
mental health status in Sample 1, and these percentages are lower by about 6 
percentage points in Sample 2. The remaining are mostly in „Good‟ status in both 
samples. Majority (57%) of the children have some form of private health insurance, 
one-third have only public health insurance, and the remaining 9% are without any 
health insurance in Sample 1. In contrast to this, about two-thirds of the children in 
Sample 2 have only public health insurance, little over one-fourth (27%) have any 
private, and remaining 7% are without any health insurance. Fathers‟ health index is 
slightly higher than mothers‟ in Sample 1, and mothers‟ health are slightly lower in 
Sample 2 than in Sample 1. Fathers smoke more than mothers; about one-fourth of the 
children have at least one smoker parent; and almost three-fourths of the parents are 
non-smoking in Sample 1. Percentage of smoking mothers is more than double in 
Sample 2 relative to Sample 1. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
(Numbers inside the parentheses are the standard deviations) 
   Variables Summary 
 Sample 1 (N = 31,756) Sample 2 (N = 13,524) 
Demographic Variables   
   Child‟s Age, Years 8.01 (5.24) 8.57 (5.27) 
   Child‟s Gender, % Male (0): 51.07; Female (1): 48.93  Male (0): 50.43; Female (1): (49.57) 
   Child‟s Race, % White (0): 44.43; Black (1): 10.0; 
Hispanic (2): 37.22; Other (3): 8.35 
White (0): 24.03; Black (1): 39.04; 
Hispanic (2): 31.66; Other (3): 5.21 
   Number of Children in the 
Household 
2.76 (1.37) 2.65 (1.42) 
   Any Child below 5, % of 
Households  
59.8 54.7 
   
Geographic Variables   
   MSA/Non-MSA, % Non-MSA (0): 16.2; MSA (1): 83.8;  Non-MSA (0): 15.5; MSA (1): 84.5;  
   Region, % NE (0): 13.2; MW (1): 19.3; S (2): 
36.2; W (3): 31.2 
NE (0): 16.6; MW (1): 19.0; S (2): 
41.5; W (3): 22.9 
   
Parental Schooling, %   
   Mother‟s Schooling No Deg. (0): 25.0; HSD/GED (1): 
43.4;  
College Deg. (2): 31.6 
No Deg. (0): 28.2; HSD/GED (1): 
56.7;  
College Deg. (2): 15.1 
   Father‟s Schooling No Deg. (0): 27.0; HSD/GED (1): 
44.0;  
College Deg. (2): 29.0 
 
   
Income & Economic Status   
   Parental Income, 2011 Dollars Mother- 48932 (58322);  
Father- 87915 (75560);  
Total Parental-136790 (108088) 
Mother- 43876 (43871) 
   Household‟s Economic Status Poor/Near Poor/Low Income-43.6; 
Middle/High Income- 56.4 
Poor/Near Poor/Low Income-76.8; 
Middle/High Income- 23.2 
   
Health Status of Child   
   Physical Health, %  Poor/Fair (0): 1.2; Good (1): 15.0;  
Very Good/Excellent (2): 83.8 
Poor/Fair (0): 2.4; Good (1): 19.7;  
Very Good/Excellent (2): 77.9 
   Mental Health, % Poor/Fair (0): 1.1; Good (1): 12.9;  
Very Good/Excellent (2): 86.0 
Poor/Fair (0): 2.8; Good (1): 17.4;  
Very Good/Excellent (2): 80.0 
   
Health Insurance Type of Child, % Any Private (0): -57.4; Public Only 
(1): 33.5; None (2): 9.1 
Any Private (0): 26.6; Public Only (1): 
66.0; None (2): 7.4 
   
Parental Health Index Mother: 49.9 (8.5);  
Father: 52.1 (7.8) 
Mother: 47.4 (10.1) 
Parental Smoking, %   
   Mother Smokes  13.6 28.6 
   Father Smokes  22.0  
   Only Mother Smokes 4.7  
   Only Father Smokes 13.0  
   Both Smoke 8.9  
   At Least One Parent Smokes 26.7  
   No Parent Smokes 73.3  
 
 
  
64 
 
 
Appendices 1 and 2 report the Pearson‟s correlation matrices of the variables 
used in the study for both samples. Most of the correlation coefficients are statistically 
significant, although the coefficients themselves are small. In spite of the fact that most 
of the variables are categorical or dummies and very few are continuous, the correlation 
coefficients can still provide useful information about the degree and direction of linear 
relationship between the variables, given they are measured in some ordinal scale. For 
instance, the physical and mental health of child are positively related with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.64 and 0.58 in the two samples respectively. Also, they are positively 
related to parental schooling, parental income and economic status, and negatively with 
insurance type (where 0 implies availability of a private insurance) in both samples, 
although relatively weakly in the second sample.   
5.2 Regression Results   
5.2.1 Regression Results for Sample 1 with Both Parents 
5.2.1.1 Comparison of the Results in the Three Models 
  Sample 1 includes 31,756 children in the households with both parents. As 
explained earlier, the dependent variables can be physical and/or mental health status 
of child measured in two categories under probit and bivariate probit models (and in 
three categories under ordered probit). Along with other factors, the equation (I) under 
each model includes parental schooling without parental income and health insurance 
type of child; equation (II) includes parental schooling and parental income but does not 
include child‟s health insurance; equation (III) includes parental schooling and child‟s 
health insurance but does not include parental income; and equation (IV) includes 
parental schooling, parental income, and child‟s health insurance. The other regressors 
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are age, sex and birth order of child; number of children and presence of any child less 
than 5 years of age in the household; child‟s race, MSA/non-MSA, and region; father‟s 
and mother‟s health indices and smoking habits; and the panel in which the child is 
observed.  
 Appendix 3 reports the coefficients associated with the bivariate probit, probit, 
and ordered probit models for Sample 1. Appendix 4 (a portion of which will be 
reproduced shortly as Table 3 for discussion) reports the corresponding marginal effects 
computed from the estimated coefficients.  
 Each of the three models in all four equations and for both dependent variables 
(physical health and mental health) are highly significant with large Wald Chi-squared 
statistics. Most of the coefficients and the marginal effects have expected signs and are 
statistically significant. The overall results (coefficients, marginal effects and the 
standard errors) are essentially identical for the sample under all three specifications. 
This is not surprising for a large sample such as this where countless factors 
simultaneously determine the dependent variables and partial contribution of a 
particular factor is relatively small. Nonetheless, the standard errors are marginally 
smaller in general under bivariate probit and ordered probit than under probit 
specifications as expected.  
The smaller standard errors in ordered probit than in probit are plausible as the 
former makes use of relatively more information in terms of having three categories of 
dependent variables than in the latter which has only two. However, as very few 
children (about 1%) are in the same (Poor/Fair) category while almost 99% belong to 
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the remaining two (Good or Very Good/Excellent) categories, the resulting gain in 
efficiency relative to probit in terms of the size of the standard errors is small.  
Similarly, smaller standard errors in general in the bivariate probit than in probit 
model are also expected as the former uses additional information – that same set of 
parameters are being estimated for the physical and mental health status of child, and 
that some common unobserved factors may be influencing both measures of dependent 
variables. Technically, if some unobserved background factors are truly common in the 
physical and mental health equations, their error terms are likely to be correlated, which 
can be tested. The following hypothesis test provides the evidence that the two error 
terms are indeed correlated, implying that bivariate probit model is a better fit than 
separate probit models for the two dependent variables. The null and alternative 
hypotheses for the test are stated as- 
 H0: ρ = 0 (the two error terms are not correlated) 
 Ha: ρ   0 (the two error terms are correlated) 
 As shown in Appendix 3, the estimated ρ is very high at 0.89 with the standard 
error of 0.005 in all four equations (I-IV). The positive sign on the correlation coefficients 
indicate that the unobserved common factors influence the two dependent variables in 
the same direction, as expected. The Wald Chi-squared statistics for these tests in the 
four equations reported by STATA are- 
Wald – χ2 (1) = 4016.02 (I); 3998.19 (II); 3987.31 (III); and 3978.05 (IV). 
 With the large test statistics and correspondingly small p-values of 0.00, the null 
hypothesis is rejected in support of the alternative hypothesis. In other words, the 
evidence suggests that the two error terms are correlated.  
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 [Alternatively, the likelihood ratio statistics can also be computed from the 
estimated log-likelihoods as LR – χ2(1) = -2 (LLr – LLur), where the subscripts r and ur 
attached to the log-likelihoods (LL) refer to the restricted (ρ = 0) and unrestricted (ρ   0) 
models. The computed LR-statistics and p-values (not reported here) also support the 
same conclusion that the error terms are correlated.] 
 In addition to utilizing the additional information about the unobserved error terms 
in the physical and mental health equations, the bivariate probit model allows us to 
compute other probabilities of interest, given that the correlation coefficient ρ is 
significantly different from zero. For instance, for the full equation (IV) that includes 
parental income and child‟s health insurance, following Table 2 presents the marginal, 
joint and conditional probabilities that pertain to a typical child having a very good or 
excellent health status for each measure of health (physical or mental)20. 
 
Table 2: Marginal, Joint and Conditional Probabilities Pertaining to Child Health in 
Sample 1 
 Bivariate Probit Results 
P (HLTH =1) 0.837 
P (MLTH = 1) 0.861 
P (HLTH = 1, MLTH = 1) 0.807 
P (HLTH =1 | MLTH =1) 0.938 
P (MLTH = 1 | HLTH =1) 0.964 
 
      A typical child has a probability of about 83.7% to have Very Good/Excellent 
physical health status as opposed to Poor/Fair/Good category. The probability is slightly 
                                                          
20
 Similar probabilities for the other three equations (I-III) are similar, and are not reported here.   
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higher, about 86.1% for mental health status. There is about an 80.7% chance that the 
child has Very Good/Excellent physical and mental health. Given that a child has Very 
Good/Excellent mental health, there is about 93.8% chance that he/she has Very 
Good/Excellent physical health. On the other hand, given that a child has Very 
Good/Excellent physical health, there is 96.4% chance that he/she has Very 
Good/Excellent mental health. The result supports the evidence that both physical and 
mental health interact closely and reinforce one another. Also, it indicates that the 
contribution of physical health on mental health is slightly greater than that of mental 
health on physical health by about 2.6 percentage points of probability. 
5.2.1.2 Analysis of the Effects of Parental Schooling 
The marginal effects in the Appendix 4 measure the change in the probability that 
the health status of a typical child will move from Poor/Fair/Good to the Very 
Good/Excellent level, when the value of the corresponding regressor changes by a unit 
or from the base level to another level, other things equal. To discuss the marginal 
effects of parental schooling on child health and the importance of the monetary 
(income and insurance) and non-monetary channels, I reproduce a portion of the 
Appendix 4 as Table 3 below. The effects of other regressors in both samples (1 and 2) 
as well as some selected subgroups of Sample 1 will be discussed together in section 
5.2.4.   
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Table 3: Selected Estimated Marginal Effects in Sample 1  
(percentage point probabilities, N = 31,756) 
Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
MoSch  
(Base: No Degree) 
        
HSD/GED 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
    6.403
***
 
(0.900) 
    6.490
***
 
(0.909) 
    6.251
***
 
(0.868) 
     5.683
***
 
(0.889) 
    5.759
***
 
(0.898) 
    5.513
***
 
(0.855) 
    5.588
***
 
(0.884) 
    5.658
***
 
(0.893) 
    5.384
***
 
(0.850) 
    5.210
***
 
(0.877) 
    5.270
***
 
(0.886) 
    4.993
***
 
(0.842) 
    5.602
***
 
(0.859) 
    5.855
***
 
(0.882) 
    5.617
***
 
(0.844) 
     4.971
***
 
(0.843) 
    5.218
***
 
(0.865) 
    5.001
***
 
(0.825) 
    4.907
***
 
(0.844) 
    5.151
***
 
(0.865) 
    4.887
***
 
(0.826) 
    4.577
***
 
(0.834) 
    4.814
***
 
(0.855) 
    4.565
***
 
(0.815) 
College 
Degree 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
  10.560
***
 
(0.996) 
  10.787
***
 
(1.003) 
  10.508
***
 
(0.974) 
    9.389
***
 
(1.009) 
    9.632
***
 
(1.014) 
    9.346
***
 
(0.982) 
    9.214
***
 
(1.000) 
    9.446
***
 
(1.007) 
    9.102
***
 
(0.976) 
    8.582
***
 
(1.006) 
    8.819
***
 
(1.012) 
    8.476
***
 
(0.979) 
    8.777
***
 
(0.939) 
    9.152
***
 
(0.962) 
    8.869
***
 
(0.938) 
    7.753
***
 
(0.943) 
    8.156
***
 
(0.964) 
    7.906
***
 
(0.936) 
    7.631
***
 
(0.945) 
    8.027
***
 
(0.967) 
    7.698
***
 
(0.940) 
    7.077
***
 
(0.946) 
    7.483
***
 
(0.967) 
    7.181
***
 
(0.938) 
FaSch  
(Base: No Degree)         
HSD/GED 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
    4.517
***
 
(0.850) 
    4.566
***
 
(0.857) 
    4.208
***
 
(0.833) 
    4.049
***
 
(0.837) 
    4.115
***
 
(0.843) 
    3.782
***
 
(0.818) 
    3.794
***
 
(0.839) 
    3.856
***
 
(0.845) 
    3.484
***
 
(0.818) 
    3.586
***
 
(0.831) 
    3.656
***
 
(0.836) 
    3.302
***
 
(0.809) 
    3.289
***
 
(0.795) 
    3.344
***
 
(0.809) 
    2.820
***
 
(0.784) 
    2.889
***
 
(0.781) 
    2.972
***
 
(0.794) 
    2.481
***
 
(0.768) 
    2.687
***
 
(0.785) 
    2.764
***
 
(0.796) 
    2.239
***
 
(0.770) 
    2.508
***
 
(0.776) 
    2.598
***
 
(0.786) 
    2.094
***
 
(0.760) 
College 
Degree 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
    7.438
***
 
(0.992) 
    7.600
***
 
(0.996) 
    7.210
***
 
(0.983) 
    6.417
***
 
(1.000) 
    6.609
***
 
(1.003) 
    6.234
***
 
(0.988) 
    6.181
***
 
(1.003) 
    6.368
***
 
(1.006) 
    5.932
***
 
(0.989) 
    5.640
***
 
(1.006) 
    5.841
***
 
(1.009) 
    5.420
***
 
(0.991) 
    5.114
***
 
(0.939) 
    5.302
***
 
(0.948) 
    4.648
***
 
(0.940) 
    4.223
***
 
(0.944) 
    4.468
***
 
(0.951) 
    3.857
***
 
(0.944) 
    4.039
***
 
(0.953) 
    4.290
***
 
(0.959) 
    3.611
***
 
(0.952) 
    3.566
***
 
(0.954) 
    3.841
***
 
(0.959) 
    3.194
***
 
(0.953) 
Pinc 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
 
    1.770
***
 
(0.298) 
    1.759
***
 
(0.294) 
    1.761
***
 
(0.272) 
 
    1.393
***
 
(0.287) 
    1.397
***
 
(0.283) 
    1.387
***
 
(0.259) 
 
    1.546
***
 
(0.253) 
    1.465
***
 
(0.241) 
    1.409
***
 
(0.224) 
 
    1.213
***
 
(0.249) 
    1.167
***
 
(0.236) 
    1.101
***
 
(0.220) 
Insur  
(Base: Any Private)         
Only 
Public 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
  
    -4.944
***
 
 (0.710) 
    -4.879
***
 
  (0.715) 
    -5.081
***
 
  (0.689) 
    -3.939
***
 
 (0.733) 
    -3.866
***
 
 (0.736) 
    -4.072
***
 
 (0.707) 
  
    -4.316
***
 
 (0.670) 
    -4.117
***
 
 (0.682) 
    -4.244
***
 
 (0.661) 
   -3.441
***
 
(0.685) 
   -3.269
***
 
(0.694) 
   -3.443
***
 
(0.671) 
None 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
  
-1.237 
 (0.926) 
-1.331 
  (0.923) 
  -1.608
*
 
  (0.905) 
-0.696 
 (0.929) 
-0.785 
 (0.925) 
-1.064 
  (0.906) 
  
-0.703 
 (0.863) 
-0.590 
 (0.860) 
-0.759 
 (0.840) 
-0.234 
 (0.863) 
-0.142 
 (0.859) 
-0.339 
 (0.839) 
Note: One, two and three stars imply the statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively.  
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The general hypotheses that pertain to the four equations (I-IV) under each of the 
three models can be stated simply as-  
H0: Controlling for other factors in the equations, parental schooling has no     
      significant effects on child health 
H1: Controlling for other factors in the equations, parental schooling has  
      significant positive effects on child health 
 The positive marginal effects associated to the mother‟s and father‟s schooling 
(where parental schooling are measured in an increasing level of ordinal categories), 
and their being statistically highly significant (at 0.01 significance level) suggest that the 
variation in parental schooling pertaining to each equation explains the variation in child 
health (physical or mental) in support of the alternative hypothesis. In the following 
paragraphs I discuss the interpretations of these marginal effects in each of the four 
equations. I keep the analysis simple by referring to the bivariate probit results, which 
provide a better fit and are more flexible than probit (although the results in all three 
models are essentially identical).  
I. Interpretations of the Marginal Effects in Equation (I) 
In equation (I), as parental income and health insurance type of child are not held 
constant, any observed beneficial effects of the parental schooling are the total effects 
as defined earlier, inclusive of all income, insurance and non-monetary effects. The 
results suggest that (a) benefits of parental schooling increases with levels of schooling; 
(b) mother‟s schooling has greater impacts than father‟s; and (c)  the impacts of 
parental schooling on physical health of child is slightly larger than on mental health. For 
instance, relative to having No Degree, mother‟s having an HSD/GED increases the 
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probability that the reported physical health status of her child is Very Good/Excellent by 
about 6.4%. With mother‟s having a College Degree, this probability increases to about 
10.6%. Similar probabilities for the father‟s schooling are somewhat smaller, about 4.5% 
and 7.4% respectively. The gain in these probabilities on child‟s mental health are 5.6% 
and 8.8% respectively for HSD/GED and College Degree for mother‟s schooling, as 
opposed to 3.3% and 5.1% respectively for father‟s schooling, which all are slightly 
smaller than in the case of physical health. These gains might seem small but in the 
case where both parents have a College Degree (as opposed to No Degree), the gain is 
substantial, about 18% and 14% respectively on physical and mental health of child.    
II. Interpretations of the Marginal Effects in Equation (II) 
Equation (II) controls for the parental income while the health insurance type of 
child varies. The importance of parental income as such on child health is explained by 
the magnitudes and significance of the marginal effects on parental income. The results 
show that parental income has small but significant positive effects on child health, and 
the effects are practically similar for both physical and mental health (with marginally 
smaller magnitude for the latter). Also, the increase in the model fit with the inclusion of 
parental income in the equation can be statistically tested by using likelihood ratio, Wald 
or Score tests. For instance, I report below the results of Wald test under bivariate probit 
specification- 
H0: Inclusion of parental income in both physical and mental health  
      equations does not significantly increase the model fit. 
H1: Inclusion of parental income in both physical and mental health  
      equations significantly increases the model fit.   
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 Wald – χ2 (2)21 of 39.38 and the corresponding p-value of 0.00 suggests that the 
null hypothesis is rejected in support of the alternative hypothesis. In other words, there 
is significant gain in the model fit with the inclusion of parental income in equation (II) 
relative to equation (I). 
 The results show that a one hundred percentage increase in (or doubling) the 
total parental income (before taking their logarithms) increases the probability that the 
reported physical health status of the child is Very Good/Excellent by about 1.8%, as 
opposed to about 1.5% for mental health. It should be noted that, the contribution of 
parental income here is not attributable to any factor included in the equation. As 
insurance is not included, it may however include some effects of insurance through 
their interaction as explained in chapter 3. For instance, low income households tend to 
have public health insurance and high income households tend to have private health 
insurance for the children. In such a case, the observed importance of parental income 
might include the unobserved effects of health insurance.        
 After settling that income is an important factor - however small, any observed 
benefits of parental schooling on child health here are the effects of factors other than 
their income attributable to their schooling. In other words, the observed marginal 
effects associated to the parental schooling measure the combined non-monetary and 
„some‟ insurance effects (it would be the sum of the non-monetary and insurance 
effects, had the income and insurance effects been disjoint). The decline in the marginal 
effects on parental schooling in equation (II) relative to (I) captures the „overall‟ income 
effects of parental schooling, which may include some effects of income via its influence 
                                                          
21
 The degrees of freedom are two for one variable (parental income) and two equations (physical and 
mental health). 
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in insurance as discussed. The general conclusions, that positive impact on child health 
increases with levels of schooling; that mother‟s schooling has greater impacts than 
father‟s; and that the impacts on physical health of child is slightly larger than on mental 
health hold just as before, when parental income is controlled for. Now, relative to 
having No Degree, mother‟s having an HSD/GED increases the probability that the 
reported physical health status of her child is Very Good/Excellent by about 5.7%. With 
mother‟s having a College Degree, this probability is about 9.4%. Similar probabilities 
for the father‟s schooling are about 4.0% and 6.4% respectively. For mental health, 
these probabilities are about 5.0%, 7.8%, 2.9%, and 4.2% respectively, which all are 
slightly smaller (by up to 1.2 percentage points probabilities) than from equation (I). The 
conclusion is - out of the total effects of parental schooling on child health, very little is 
attributable to increased income due to higher level of parental schooling.  
III. Interpretations of the Marginal Effects in Equation (III) 
Equation (III) controls for the health insurance type of child, while the parental 
income varies. The importance of health insurance on child health is explained by the 
magnitudes and significance of the marginal effects on health insurance. The results 
show that Only Public as opposed to Any Private health insurance is statistically 
significant for both the physical and mental health of child. Also, the results of Wald test 
reported below shows that there is significant increase in the model fit with the inclusion 
of health insurance in equation (III) relative to equation (I) without it-  
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H0: Inclusion of health insurance in the equations does not significantly  
      increase the model fit.   
H1: Inclusion of health insurance in the equations significantly increases  
      the model fit.   
 Wald – χ2 (4)22 is 57.55, and the corresponding p-value is 0.00, which implies that 
there is significant gain in the fit of the model with the inclusion of health insurance in 
equation (III) relative to (I). The results show that having only public health insurance as 
opposed to having a private health insurance significantly lowers the probability that 
Very Good/Excellent child health status is observed, by about 4.9% and 4.3% for the 
physical and mental health respectively. Having No Insurance has no significant effects 
and the signs are negative.  
 Following the earlier argument, the observed contribution of health insurance on 
child health in equation (III) should be understood in light of income not being controlled 
for, which may in fact capture some role of parental income too. For instance, because 
the children with private health insurance are likely to have parents with better jobs and 
higher incomes (and children with public only health insurance tend to have parents with 
low income jobs), some of the observed importance of private health insurance may in 
fact be the effects of parental income that can be spent on health enhancing goods 
such as nutritious food. 
 After establishing that health insurance is an important factor, any observed 
benefits of parental schooling on child health then are the effects other than due to 
differences in health insurance type among the children. In other words, the observed 
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 The degree of freedom is four for the two categories of health insurance (only public and no insurance) 
and the two equations. 
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marginal effect associated with the parental schooling now measure the combined non-
monetary and some income effects. The decline in the marginal effects on parental 
schooling in equations (III) relative to (I) captures the overall insurance effects of 
parental schooling, which may include some effects of income due to the 
interchangeability of the roles of income and insurance as discussed earlier. The three 
general conclusions about the effects mother‟s and father‟s schooling on the physical 
and mental health of child still hold as before. Relative to having No Degree, mother‟s 
having an HSD/GED increases the probability that the reported physical health status of 
her child is Very Good/Excellent by about 5.6%. With mother‟s having a College 
Degree, this probability is about 9.2%. Similar probabilities for the father‟s schooling are 
about 3.8% and 6.2% respectively. For mental health, these probabilities are about 
4.9%, 7.6%, 2.7%, and 4.0% respectively, which all are slightly smaller (by 1.4 
percentage points or less) than in equation (I). Thus, out of the total effects of parental 
schooling on child health, very little is attributable to health insurance type, although 
health insurance in itself, particularly private as opposed to only public, seems to be an 
important factor.  
IV. Interpretations of the Marginal Effects in Equation (IV) 
Equation (IV) controls for both the parental income and the health insurance type 
of child, among others. The importance of income and health insurance on child health 
is explained by the magnitudes and significance of the marginal effects on these two 
variables. The results show that parental income and Only Public as opposed to Any 
Private health insurance are statistically significant. Also, the results of Wald test 
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reported below shows that there is significant increase in the model fit with the inclusion 
of parental income and child‟s health insurance type in the equations- 
H0: Inclusion of parental income and child’s health insurance type in the  
      equations does not significantly increase the model fit.  
H1: Inclusion of parental income and child’s health insurance type in the   
     equations significantly increases the model fit.   
 Wald – χ2 (6)23 is 83.71, and the corresponding p-value is 0.00, which implies that 
there is significant gain in the model fit with the inclusion of these two variables in 
equation (IV) relative to (I). Furthermore, inclusion of parental income in equation (III) or 
health insurance in (II) results into Wald – χ2 (2) = 26.11 with a p-value of 0.00, and 
Wald – χ2 (4) = 35.90 with a p-value of 0.00 respectively, implying that the equation (IV) 
fits better than equations (II) or (III) and justifies the role of these two factors in the 
equation in explaining child health.      
 It can be observed that the magnitudes of the effects of income and insurance in 
equation (IV) are only marginally smaller relative to (II) or (III). The results show that 
when health insurance is controlled for, a one hundred percentage increase in the total 
parental income increases the probability that the reported physical health status of the 
child is Very Good/Excellent by about 1.4% for physical health, and 1.2% for mental 
health (as opposed to 1.8% and 1.5% when insurance is not controlled for), and these 
are the „pure‟ contributions of parental income as distinguished from the latter which 
includes some effects of insurance as explained earlier. Similarly, when parental income 
is controlled for, having only public health insurance as opposed to having a private 
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 The degree of freedom is six for the two categories of health insurance (only public and no insurance), 
and parental income in the two equations. 
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health insurance significantly lowers the probability that Very Good/Excellent child 
health status is observed by about 3.9% for physical health and 3.4% for mental health 
(about a percentage point lower than when parental income is not controlled for). Thus 
these are the pure contributions of health insurance as distinguished from what is 
observed in equation (III) which includes some contributions of income. As before, 
having No Insurance has no significant effects and the signs are negative.  
 After establishing that parental income and child‟s health insurance type are 
jointly significant, any observed benefits of parental schooling on child health in 
equation (IV) are now the effects other than due to differences in parental income or 
health insurance type among the children. In other words, the observed marginal effects 
on the parental schooling are the non-monetary effects of parental schooling. The three 
general conclusions about the effects of mother‟s and father‟s schooling on the physical 
and mental health of child still hold as before. Relative to having No Degree, mother‟s 
having an HSD/GED increases the probability that the reported physical health status of 
her child is Very Good/Excellent by about 5.2%. With mother‟s having a College 
Degree, this probability is about 8.6%. Similar probabilities for the father‟s schooling are 
about 3.6% and 5.6% respectively. For mental health, these probabilities are about 
4.6% and 7.1% for mother‟s, and 2.5% and 3.6% for father‟s schooling respectively, 
which all are slightly smaller (by 2 percentage points or less) than in equation (I). These 
declines in the marginal effects on parental schooling in equation (IV) relative to 
equation (I) capture the combined income and insurance effects of parental schooling 
(or the monetary effects), which are relatively much smaller compared to the non-
monetary effects. 
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5.2.1.3 Decomposition of Total Effects of Parental Schooling 
The Table 4 below presents the decomposition of the total effects of parental 
schooling into overall income, insurance, monetary, and non-monetary effects using the 
results of the bivariate probit model. 
 
Table 4: Decomposing Total Effects of Parental Schooling on Child Health in Sample 1 
Child 
Health 
Parental 
Schooling 
(Base: No 
Degree) 
Total [%] 
(a) = (d) + (e)  
Income 
[%] 
(b) 
Insurance 
[%] 
(c) 
Monetary 
[%] 
(d) 
Non-monetary 
[%] 
(e) 
Physical 
Mother      
HSD/GED   6.4 [100] 0.7 [11] 0.8 [13] 1.2 [19] 5.2 [81] 
College 
Degree 
10.6 [100] 1.2 [11] 1.3 [13] 2.0 [19] 8.6 [81] 
Father      
HSD/GED   4.5 [100] 0.5 [10] 0.7 [16] 0.9 [21] 3.6 [79] 
College 
Degree 
  7.4 [100] 1.0 [14] 1.3 [17] 1.8 [24] 5.6 [76] 
Mental 
Mother      
HSD/GED   5.6 [100] 0.6 [11] 0.7 [12] 1.0 [18] 4.6 [82] 
College 
Degree 
  8.8 [100] 1.0 [12] 1.1 [13] 1.7 [19] 7.1 [81] 
Father      
HSD/GED   3.3 [100] 0.4 [12] 0.6 [18] 0.8 [24] 2.5 [76] 
College 
Degree 
  5.1 [100] 0.9 [17] 1.1 [21] 1.5 [30] 3.6 [70] 
 
The numbers without the brackets are the effects of parental schooling on child 
health, measured as the marginal impacts, namely the increase in the probability that 
the reported health status of the child is Very Good/Excellent as opposed to 
Poor/Fair/Good category. It should be noted that the income effects of parental 
schooling in the table show the „overall‟ effects of income, implying that insurance is not 
controlled for while these effects are being measured, and same is true with the 
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insurance effects, where income is not controlled for24. The sum of the separate income 
and insurance effects (columns „b‟ plus „c‟) measured this way is technically greater 
than the overall monetary effects (column „d‟) by the contribution of the overlapped 
portion of income and insurance effects (which is very small, less than 0.5 percentage 
points in probabilities) and is not shown in the table. Clearly, the sum of the overall 
monetary and the non-monetary effects (columns „d‟ and „e‟) equals the total effects 
(column „a‟). Also, the numbers inside the square brackets represent the relative 
importance of each component effect as a share of the total effects (normalized at 100) 
in each row.  
All five measures of the effects of parental schooling increase with the levels of 
schooling with mother‟s schooling having greater impacts than father‟s and the impacts 
on physical health of child being slightly larger than on mental health. Both income and 
insurance effects are much smaller than the non-monetary effects, and are almost equal 
for both physical and mental health of child for a particular level of parental schooling, 
and marginally increase with the level of schooling. Most of the beneficial effects of 
parental schooling on child health are the non-monetary effects, and these are about 
four-fifths of the total effects for mother‟s schooling and slightly less for father‟s 
schooling. Accordingly, the overall monetary effects accounts for about one-fifth of the 
total effects for mother‟s schooling and slightly more for father‟s schooling.  
  
                                                          
24
 These income and insurance effects could also be measured by controlling the other each time one is 
measured, but the general conclusions would not be significantly different, as the effects of income and 
insurance themselves, as well as their joint contributions are very small.   
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Figure 5: Decomposing Total Effects of Parental Schooling into Monetary and 
Non-monetary Effects in Sample 1 
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Figure 5 pictorially illustrates the decomposition of total effects of parental 
schooling into the overall monetary and non-monetary effects. The monetary or income 
equivalents of the non-monetary effects of parental schooling on child health are difficult 
to estimate. One reason is that the health benefits of a given increase in income may 
vary widely depending on several factors including the initial level of income that 
together determine the expenditure patterns of the households. But more importantly, 
the parents can spend a given endowment of income only once (and it depletes after 
every spending), whereas the knowledge and information acquired through higher 
schooling for example can be used multiple times (and may become even more 
effective after every use). So the computed income equivalents of the non-monetary 
effects are likely to be underestimated. Nonetheless, just to get a rough idea, the non-
monetary effects of a mother‟s having a College Degree (as opposed to having No 
Degree) is at least as effectual as an increase of income by 6.1 folds (which is 8.6 
divided by 1.4, where the former is the estimate for the corresponding non-monetary 
effects, and the latter is the estimate for the marginal effects on parental income) in 
terms of lifting the child‟s physical health from the lower to the upper category. Similar 
equivalent of the non-monetary effects of father‟s having a College Degree can be 
estimated as an income transfer by 4.0 folds. Similar estimates for mental health are 
slightly small, about 5.9 and 6.0 folds respectively for mother‟s and father‟s schooling.  
In summary, parental schooling plays an important role in determining child 
health, and the smaller monetary effects and relatively larger non-monetary effects 
imply that most of the effects of parental schooling on child health transmit through the 
channel other than the income and insurance, possibly in the form of better access to 
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relevant health care information, ability to process these information, and increased 
willingness to implement on these information. I presume that better schooling helps the 
parents bring about healthy attitudes, tastes and behaviors within the family, prioritize 
and allocate the resources better, provide timely care of the health related issues, and 
eventually increase efficiency and child health productivity.  
Also, controlling for parental schooling, parental income and insurance type of 
child can both explain the variation in child health to some degree, where the insurance 
seems to be more important factor than income. For instance, having any private 
insurance as opposed to only public health insurance increases the probability of 
reporting Very Good/Excellent child health status by about 3.9% and 3.4% for physical 
and mental health of child, while doubling of the income increases these probabilities 
only by 1.4% and 1.2% respectively (or income needs to be increased by roughly 2.8 
folds to achieve similar effects as the private insurance). This should not be interpreted 
too rigidly however, as various factors including the parental schooling together 
determine the income and health insurance. Nonetheless, this might suggest that higher 
parental income is associated with better (private) health insurance of the child, and 
better child health. Also, almost equal (although small) income and insurance effects of 
parental schooling, while insurance being relatively more important factor than income, 
might suggest that parental income in itself is relatively less important than health 
insurance for child health, but is more closely attributable to parental schooling, and vice 
versa. 
 
  
83 
 
 
5.2.2 Regression Results for Sample 2 with Single Mothers 
Sample 2 includes the 13,524 children in the households with single mother. 
Hence the parental characteristics pertaining to father, namely father‟s schooling 
(FaSch), father‟s health (FaHlth), and father‟s smoking habit (Fsmok) are missing in the 
equations, and the total parental income (Pinc) is replaced by mother‟s total income 
(Minc). All other explanatory variables are same as in Sample 1. Along with mother‟s 
schooling and other factors, the equation (I) in each model excludes both mother‟s 
income and child‟s health insurance; equation (II) includes mother‟s income but does 
not include health insurance; equation (III) includes health insurance but does not 
include mother‟s income; and equation (IV) includes both mother‟s income and child‟s 
health insurance.  
 Appendix 5 reports the coefficients associated with the bivariate probit, probit and 
ordered probit models for Sample 2, and Appendix 6 reports the corresponding marginal 
effects computed from the estimated model coefficients (a portion of which will be 
reproduced shortly as Table 6 for discussion). Each of the three models in all four 
equations and for both dependent variables is overall highly significant with large Wald 
Chi-squared statistics, and most of the coefficients and the marginal effects have 
expected signs and are statistically significant. The overall results (coefficients, marginal 
effects and the standard errors) are largely similar to Sample 1, and the standard errors 
are marginally smaller in general under bivariate probit and ordered probit than under 
probit specifications. The conclusion that bivariate probit fits better than the probit holds 
as in Sample 1 with marginally smaller value of the estimated correlation coefficient (  = 
84 
 
 
0.853 as opposed to 0.895 in Sample 1) between the error terms in the physical and 
mental health equations.  
For the full equation (IV), the Table 5 below presents the marginal, joint and 
conditional probabilities that pertain to a typical child having Very Good/Excellent health 
status for each measure of health (physical or mental) for both samples 1 and 2 for 
comparison. 
 
Table 5: Marginal, Joint and Conditional Probabilities Pertaining to Child Health  
In Sample 2 
 
Bivariate Probit Results 
(Sample 2) 
Bivariate Probit Results 
(Sample 1) 
 
P (HLTH =1) 0.779 0.837  
P (MLTH = 1) 0.799 0.861  
P (HLTH = 1, MLTH = 1) 0.725 0.807  
P (HLTH =1 | MLTH =1) 0.908 0.938  
P (MLTH = 1 | HLTH =1) 0.931 0.964  
 
A typical child has a probability of about 77.9% to have Very Good/Excellent 
physical health status as opposed to the lower categories. Similar probability for mental 
health is about 79.9%. These are about 6% point smaller than in Sample 1. There is 
about 72.5% chance that the child has Very Good/Excellent physical and mental health, 
which is about 8% point lower than in Sample 1. Given that a child has Very 
Good/Excellent mental health, there is about 90.8% chance that he/she has Very 
Good/Excellent physical health, and given that a child has Very Good/Excellent physical 
health, there is about 93.1% chance that he/she has Very Good/Excellent mental 
health, both of which are about three percentage points lower than in Sample 1. The 
result supports the evidence that both physical and mental health reinforce one another, 
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and that the contribution of physical health on mental health is slightly greater than of 
mental health on physical health. To discuss the marginal effects of mother‟s schooling 
on the physical and mental health of child and the three channels, I present below a 
portion of Appendix 6 as Table 6.  
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Table 6: Selected Estimated Marginal Effects in Sample 2 
(N = 13,524) 
Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
MoSch  
(Base: No Degree) 
        
HSD/GED 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
    5.396
***
 
(1.180) 
    5.609
***
 
(1.202) 
    5.649
***
 
(1.144) 
    4.961
***
 
(1.196) 
    5.171
***
 
(1.219) 
    5.139
***
 
(1.160) 
    4.682
***
 
(1.174) 
    4.856
***
 
(1.196) 
    4.893
***
 
(1.136) 
    4.445
***
 
(1.187) 
    4.623
***
 
(1.211) 
    4.598
***
 
(1.149) 
    6.622
***
 
(1.190) 
    6.976
***
 
(1.236) 
    6.806
***
 
(1.169) 
    6.110
***
 
(1.205) 
    6.432
***
 
(1.252) 
    6.277
***
 
(1.182) 
    6.127
***
 
(1.187) 
    6.441
***
 
(1.233) 
    6.186
***
 
(1.164) 
    5.778
***
 
(1.199) 
    6.073
***
 
(1.246) 
    5.849
***
 
(1.174) 
College 
Degree 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
    9.195
***
 
(1.446) 
    9.713
***
 
(1.478) 
    9.190
***
 
(1.447) 
    8.467
***
 
(1.497) 
    8.992
***
 
(1.529) 
    8.337
***
 
(1.494) 
    7.235
***
 
(1.525) 
    7.686
***
 
(1.561) 
    7.098
***
 
(1.516) 
    6.863
***
 
(1.557) 
    7.326
***
 
(1.593) 
    6.634
***
 
(1.546) 
    9.582
***
 
(1.432) 
  10.371
***
 
(1.479) 
    9.624
***
 
(1.438) 
    8.722
***
 
(1.483) 
    9.485
***
 
(1.534) 
    8.741
***
 
(1.486) 
    8.218
***
 
(1.508) 
    8.952
***
 
(1.559) 
    7.963
***
 
(1.516) 
    7.669
***
 
(1.540) 
    8.387
***
 
(1.594) 
    7.431
***
 
(1.546) 
Minc 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
 
   0.414
**
 
(0.182) 
   0.418
**
 
(0.185) 
    0.495
***
 
(0.183)  
0.265 
(0.186) 
0.262 
(0.188) 
 0.339
*
 
(0.187)  
    0.487
***
 
(0.178) 
    0.509
***
 
(0.183) 
    0.509
***
 
(0.173)  
   0.394
**
 
(0.181) 
   0.407
**
 
(0.187) 
   0.386
**
 
(0.176) 
Insur  
(Base: Any Private)         
Only 
Public 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
  
    -5.588
***
 
 (1.037) 
    -5.889
***
 
 (1.062) 
     6.042
***
 
 (1.018) 
   -5.324
***
 
(1.055) 
   -5.631
***
 
(1.079) 
   -5.706
***
 
(1.036)   
   -3.949
***
 
(1.027) 
   -4.271
***
 
(1.072) 
   -4.934
***
 
(1.015) 
   -3.541
***
 
(1.048) 
   -3.860
***
 
(1.094) 
   -4.546
***
 
(1.034) 
None 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
  
-1.885 
 (1.718) 
-2.217 
 (1.754) 
-2.302 
 (1.719) 
-1.640 
 (1.730) 
-1.976 
 (1.767) 
-1.990 
  (1.735)   
0.917 
(1.617) 
0.492 
(1.654) 
-0.056 
 (1.608) 
1.274 
(1.634) 
0.850 
(1.672) 
0.274 
(1.626) 
Note: One, two and three stars imply the statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively.  
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The contributions of income are even smaller than in Sample 1. The probability of 
observing Very Good/Excellent physical or mental health when income doubles is less 
than 1% when health insurance is not controlled for, and they are statistically 
insignificant for physical health when the health insurance is controlled for. In the full 
equation (IV) where income is controlled for, having Only Public health insurance as 
opposed to having Any Private health insurance significantly lowers the probability that 
Very Good/Excellent child health status is observed by about 5.3% for physical health 
(about 1 percentage point higher than in Sample 1) and 3.5% for mental health (similar 
to Sample 1). Having No Insurance has no significant effects as in Sample 1.  
The general hypotheses that mother‟s schooling has significant positive effects 
on child health hold true for all four equations (I-IV) under each of the three models and 
the essential results are identical with marginally different magnitudes. The Table 7 
below presents the decomposition of the total effects of mother‟s schooling into overall 
income, insurance, monetary and non-monetary effects using the results of the bivariate 
probit model.  
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Table 7: Various Components of the Total Effects of Mother’s Schooling on Child 
Health in Sample 2 
Child 
Health 
Mother’s 
Schooling 
(Base: No 
Degree) 
Total [%] 
(a) = (d) + (e)  
Income 
[%] 
(b) 
Insurance 
[%] 
(c) 
Monetary 
[%] 
(d) 
Non-monetary 
[%] 
(e) 
       
Physical HSD/GED 
  5.4 [100] 
  6.4 [100] 
0.4 [8] 
  0.7 [11] 
 0.7 [13] 
 0.8 [13] 
1.0 [18] 
1.2 [19] 
4.4 [82] 
5.2 [81] 
 
College 
Degree 
  9.2 [100] 
10.6 [100] 
0.7 [8] 
  1.2 [11] 
 2.0 [21] 
 1.3 [13] 
2.3 [25] 
2.0 [19] 
6.9 [75] 
8.6 [81] 
Mental HSD/GED 
   6.6 [100] 
  5.6 [100] 
0.5 [8] 
  0.6 [11] 
0.5 [7] 
 0.7 [12] 
0.8 [13] 
1.0 [18] 
5.8 [87] 
4.6 [82] 
 
College 
Degree 
  9.6 [100] 
  8.8 [100] 
0.9 [9] 
  1.0 [12] 
 1.4 [14] 
 1.1 [13] 
1.9 [20] 
1.7 [19] 
7.7 [80] 
7.1 [81] 
 
The numbers without the brackets are the effects of parental schooling on child 
health, measured as the increase in the probability that the reported health status of the 
child is Very Good/Excellent as opposed to Poor/Fair/Good. For instance, relative to 
having No Degree, mother‟s having an HSD/GED increases the probability that the 
reported physical health status of her child is Very Good/Excellent by about 5.4% as 
total effects, by 0.4% as income effects, by 0.7% as insurance effects, by 1.0% as 
combined monetary effects, and by 4.4% as non-monetary effects. Corresponding 
probabilities associated to mother‟s having a College Degree are 9.2%, 0.7%, 2.0%, 
2.3%, and 6.9% respectively. The numbers inside the square brackets represent the 
relative importance of each component effect as a share of the total effects (normalized 
at 100) in each row. The bottom values in italics in each cell are the corresponding 
effects of mother‟s schooling in Sample 1 for comparison. 
The effects of mother‟s schooling are slightly smaller on physical health and 
slightly larger on mental health of child in this sample than in Sample 1. Also, contrary to 
Sample 1, the impacts on mental health are slightly greater than on physical health in 
this sample in terms of total, income, and non-monetary effects, and that the insurance 
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effects are somewhat larger than the income effects. Except for these marginal 
differences, the results are not substantially different in the two samples in terms of the 
increasing effects of the levels of mother‟s schooling, overall size of the total effects, the 
largest share of non-monetary effects (from three-fourths to seven-eighths compared to 
four-fifths in Sample 1), and the smallest share of income and insurance effects (one-
fourth or less share of monetary effects compared to one-fifth in Sample 1). Figure 6 
below pictorially illustrates the decomposition of total effects of mother‟s schooling on 
physical and mental health of child into the overall monetary and non-monetary effects 
for both samples for comparison.   
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Figure 6: Decomposing Total Effects of Mother’s Schooling into 
Monetary and Non-monetary Effects 
(Samples 1 & 2) 
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5.2.3 Subgroup Analysis in Sample 1 
In this section, I briefly compare the results of the bivariate probit model across 
selected subgroups of the main Sample 1 with both parents present - namely by age-
group, sex, race and economic status. For this, the sample is grouped into three age-
groups, namely the bottom age-group of infants, toddlers and preschoolers between the 
ages 0-5 years; the middle age-group of middle childhood between the ages 6-11 years; 
and the top age-group of young teens and teenagers between the ages 12-17 years. 
Similarly the sample is grouped into Male and Female; into White, Black, Hispanic and 
Other races; and into Low and High economic status, where the former includes the 
poor, near poor and low income households, and the latter includes the middle and high 
income households.     
The following Table 8 reports the various marginal, joint and conditional 
probabilities pertaining to the physical and mental health status of the children across 
different subgroups as estimated from the full equation (IV) that includes both parental 
income and child‟s health insurance. 
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Table 8: Marginal, Joint and Conditional Probabilities 
Pertaining to Child Health Across Subgroups 
 
Sub 
Groups 
N 
ρ 
(s.e.) 
P(H =1) P(M = 1) P(H = 1, M = 1) P(H =1 | M =1) P(M = 1 | H =1) 
Total  31756 
 0.894 
(0.005) 
0.837 0.861 0.807 0.938 0.964 
Sex 
Male 16217 
 0.879 
(0.006) 
0.833 0.852 0.797 0.935 0.956 
Female 15539 
 0.910 
(0.006) 
0.842 0.870 0.818 0.940 0.971 
Age 
Group 
0-5 11717 
 0.911 
(0.007) 
0.850 0.901 0.838 0.930 0.986 
6-11 10385 
 0.901 
(0.007) 
0.841 0.855 0.808 0.946 0.961 
12-17 9654 
 0.875 
(0.008) 
0.819 0.819 0.768 0.938 0.939 
Race 
White 14108 
 0.836 
(0.010) 
0.895 0.901 0.859 0.953 0.959 
Black 3177 
 0.908 
(0.013) 
0.847 0.864 0.815 0.943 0.962 
Hispanic 11819 
 0.925 
(0.005) 
0.758 0.804 0.734 0.912 0.968 
Other 2652 
 0.923 
(0.014) 
0.880 0.897 0.856 0.955 0.973 
Econ. 
Status 
Low 13857 
 0.912 
(0.005) 
0.759 0.798 0.727 0.912 0.958 
High 17899 
 0.866 
(0.008) 
0.899 0.910 0.869 0.956 0.968 
Note: „H‟ and „M‟ refer to physical and mental health status of child.  
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The high correlation coefficients (from 0.84 to 0.93) between the error terms in 
the physical and mental health equations and their statistical significance show that the 
bivariate probit model is a better fit than the isolated probit models in each subgroup. 
The higher conditional probabilities in the last two columns relative to the smaller 
marginal and joint probabilities imply that both physical and mental health of child 
reinforce one-another in each subgroup, where contributions of physical health on 
mental health are slightly higher than the contributions of mental health on physical 
health. The male and female children have practically similar (with the females having 
slightly higher) probabilities of having the best physical and mental health in terms of all 
marginal, joint and conditional sense. The bottom, followed by the middle age-groups, 
has by and large better physical and mental health than the top age-group. Conditional 
upon Very Good/Excellent mental health, the probabilities of having Very 
Good/Excellent physical health are similar (around 94%) in all age-groups. However the 
probability of having Very Good/Excellent mental health conditional upon Very 
Good/Excellent physical health is highest (99%) for the bottom age-group, followed by 
middle (96%) and top (94%) age-groups. White has the best physical and mental health 
outcomes followed by the Other race and Black; and Hispanic has the worst outcomes. 
But the differences narrow down for the conditional probabilities. The high income group 
clearly has better child health outcomes in all measures, but the differences on the 
conditional probabilities are smaller.  
Appendices 7-10 report the marginal effects obtained from the bivariate probit 
regressions on each of these subgroups. The Table 9 below reports the marginal effects 
of parental income and the health insurance type of child across the subgroups 
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corresponding to the full equation (IV). Parental income has small but significant 
positive effects on both physical and mental health of child across all subgroups except 
Black and Other race (mainly due to large standard errors possibly from small sample 
size). These effects are marginally smaller for mental health, and relatively greater for 
Hispanic and high25 income groups. Similarly, health insurance by and large seems to 
be an important factor too. In particular, the health reducing effects of Public Only as 
opposed to Any Private health insurance are mostly prominent in Hispanic than in other 
subgroups.     
  
                                                          
25
 The apparently greater effects on high income groups are not surprising as these measured effects in 
fact correspond to doubling of parental income rather than a unit change in income.   
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Table 9: Marginal Effects of Parental Income and Child’s Health  
Insurance Type Across Subgroups 
 
Sub 
Groups 
N Physical Health Mental Health 
   Pinc Insur Pinc Insur 
    Only Public  None  Only Public  None 
Total  31756 
    1.393
***
 
(0.287) 
    -3.939
***
 
 (0.733) 
  -0.696 
    (0.929) 
    1.213
***
 
(0.249) 
    -3.441
***
 
 (0.685) 
-0.234 
  (0.863) 
Sex 
Male 16217 
    1.252
***
 
(0.353) 
    -4.329
***
 
 (0.912) 
    0.411 
    (1.112) 
    1.173
***
 
(0.323) 
    -4.066
***
 
 (0.875) 
 -0.031 
   (1.067) 
Female 15539 
    1.559
***
 
(0.359) 
    -3.540
***
 
 (0.928) 
   -1.864 
    (1.204) 
    1.291
***
 
(0.313) 
    -2.839
***
 
(0.839) 
 -0.442 
  (1.066) 
Age 
Group 
0-5 11717 
    0.800
***
 
(0.339) 
    -3.308
***
 
 (0.960) 
   -1.769 
    (1.380) 
    0.922
***
 
(0.263) 
    -2.155
***
 
 (0.771) 
 -1.720 
  (1.148) 
6-11 10385 
    1.507
***
 
(0.509) 
    -4.150
***
 
 (1.115) 
    0.441 
    (1.385) 
    1.566
***
 
(0.464) 
    -3.503
***
 
 (1.057) 
  0.390 
  (1.369) 
12-17 9654 
    1.935
***
 
(0.486) 
    -4.222
***
 
 (1.238) 
  -1.147 
   (1.440) 
    1.195
***
 
(0.480) 
    -4.041
***
 
 (1.277) 
 -0.147 
  (1.428) 
Race 
White 14108 
    1.329
***
 
(0.351) 
    -3.163
***
 
 (0.919) 
   0.467 
   (1.362) 
    0.900
***
 
(0.337) 
    -3.025
***
 
 (0.882) 
  0.721 
  (1.301) 
Black 3177 
1.222 
(0.948) 
-1.676 
 (2.038) 
 -0.549 
  (3.271) 
0.871 
(0.891) 
-1.887 
 (1.887) 
  0.625 
  (3.115) 
Hispanic 11819 
    2.246
***
 
(0.595) 
    -6.431
***
 
 (1.369) 
 -2.692 
  (1.729) 
    2.099
***
 
(0.459) 
    -5.309
***
 
 (1.248) 
-1.598 
 (1.615) 
Other 2652 
0.237 
(0.584) 
-2.516 
 (2.151) 
 -0.342 
  (3.402) 
0.410 
(0.503) 
-0.530 
  (2.139) 
-1.676 
 (2.987) 
Economi
c Status 
Low 13857 
    0.945
***
 
(0.403) 
    -2.952
***
 
 (1.258) 
  0.895 
  (1.701) 
    0.924
***
 
(0.358) 
    -2.626
**
 
   (1.188) 
 1.876 
 (1.574) 
High 17899 
    2.281
***
 
(0.603) 
    -2.750
***
 
 (1.001) 
 -0.266 
   (1.043) 
    1.668
***
 
(0.531) 
    -2.288
**
 
   (0.962) 
-0.947 
 (1.003) 
Note: 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 imply the statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively.  
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Table 10 below highlights the total (denoted „T‟) and non-monetary (denoted 
„NM‟) effects of parental schooling on child health reproduced from the appendices 7-10 
for the purpose of comparing across these subgroups. In particular, the numbers in the 
table measure the increase in the probability that the reported health (physical or 
mental) of the child is Very Good/Excellent as opposed to Poor/Fair/Good category as 
parental schooling increases to the given level with No Degree as the reference point in 
each of the equations (I), where parental income and child‟s health insurance type vary, 
and (IV), where these two variables are controlled for. Also, the difference in the total 
and non-monetary effects represent the share of monetary (combined income and 
insurance) effects of parental schooling, and are not shown in the table.  
The three general conclusions for the whole sample indicate: (1) that parental 
schooling has health enhancing effects on child; (2) that mother‟s schooling has greater 
effects than father‟s; and (3) that effects on mental health are slightly smaller than on 
physical health.  These conclusions largely hold across the subgroups. Also, as seen 
earlier for the entire sample, most of the effects of parental schooling (more than three-
fourth in most of the subgroups) transmit through the non-monetary channel so that the 
share of the monetary effects shrinks to less than one-fourth in general.  
Mothers' effects seem to be somewhat larger on male child than on female by 
about 1-2 percentage points in terms of both physical and mental health, whereas 
father's effects are practically similar on both male and female. Both mother's and 
father's effects are clearly largest for the top age-group, by up to 5 percentage points 
increase in the probabilities that the health outcome is Very Good/Excellent. The effects 
on the other two age-groups are essentially alike. Also, the effects of father's schooling 
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on the top age-group is particularly larger, and more so for College Degree by about 3-5 
percentage points increase in the probabilities compared with the other two age-groups. 
Across the race, the effects are largely statistically insignificant for the Other race, 
followed by Black and White, and more so in the non-monetary effects than in the total 
effects. These insignificances are the result of large standard errors relative to the small 
effects (see Appendix 9), likely exacerbated by the small number of observations in the 
case of these two races. However, the effects on Hispanic are highly significant and 
particularly higher than in any other racial groups, mostly by up to 5-6 percentage points 
increase in probability than the White counterparts, and by slightly smaller difference 
with Black. Across the economic status, the effects on the low income group are 
generally larger by up to 5 percentage points probabilities. Particularly father's having a 
College Degree results into greater effects on both physical and mental health of child, 
and mother's having a College Degree results into greater effects on mental health for 
the low income groups. 
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Table 10: Total and Non-monetary Effects of Parental Schooling on Child Health 
Across Selected Subgroups 
C
h
il
d
 H
e
a
lt
h
 
Parent 
 
Parental 
Schoolin
g 
(Base: No 
Degree) 
E
ff
e
c
t 
T
y
p
e
 
All 
Sex Age-Group Race 
Economic 
Status 
M
 
F
 
0
-5
 
6
-1
1
 
1
2
-1
7
 
W
 
B
 
H
 
O
 
L
 
H
 
P
h
y
s
ic
a
l M
o
th
e
r HSD/GED 
T  6.4  7.0  5.8  6.4  6.3  6.7  3.2  5.2  7.9  4.7  6.1  5.6 
NM  5.2  5.9  4.6  5.5  5.2  5.2  2.0  4.4  6.5  4.5  5.7  4.6 
College 
Degree 
T 10.6 10.5 10.7 10.8 10.6 10.6  6.8  8.9 12.8 10.3  8.1  9.0 
NM  8.6  8.6  8.6  9.2  8.6  8.4  4.8  7.3  9.9  9.8  7.6  7.4 
F
a
th
e
r HSD/GED 
T  4.5  4.6  4.4  3.7  4.0  6.1  1.8  2.0  6.9  0.1  3.9  3.6 
NM  3.6  3.7  3.4  3.1  3.2  4.7  0.9  1.4  5.9 -0.6  3.7  2.8 
College 
Degree 
T  7.4  7.5  7.4  5.7  6.5 10.4  3.9  7.0 10.1  2.3  8.8  4.7 
NM  5.6  5.6  5.6  4.3  4.6  8.3  2.3  5.7  7.3  1.0  7.9  3.4 
M
e
n
ta
l 
M
o
th
e
r HSD/GED 
T  5.6  6.7  4.6  4.9  5.8  6.7  3.1  4.0  6.8  3.0  5.2  5.0 
NM  4.6  5.6  3.6  4.1  4.7  5.6  2.1  3.3  5.6  2.7  4.9  4.2 
College 
Degree 
T  8.8  9.4  8.2  8.2  9.4  9.1  5.8  5.9 11.5  6.0  9.0  6.7 
NM  7.1  7.6  6.6  6.9  7.6  7.5  4.2  4.6  8.9  5.6  8.6  5.5 
F
a
th
e
r HSD/GED 
T  3.3  3.1  3.4  3.1  2.4  4.4  0.5  3.1  5.3  1.6  3.1  2.1 
NM  2.5  2.2  2.7  2.6  1.6  3.4 -0.3  2.5  4.4  1.4  2.8  1.5 
College 
Degree 
T  5.1  5.0  5.1  3.7  4.3  7.5  2.0  7.4  5.4  3.8  5.6  2.8 
NM  3.6  3.3  3.7  2.5  2.5  5.9  0.8  6.3  3.0  3.4  4.7  1.8 
Note: The numbers in italics are statistically significant at 0.1 level, and the numbers highlighted in gray represent 
statistically insignificance. All other numbers represent significant at .05 or .01 levels.   
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5.2.4 Effects of Other Factors on Child Health 
In this section I assess the effects of other factors included in the regression 
models on the physical and mental health of child. For this, I reproduce the marginal 
effects of these factors in the bivariate probit results for Sample 1 (with both parents 
present) from Appendix 4 as Table 11 below, and briefly highlight how these impacts 
compare across Sample 2 (with single mother) and the selected subgroups of Sample 
1. To keep it simple yet informative, I resort mainly to the qualitative analysis referring to 
appendices 6-10 without re-reporting the actual figures for Sample 2 and the selected 
subgroups. Mostly the results in the four equations (I-IV) differ only marginally, and I 
shall mainly refer only to the full equation (IV) that includes both the parental income 
and child‟s health insurance type.  
  
100 
 
 
Table 11: Marginal Effects of Other Factors in Sample 1 
Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
Age 
    -0.304
***
 
 (0.064) 
   -0.320
***
 
(0.064) 
   -0.359
***
 
(0.065) 
   -0.363
***
 
(0.064) 
   -0.635
***
 
(0.060) 
   -0.647
***
 
(0.060) 
    -0.685
***
 
 (0.061) 
   -0.686
***
 
(0.060) 
Female 
     1.001
***
 
 (0.398) 
   0.961
**
 
(0.398) 
    1.040
***
 
(0.397) 
    1.003
***
 
(0.397) 
    2.016
***
 
(0.369) 
     1.978
***
 
 (0.368) 
     2.047
*** 
 (0.368) 
    2.013
***
 
(0.368) 
Brthrd 
     1.758
***
 
 (0.454) 
    1.914
*** 
(0.455) 
    1.827
***
 
(0.454) 
    1.937
***
 
(0.454) 
    1.290
***
 
(0.419) 
     1.426
***
 
 (0.419) 
     1.352
***
 
 (0.418) 
    1.447
***
 
(0.418) 
Chldrn 
 0.218 
 (0.259) 
0.258 
(0.258) 
0.352 
(0.260) 
0.356 
(0.259) 
-0.411
*
 
(0.244) 
-0.376 
 (0.243) 
-0.293 
 (0.244) 
-0.289 
 (0.243) 
Child_5 
-0.140 
 (0.743) 
0.050 
(0.743) 
0.028 
(0.741) 
0.143 
(0.742) 
1.055 
(0.703) 
  1.220
*
 
 (0.702) 
   1.199
*
 
  (0.702) 
  1.300
*
 
 (0.702) 
Race 
(Base: 
White) 
        
Black 
   -3.544
***
 
(0.965) 
   -3.151
***
 
(0.963) 
   -3.052
***
 
(0.968) 
  -2.828
***
 
(0.966) 
    -3.088
***
 
 (0.912) 
   -2.734
***
 
(0.910) 
  -2.641
***
 
(0.916) 
   -2.438
***
 
(0.913) 
Hispanic 
   -6.389
***
 
(0.748) 
   -5.899
***
 
(0.746) 
   -5.551
***
 
(0.753) 
   -5.350
***
 
(0.752) 
    -4.199
***
 
 (0.708) 
   -3.779
***
 
(0.709) 
   -3.517
***
 
(0.715) 
   -3.344
***
 
(0.715) 
Other 
  -2.437
**
 
(1.046) 
 -2.046
**
 
(1.046) 
 -2.196
**
 
(1.055) 
-1.939
*
 
(1.053) 
-1.281 
 (1.001) 
-0.933 
 (0.998) 
-1.069 
 (1.013) 
-0.842 
 (1.009) 
MSA 
     2.176
***
 
 (0.769) 
    1.926
***
 
(0.764) 
     1.946
***
 
 (0.765) 
   1.788
**
 
(0.761) 
     2.699
***
 
 (0.750) 
     2.478
***
 
 (0.745) 
     2.488
***
 
(0.747) 
     2.349
***
 
 (0.744) 
Region 
(Base: 
NE) 
        
MW 
  -1.860
**
 
(0.955) 
 -1.956
**
 
(0.957) 
 -2.112
**
 
(0.956) 
 -2.140
**
 
(0.957) 
   -2.525
***
 
(0.894) 
   -2.595
***
 
(0.895) 
   -2.749
***
 
(0.896) 
   -2.765
***
 
(0.897) 
S 
 -1.854
**
 
(0.857) 
  -1.747
**
 
 (0.857) 
  -1.792
**
 
 (0.854) 
 -1.735
**
 
(0.854) 
0.874 
(0.786) 
-0.765 
 (0.784) 
-0.838 
 (0.783) 
-0.777 
 (0.782) 
W 
0.181 
(0.887) 
-0.008 
 (0.890) 
 0.095 
 (0.885) 
-0.036 
 (0.888) 
0.836 
(0.831) 
-0.990 
 (0.834) 
-0.903 
 (0.830) 
-1.011 
 (0.832) 
MoHlth 
    0.367
***
 
(0.032) 
     0.360
***
 
 (0.032) 
     0.354
***
 
(0.032) 
     0.351
***
 
(0.032) 
    0.391
***
 
(0.029) 
     0.385
***
 
(0.029) 
     0.379
***
 
 (0.029) 
     0.376
***
 
 (0.029) 
FaHlth 
     0.247
***
 
 (0.035) 
     0.227
***
 
 (0.035) 
     0.232
***
 
(0.035) 
    0.219
***
 
 (0.035) 
     0.274
***
 
 (0.032) 
     0.256
***
 
 (0.033) 
     0.260
***
 
(0.032) 
     0.248
***
 
 (0.032) 
Msmok 
 0.357 
 (0.814) 
 0.616 
 (0.807) 
 0.590 
 (0.810) 
 0.749 
 (0.805) 
-0.825 
 (0.792) 
-0.589 
 (0.785) 
-0.615 
 (0.788) 
-0.471 
 (0.783) 
Fsmok 
-0.933 
 (0.721) 
-0.764 
  (0.715) 
-0.602 
 (0.716) 
-0.531 
 (0.712) 
-0.759 
  (0.688) 
-0.615 
 (0.683) 
-0.475 
 (0.685) 
-0.416 
 (0.682) 
Panel 
(Base: 6) 
        
7 
-1.149 
 (1.159) 
-0.981 
 (1.164) 
-0.798 
 (1.169) 
-0.728 
 (1.171) 
-1.323 
  (1.111) 
-1.187 
 (1.119) 
-1.009 
 (1.125) 
-0.955 
 (1.129) 
8 
 0.373 
 (1.140) 
 0.599 
 (1.145) 
 0.870 
 (1.148) 
 0.959 
 (1.151) 
 -0.321 
  (1.101) 
-0.131 
 (1.105) 
 0.123 
 (1.111) 
 0.197 
 (1.113) 
9 
-1.004 
 (1.151) 
-0.788 
 (1.154) 
-0.451 
 (1.159) 
-0.379 
 (1.160) 
-1.669 
 (1.100) 
-1.482 
 (1.104) 
-1.174 
  (1.110) 
-1.112 
 (1.111) 
10 
-0.572 
(1.137) 
-0.277 
 (1.139) 
 0.081 
 (1.145) 
 0.200 
 (1.146) 
 0.606 
 (1.080) 
-0.350 
 (1.082) 
 -0.025 
  (1.090) 
 0.081 
 (1.091) 
11 
1.168 
(1.147) 
 1.484 
 (1.151) 
  1.834
*
 
(1.150) 
  1.965
*
 
 (1.153) 
 1.177 
 (1.078) 
 1.443 
 (1.081) 
   1.773
*
 
 (1.087) 
 1.881
*
 
(1.088) 
12 
     4.981
***
 
 (1.119) 
     5.453
***
 
 (1.121) 
     5.667
***
 
 (1.126) 
     5.909
***
 
 (1.127) 
     3.101
***
 
 (1.080) 
     3.512
***
 
 (1.081) 
     3.722
***
 
(1.087) 
     3.930
***
 
 (1.087) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
13 
     2.764
***
 
 (1.074) 
     3.243
***
 
 (1.078) 
     3.466
***
 
 (1.083) 
     3.716
***
 
 (1.085) 
  1.675
*
 
 (1.027) 
    2.090
**
 
 (1.029) 
   2.298
**
 
(1.038) 
    2.515
**
 
 (1.038) 
14 
     2.894
***
 
 (1.118) 
     3.533
***
 
 (1.117) 
     3.545
***
 
(1.125) 
     3.937
***
 
(1.122) 
    2.549
**
 
 (1.060) 
     3.094
***
 
 (1.056) 
     3.142
***
 
 (1.066) 
     3.473
***
 
 (1.062) 
15 
  1.932
*
 
(1.227) 
    2.527
**
 
 (1.217) 
   2.949
**
 
(1.218) 
     3.230
***
 
(1.212) 
 1.316 
 (1.137) 
  1.834
*
 
(1.132) 
    2.224
**
 
 (1.135) 
    2.469
**
 
 (1.132) 
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 Age (Age): Age has very small negative effects on the reported physical and 
mental health of child, the effect being almost double for the latter. Other things 
same, a child one year elder to similar other children is likely to have about 0.4% 
(and 0.7%) less chance of having very good or excellent physical (and mental) 
health respectively. To put it differently, a 13 year old child is likely to have 4% 
(and 7%) less chance of having the Very Good/Excellent physical (and mental) 
health status than a 3 year old child. The negative effect of age might suggest 
that the child is exposed to more health shocks as he or she ages. Also, the 
negative age effects are relatively larger for female, Black and low income 
groups for both physical and mental health and for Sample 2 for mental health. 
 Sex (Female): Relative to a male child, a female child is likely to have slightly 
higher - 1% (and 2%) greater chance of having very good or excellent physical 
(and mental) health status. The relatively higher positive impacts on mental 
health than on physical health holds across Sample 2 and all subgroups, and are 
strongest for Sample 2, the upper two age-groups, Black and low income groups. 
Understanding gender differential in health is complex as it is determined by 
several factors – biological (evolutionary and genetic included), behavioral, 
cultural, nutritional and others. For instance, many cultures (such as in South 
Asia) attribute higher values to boys, and discriminate against girls. On the other 
hand, some believe that girls are genetically superior to boys in certain ways. 
Buckberry et al (2014) argue that boys and girls differ in terms of growth and 
development in utero which places males at increased risk when in suboptimal 
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conditions. Also, some surveys reveal that boys are less likely to eat healthy food 
than girls26.      
 Birth Order (Brthrd): A first-born child is likely to have 2% greater chance of 
having the Very Good/Excellent physical health. The effect is slightly smaller 
(1.4%) for mental health. The benefits of having first born on both physical and 
mental health are relatively greater on female, the bottom age-group, Black, 
Hispanic and low income groups. Although the exact reason for this variation is 
not fully known, a number of theories exist explaining why the first born children 
tend to be healthier (and smarter, or at least test better) than the latter born. For 
instance, Behram (1988) believes that parental preferences have productivity-
equity tradeoffs and favor their first born children, particularly in hard times. 
Horton (1988) on the other hand believes that parents do not discriminate among 
children of different birth orders when deciding on the allocation of current 
resources, but they are unable to allocate resources over time in such a way as 
to offset the inevitable advantages accruing to children in earlier birth orders who 
are born when per capita resources (both financial and parental attention) are 
greater. However, the possibility that parents may have more resources and 
acquire more effective childrearing and parenting skills with more children cannot 
be ignored. 
 Number of Children (Chldrn): Number of children in the household is largely an 
insignificant factor in Sample 1 and its subgroups. However in Sample 2 with 
single mother, this factor is highly significant in the mental health equations, and 
indicates that every additional child in the household results into about 1.3% 
                                                          
26
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4606393.stm 
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decline in the probability that the mental health of the child is Very 
Good/Excellent. The insignificance of this variable in the main Sample 1 (and the 
subgroups) may be due to simultaneous contributions of some positive factors 
(such as increased parental experience and possibility of sharing of some inputs 
among the children), and some negative factors (reduced share of necessary 
inputs available to each child and exposure to more health shocks such as due to 
some contagious diseases) as the number of children increases. If this is the 
case, the negative effects may have overshadowed the positive effects in 
Sample 2.  
 Child Less Than 5 Years at Home (Child_5): Presence of a child less than 5 
years at home is insignificant for physical health, but is marginally significant for 
mental health at 0.1 level in the main Sample 1, and results into about 1.3% 
greater chance that a child has Very Good/Excellent health. These effects on 
mental health are significant and slightly larger for male, middle age-group and 
White. The marginal contribution of this factor may be due to the increased 
likelihood of more parental time and care at home in the families with a child less 
than 5 years of age.  
 Child‟s Race (Race): In Sample 1, Hispanic children are likely to have about 5% 
(and 3%) less chance of having Very Good/Excellent physical (and mental) 
health than the White counterparts; whereas Blacks have about 3% (and 2%) 
lower chances than Whites. The effects on Other race are slightly smaller, about 
2% lower than White for physical health, and insignificant for mental health. The 
effects on Hispanic are slightly smaller for physical health in Sample 2, whereas 
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effects on Other race are insignificant. The racial effects are slightly stronger in 
equation (I), where income and insurance are not held constant, than in the full 
equation (IV), which may be due to the fact that Hispanic followed by Black has 
somewhat inferior income and insurance status compared to White in the 
sample. Also, the negative effects of Black are largest for the top age-group and 
the high income groups, whereas the negative effects of Hispanic are largest for 
the lowest two age-groups and the low income groups. 
 Living in MSA (MSA): Relative to living in non-MSA, living in MSA is associated 
to about additional 1.8% (and 2.3%) chance of having Very Good/Excellent 
physical (and mental) health status. The MSA effects are slightly higher for 
Sample 2. Also, the marginally stronger effects in equation (I) than in equation 
(IV) might imply that there are some positive benefits of living in MSAs in terms of 
higher income and better health insurance through job. The positive MSA effects 
are somewhat greater for the male and the upper two age-groups, and 
particularly high for Black and low income groups.  
 Region of Residence (Region): The regional effects on child health are mixed. In 
the main Sample 1, compared to living in North-East region, living in Mid-West 
and South are associated to about 2% lower probability of having Very 
Good/Excellent physical health of child. For mental health, the effects are about 
3% lower in Mid-West but insignificant in the South. Living in the West does not 
seem to have statistically significant effects on child health. Across the 
subgroups of Sample 1, MW has very strong negative effects on Hispanic, 
followed by low income groups and upper two age-groups. South has stronger 
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negative impacts on male and low income groups on the physical health and on 
Hispanic on both physical and mental health. West has some negative impacts 
on the top age-group on mental health but has some positive effects on „Other‟ 
race on physical health. The picture in Sample 2 is somewhat different, where 
West and South have some (2% - 4%) greater probabilities relative to North-
East, and Mid-West effects are insignificant. Exploring the cause for these small 
regional impacts is beyond the scope of this study. However these findings are 
partly consistent with the findings of Shea et al (2008), which note that there is 
wide variation in children's access to care and health care quality across the 
United States, and the states in the South by and large have inferior outcomes 
than the states in the North-East. 
 Parental Health (MoHlth and FaHlth): Both mother‟s and father‟s health have 
some positive effects on child‟s physical and mental health. Mothers have slightly 
greater effects than fathers, and the effects are almost identical for both physical 
and mental health. For instance, a 10 points increase in the health index of 
mother results into about 4% higher probability that the child is in best physical 
and mental health status, and similar effects of father is about 2%. The effects of 
mother‟s health in Sample 2 are marginally higher, about 5-6%. Across the 
subgroups, the positive impacts of both mother‟s and father‟s health are by and 
large stronger for the top followed by the middle age-groups, Hispanic, and low 
income groups. 
 Parental Smoking (Msmok and Fsmok): Parental smoking does not seem to have 
a significant effect on child health in both Sample 1 and Sample 2. Across the 
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subgroups of Sample 1, father‟s smoking has about 1-2% negative effects on 
both physical and mental health of child in the high income group; mother‟s 
smoking seems to have some small (1.5% lower probability) and marginally 
significant negative effects on the mental health of White; and father‟s smoking 
seems to have similar negative effects on physical health of White and Other 
races. Also, it should be noted that the inclusion of parental smoking habits in the 
equations informs us that any observed non-monetary effects of parental 
schooling on child health may include factors such as healthy habits, but not 
related to smoking, that the parents may exercise at home.  
 Panel Number (Panel): Relative to panel 6, children in the last five panels (11-15) 
have higher chance of reporting Very Good/Excellent physical and mental health 
than the earlier panels. The effects are highest (6% and 4% in physical and 
mental health) for panel 12. To understand the real cause for this time effect is 
beyond the scope of this study. I suspect that some of these effects in the latter 
years can be attributed to increased access to and use of health care resources 
including shots and vaccines, better technology, increased information, and more 
time spent at home by many parents who lost jobs (or work hours) during the last 
recession. More interestingly, the health enhancing effects associated to a given 
panel gets stronger with successive inclusion of parental income and child‟s 
health insurance. This may mean that passage of time has positive effects on 
health; but that negative effects of lower income and lower share of private health 
insurance creep in as time passes (which is consistent with the correlation table 
in Appendix 1). In other words, the suppressed negative effects of lower income 
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and lower share of private health insurance may have released when these are 
included in the equations. Also, these time effects are typically greater for Blacks 
and Hispanics, but are largely mixed for other subgroups. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
6.1 General Findings and Implications 
This study applies bivariate probit models to the Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey data set to explore the effects of parental schooling on the physical and mental 
health of child and the underlying mechanism of the transmission of these beneficial 
effects. The major sample (Sample 1) includes 31,756 children with both parents 
present and the second sample (Sample 2) includes 13,524 children with single 
mothers. A typical child in the first sample has about 84% (and 86%) probability to have 
Very Good/Excellent physical (and mental) health. Similar probabilities in the second 
sample are about 6 percentage point less. Across the subgroups of Sample 1, the top 
followed by the middle age-group children, Hispanics followed by Blacks, and the 
children from lower income families have greater probabilities of having Poor/Fair/Good 
physical or mental health.  
Using the perceived physical and mental health status of child as the outcome 
variable, the results in the Sample 1 indicate that (a) benefits of parental schooling 
increases with levels of parental schooling; (b) mother‟s schooling has greater impacts 
than father‟s; and (c) the impacts of parental schooling on physical health of child is 
slightly larger than on mental health. For instance, relative to having No Degree at all, 
mother‟s having an HSD/GED (and College Degree) increases the probability that the 
reported physical health status of her child is Very Good/Excellent as opposed to 
Poor/Fair/Good by about 5.2% (and 8.6%) in terms of non-monetary effects where 
parental income and child‟s health insurance type are already controlled for. Similar 
probabilities for father‟s schooling are about 3.6% (and 5.6%) respectively. For mental 
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health, these probabilities are about 4.6% and 7.1% for mother‟s schooling, and 2.5% 
and 3.6% for father‟s schooling respectively. The total effects of parental schooling are 
about 2 percentage points higher than these non-monetary effects, implying that the 
combined contribution of the monetary-effects of income and health insurance 
attributable to parental schooling in raising the probability that the child health is Very 
Good/Excellent as opposed to Poor/Fair/Good is about 2%. 
About one-fifth of the total effects of parental schooling are thus monetary in 
origin, and transmit through the channels of increased parental income and access to 
better health insurance attributable to higher level of parental schooling. Most of the 
effects (about four-fifths) are non-monetary in nature and stem from the higher level of 
parental schooling, possibly working through better access to and use of relevant health 
care information, better allocation of health care inputs, and thereby increased efficiency 
and health productivity.  
The results in Sample 2 also suggest similar beneficial effects of mother‟s 
schooling, with marginally greater impacts on mental health than on physical health. 
Similar beneficial effects of parental schooling can be observed across most of the 
subgroups with varying degree. For instance, mother's effects seem to be somewhat 
larger on male child than on female. Both mother's and father's effects are largest for 
the top age-group children. The effects of parental schooling on child health are 
particularly highest for the Hispanic, followed by Black and White (the effects on the 
Other race are largely insignificant). Similarly, the effects on the low income families are 
larger than on high income families. These all indicate that the subgroups with relatively 
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inferior health of child (and thus warrant greater support in relative sense) have by and 
large greater potential to benefit from parental schooling in the long run. 
Controlling for parental schooling and other factors, the contributions of parental 
income on child health is negligible, whereas having a private health insurance as 
opposed to having only a public health insurance seems clearly favorable. Among other 
regressors, being a young child; being a female; being a first-born; living in MSA; having 
healthier parents (particularly mother); and belonging to the more recent panels have 
some contributing effects on both physical and mental health of child.  
Despite substantial differences in the methodology and contexts, the findings of 
this study are somewhat similar to comparable studies. For instance, the findings that 
non-monetary factors attributable to the parental schooling play a bigger role than the 
monetary factors and that the mother‟s effects are bigger than the father‟s are largely 
consistent with the findings of Caldwell et al (1982), Thomas et al (1991), Basu et al 
(2005), and Aslam et al (2012) in the context of the developing countries.  
To my knowledge, this study is unique in that it analyzes the possible 
mechanisms by which parental schooling may bring about beneficial effects on overall 
child health – both physical and mental, using the recent data in the U.S. context. Also, 
the use of a bivariate probit model as opposed to separate probit models to account for 
the likely correlation between the background factors influencing the two dependent 
variables, and the inclusion of parental health to address potential econometric issues 
are some strengths of this study. Understanding of the beneficial effects of parental 
schooling and the underlying mechanisms can be useful to the policy makers in 
formulating more comprehensive and effective health and education policies for the 
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future, given the limited resources. In particular, the findings that the non-monetary 
(intangible) effects of parental schooling are even more important than the monetary 
effects, and that mother‟s effects are greater than father‟s, can have significant 
efficiency implications. Also, the observations that Hispanic followed by Black children 
have relatively inferior health, but have greater potential to benefit from parental 
schooling in the same order, can be useful information to be incorporated in the future 
policies. For instance, differential supports such as education subsidies to the needed 
social strata can thus be justified on economic grounds. It should not be ignored 
however that the beneficial effects in the form of better child health are only a part of the 
total benefits of parental schooling (there are health and other benefits that accrue to 
the parents themselves and the society as a whole in the form of positive externalities), 
which makes the investment in education even more important.  
6.2 Limitations and Moving Ahead 
This study has several limitations. First, it considers only the parents-rated child 
health outcomes as the dependent variables and ignores other possible measures such 
as outcomes measured clinically by the health care professionals. If possible, it would 
be a good idea to have measures that incorporate both the parental perceptions as well 
as clinical measures for more reliable results, both of which are beyond the scope of 
this study.  
Second, I consider only formal schooling of the parents. This assumes that 
schooling is a homogeneous attribute in terms their effects on child health, which is 
surely not the case. For instance, parents in health care professions would probably 
have greater impacts of their schooling on the health of their children than those in other 
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professions. Even among the parents not in health care area, the impacts of their 
schooling would still be diverse based on their personal inclinations and skills.  
Third, the study presumes that the more important non-monetary effects of 
parental schooling operate through better access to and use of relevant health care 
information and the resulting efficiency in the allocation of health care inputs. Due to 
lack of relevant variables pertaining to the acquisition of information and the complexity 
involved in this process, the study is unable to delineate the exact mechanism by which 
this non-monetary channel operates.  
Fourth, the data set lacks many relevant explanatory variables such as the health 
endowment of child, family background, and parental tastes and their innate ability. The 
presence of these variables could enhance the results.  
Fifth, it is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the mechanisms of the 
observed effects of various other factors included in the equations. For instance, the 
racial and geographical differences on child health as well as the favorable effects of 
time (benefits of being in the recent panels) are not explored here.  
Lastly, the magnitudes of the beneficial effects of parental schooling as observed 
in this study pertain only to this specific data set for U.S. population. Clearly it cannot be 
generalized verbatim for other societies and contexts.  
It might be useful to extend this analysis further by addressing some key 
limitations of this study. If possible, using a combined measure of child health for the 
dependent variable that incorporates both parental perceptions as well as clinical 
outcomes would be a good idea. If the factors related to the acquisition of relevant 
information (such as parental response to whether they are aware of a given set of child 
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health related information, and the different sources they would attribute to those 
information) are available, it would be possible to explore the mechanism of the working 
of the more important non-monetary channel. This might be useful to develop a simple 
and effective health care package which can be incorporated in the formal schooling as 
well as the general dissemination of information through popular media. Similarly, 
having information on health endowment of child (such as birth weight and general 
health at birth) and various exogenous health shocks experienced by the child after 
his/her birth could enhance the results. Data permitting, use of an appropriate 
instrument or studying identical twins could be another option to deal with the issue of 
health endowment as well as potential endogeneity caused by the genetic effects as 
discussed earlier. Lastly, extending this study further to other settings such as in other 
developing and developed countries would shed more light on these findings. 
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APPENDIX27 
 A.1: Correlation Coefficients Between the Variables Used in Sample 1 
(Children with Both Parents) 
 
 
 
 
HLTH MLTH MoSch FaSch Pinc EcoSt Insur Age Female Brthrd Chldrn Child_5 
MLTH 
0.64 
(0.00) 
1.00           
MoSch 
0.21 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(0.00) 
1.00          
FaSch 
0.20 
(0.00) 
0.16 
(0.00) 
0.65 
(0.00) 
1.00         
Pinc 
0.16 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
0.41 
(0.00) 
0.41 
(0.00) 
1.00        
EcoSt 
0.18 
(0.00) 
0.15 
(0.00) 
0.49 
(0.00) 
0.47 
(0.00) 
0.57 
(0.00) 
1.00       
Insur 
-0.14 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.00) 
-0.43 
(0.00) 
-0.42 
(0.00) 
-0.39 
(0.00) 
-0.48 
(0.00) 
1.00      
Age 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
1.00     
Female 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.49) 
0.00 
(0.74) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.00 
(0.86) 
0.00 
(0.76) 
0.00 
(0.98) 
1.00    
Brthrd 
0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.31) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.00) 
0.37 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.69) 
1.00   
Chldrn 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
-0.20 
(0.00) 
-0.16 
(0.00) 
-0.12 
(0.00) 
-0.28 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.93) 
-0.40 
(0.00) 
1.00  
Child_5 
0.00 
(0.54) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.00) 
-0.12 
(0.00) 
-0.18 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
-0.63 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.36) 
-0.14 
(0.00) 
0.29 
(0.00) 
1.00 
Race 
-0.12 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
-0.33 
(0.00) 
-0.33 
(0.00) 
-0.23 
(0.00) 
-0.28 
(0.00) 
0.28 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.48) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
MSA 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(1.00) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.72) 
-0.01 
(0.24) 
-0.01 
(0.21) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
Region 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.23 
(0.00) 
-0.22 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
-0.15 
(0.00) 
0.16 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.45) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
MoHlth 
0.14 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
0.13 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.34) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
FaHlth 
0.11 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.63) 
0.00 
(0.81) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.24) 
Msmok 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.63) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
Fsmok 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.00) 
-0.15 
(0.00) 
-0.13 
(0.00) 
-0.13 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.74) 
0.01 
(0.31) 
0.00 
(0.99) 
-0.01 
(0.32) 
Panel 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
0.00 
(0.52) 
0.01 
(0.30) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.41) 
 
                                                          
27
 One, two and three stars in the appendix tables imply statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels respectively.  
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 Race MSA Region MoHlth FaHlth Msmok Fsmok Panel 
MSA 
0.15 
(0.00) 
1.00       
Region 
0.29 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
1.00      
MoHlth 
0.00 
(0.61) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
1.00     
FaHlth 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.69) 
-0.01 
(0.29) 
0.43 
(0.00) 
1.00    
Msmok 
-0.15 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.00) 
-0.14 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
1.00   
Fsmok 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.12 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
0.42 
(0.00) 
1.00  
Panel 
0.08 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.29) 
-0.01 
(0.29) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
1.00 
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A.2: Correlation Coefficients Between the Variables Used in Sample 2 
(Children with Single Mother) 
 HLTH MLTH MoSch Minc EcoSt Insur Age Female Brthrd Chldrn Child_5 Race 
MLTH 
0.58 
(0.00) 
1.00           
MoSch 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
1.00          
Minc 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.28 
(0.00) 
1.00         
EcoSt 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
0.35 
(0.00) 
0.29 
(0.00) 
1.00        
Insur 
-0.07 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.27 
(0.00) 
-0.24 
(0.00) 
-0.35 
(0.00) 
1.00       
Age 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.13 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(0.00) 
0.13 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.00) 
1.00      
Female 
0.02 
(0.08) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.66) 
-0.01 
(0.42) 
-0.01 
(0.32) 
0.01 
(0.35) 
0.01 
(0.47) 
1.00     
Brthrd 
0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.15 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
0.37 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.90) 
1.00    
Chldrn 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
-0.20 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.00) 
-0.27 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.45 
(0.00) 
1.00   
Child_5 
0.01 
(0.54) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
-0.15 
(0.00) 
-0.17 
(0.00) 
-0.20 
(0.00) 
0.13 
(0.00) 
-0.60 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.17) 
-0.16 
(0.00) 
0.32 
(0.00) 
1.00  
Race 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.42) 
-0.21 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
-0.13 
(0.00) 
0.16 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
1.00 
MSA 
0.02 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.37) 
0.01 
(0.21) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(0.70) 
0.00 
(0.94) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
0.00 
(0.64) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
Region 
0.01 
(0.16) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.27) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
0.00 
(0.89) 
-0.01 
(0.15) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.34) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
MoHlth 
0.15 
(0.00) 
0.21 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.65) 
0.01 
(0.33) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
Msmok 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.27) 
0.00 
(0.80) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
-0.19 
(0.00) 
Panel 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.27) 
-0.01 
(0.33) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
 
 
 MSA Region MoHlth Msmok Panel 
Region 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
1.00    
MoHlth 
0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.32) 
1.00   
Msmok 
-0.07 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
-0.170 
(0.00) 
1.00  
Panel 
0.05 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
1.00 
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A.3: Estimated Coefficients for Sample 1 
(N = 31,756) 
Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
MoSch 
(Base: No Degree) 
        
HSD/GED 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.254
***
 
(0.034) 
0.255
***
 
(0.034) 
0.246
***
 
(0.032) 
0.229
***
 
(0.034) 
0.230
***
 
(0.034) 
0.220
***
 
(0.032) 
0.226
***
 
(0.034) 
0.226
***
 
(0.034) 
0.216
***
 
(0.032) 
0.212
***
 
(0.034) 
0.213
***
 
(0.034) 
0.202
***
 
(0.032) 
0.250
***
 
(0.037) 
0.260
***
 
(0.037) 
0.250
***
 
(0.036) 
0.225
***
 
(0.037) 
0.235
***
 
(0.037) 
0.226
***
 
(0.035) 
0.223
***
 
(0.037) 
0.233
***
 
(0.037) 
0.222
***
 
(0.036) 
0.210
***
 
(0.037) 
0.220
***
 
(0.037) 
0.209
***
 
(0.036) 
College 
Degree 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.459
***
 
(0.042) 
0.472
***
 
(0.042) 
0.460
***
 
(0.041) 
0.410
***
 
(0.043) 
0.424
***
 
(0.043) 
0.411
***
 
(0.042) 
0.403
***
 
(0.043) 
0.416
***
 
(0.043) 
0.400
***
 
(0.042) 
0.376
***
 
(0.043) 
0.390
***
 
(0.043) 
0.374
***
 
(0.042) 
0.426
***
 
(0.044) 
0.451
***
 
(0.045) 
0.436
***
 
(0.045) 
0.379
***
 
(0.045) 
0.404
***
 
(0.046) 
0.391
***
 
(0.045) 
0.373
***
 
(0.045) 
0.398
***
 
(0.046) 
0.381
***
 
(0.045) 
0.347
***
 
(0.045) 
0.372
***
 
(0.046) 
0.357
***
 
(0.046) 
FaSch  
(Base: No Degree)         
HSD/GED 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.186
***
 
(0.034) 
0.187
***
 
(0.034) 
0.173
***
 
(0.033) 
0.170
***
 
(0.034) 
0.171
***
 
(0.034) 
0.158
***
 
(0.033) 
0.159
***
 
(0.034) 
0.161
***
 
(0.034) 
0.146
***
 
(0.033) 
0.152
***
 
(0.034) 
0.154
***
 
(0.034) 
0.139
***
 
(0.033) 
0.154
***
 
(0.036) 
0.158
***
 
(0.037) 
0.134
***
 
(0.036) 
0.138
***
 
(0.036) 
0.142
***
 
(0.037) 
0.120
***
 
(0.036) 
0.128
***
 
(0.037) 
0.133
***
 
(0.037) 
0.109
***
 
(0.036) 
0.121
***
 
(0.037) 
0.126
***
 
(0.037) 
0.102
***
 
(0.036) 
College 
Degree 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.327
***
 
(0.043) 
0.337
***
 
(0.043) 
0.320
***
 
(0.043) 
0.283
***
 
(0.044) 
0.293
***
 
(0.044) 
0.276
***
 
(0.043) 
0.273
***
 
(0.044) 
0.284
***
 
(0.044) 
0.264
***
 
(0.043) 
0.249
***
 
(0.044) 
0.260
***
 
(0.044) 
0.241
***
 
(0.044) 
0.252
***
 
(0.046) 
0.266
***
 
(0.047) 
0.234
***
 
(0.047) 
0.208
***
 
(0.046) 
0.225
***
 
(0.047) 
0.194
***
 
(0.047) 
0.200
***
 
(0.047) 
0.217
***
 
(0.048) 
0.183
***
 
(0.048) 
0.176
***
 
(0.047) 
0.194
***
 
(0.048) 
0.162
***
 
(0.048) 
Pinc 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
 
0.079
***
 
(0.013) 
0.079
***
 
(0.013) 
0.079
***
 
(0.012) 
 
0.062
***
 
(0.013) 
0.063
***
 
(0.012) 
0.062
***
 
(0.011) 
 
0.077
***
 
(0.013) 
0.075
***
 
(0.012) 
0.072
***
 
(0.011) 
 
0.061
***
 
(0.012) 
0.060
***
 
(0.012) 
0.056
***
 
(0.011) 
Insur  
(Base: Any Private)         
Only 
Public 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
  
-0.215
***
 
(0.030) 
-0.213
***
 
(0.030) 
-0.221
***
 
(0.029) 
-0.172
***
 
(0.032) 
-0.170
***
 
(0.031) 
-0.178
***
 
(0.030) 
  
-0.210
***
 
(0.032) 
-0.204
***
 
(0.033) 
-0.209
***
 
(0.032) 
-0.168
***
 
(0.033) 
-0.163
***
 
(0.034) 
-0.171
***
 
(0.033) 
None 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
  
-0.058 
(0.043) 
-0.063 
(0.042) 
-0.075
*
 
(0.041) 
-0.033 
(0.043) 
-0.037 
(0.043) 
-0.050 
(0.041) 
  
-0.037 
(0.045) 
-0.032 
(0.046) 
-0.042 
(0.045) 
-0.012 
(0.046) 
-0.007 
(0.047) 
-0.018 
(0.045) 
Age 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.014
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.012
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.011
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.014
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.013
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.012
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.016
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.015
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.014
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.016
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.0154
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.014
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.032
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.031
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.031
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.032
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.031
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.032
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.034
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.033
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.034
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.034
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.034
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.034
***
 
(0.003) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
Female 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.045
***
 
(0.018) 
0.037
**
 
(0.017) 
0.036
**
 
(0.017) 
0.043
**
 
(0.018) 
0.035
**
 
(0.017) 
0.034
**
 
(0.017) 
0.047
***
 
(0.018) 
0.039
**
 
(0.017) 
0.038
**
 
(0.017) 
0.045
***
 
(0.018) 
0.037
**
 
(0.018) 
0.036
**
 
(0.017) 
0.101
***
 
(0.018) 
0.086
***
 
(0.018) 
0.086
***
 
(0.018) 
0.099
***
 
(0.019) 
0.084
***
 
(0.018) 
0.084
***
 
(0.018) 
0.103
***
 
(0.019) 
0.088
***
 
(0.018) 
0.088
***
 
(0.018) 
0.101
***
 
(0.019) 
0.086
***
 
(0.018) 
0.086
***
 
(0.019) 
Brthrd 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.079
***
 
(0.020) 
0.083
***
 
(0.020) 
0.085
***
 
(0.020) 
0.086
***
 
(0.020) 
0.090
***
 
(0.020) 
0.092
***
 
(0.020) 
0.082
***
 
(0.020) 
0.086
***
 
(0.020) 
0.089
***
 
(0.020) 
0.087
***
 
(0.020) 
0.092
***
 
(0.020) 
0.094
***
 
(0.020) 
0.065
***
 
(0.021) 
0.064
***
 
(0.021) 
0.050
**
 
(0.021) 
0.072
***
 
(0.021) 
0.071
***
 
(0.021) 
0.056
***
 
(0.021) 
0.068
***
 
(0.021) 
0.068
***
 
(0.021) 
0.053
***
 
(0.021) 
0.073
***
 
(0.021) 
0.073
***
 
(0.021) 
0.058
***
 
(0.021) 
Chldrn 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.010 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
0.016 
(0.011) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
0.016 
(0.011) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
-0.020
*
 
(0.012) 
-0.0209
*
 
(0.0123) 
-0.026
**
 
(0.013) 
-0.019 
(0.012) 
-0.0191 
(0.0123) 
-0.024
**
 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
-0.020
*
 
(0.013) 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
-0.0150 
(0.0124) 
-0.020
*
 
(0.013) 
Child_5 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.006 
(0.033) 
-0.005 
(0.033) 
-0.003 
(0.032) 
0.002 
(0.033) 
0.002 
(0.033) 
0.004 
(0.032) 
0.001 
(0.033) 
0.001 
(0.033) 
0.003 
(0.032) 
0.006 
(0.033) 
0.006 
(0.033) 
0.008 
(0.032) 
0.053 
(0.035) 
0.057
*
 
(0.035) 
0.067
**
 
(0.035) 
0.061
*
 
(0.035) 
0.065
*
 
(0.035) 
0.074
**
 
(0.035) 
0.060
*
 
(0.035) 
0.064
*
 
(0.035) 
0.073
**
 
(0.035) 
0.065
*
 
(0.035) 
0.069
**
 
(0.035) 
0.078
**
 
(0.035) 
Race (Base: White)         
Black 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.165
***
 
(0.043) 
-0.176
***
 
(0.043) 
-0.165
***
 
(0.042) 
-0.147
***
 
(0.043) 
-0.158
***
 
(0.044) 
-0.148
***
 
(0.042) 
-0.142
*** 
(0.043) 
-0.153
***
 
(0.044) 
-0.141
***
 
(0.043) 
-0.132
***
 
(0.043) 
-0.143
***
 
(0.044) 
-0.132
***
 
(0.043) 
-0.158
***
 
(0.044) 
-0.169
***
 
(0.046) 
-0.150
***
 
(0.045) 
-0.140
***
 
(0.045) 
-0.151
***
 
(0.046) 
-0.133
***
 
(0.045) 
-0.135
***
 
(0.045) 
-0.146
***
 
(0.046) 
-0.126
***
 
(0.045) 
-0.125
***
 
(0.045) 
-0.135
***
 
(0.046) 
-0.117
***
 
(0.045) 
Hispanic 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.282
***
 
(0.032) 
-0.294
***
 
(0.032) 
-0.282
***
 
(0.031) 
-0.261
***
 
(0.033) 
-0.273
***
 
(0.033) 
-0.261
***
 
(0.032) 
-0.246
***
 
(0.033) 
-0.257
***
 
(0.033) 
-0.244
***
 
(0.032) 
-0.238
***
 
(0.033) 
-0.248
***
 
(0.033) 
-0.235
***
 
(0.032) 
-0.209
***
 
(0.035) 
-0.222
***
 
(0.035) 
-0.203
***
 
(0.035) 
-0.189
***
 
(0.035) 
-0.203
***
 
(0.035) 
-0.184
***
 
(0.035) 
-0.176
***
 
(0.035) 
-0.191
***
 
(0.036) 
-0.171
***
 
(0.035) 
-0.167
***
 
(0.035) 
-0.182
***
 
(0.036) 
-0.163
***
 
(0.035) 
Other 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.117
**
 
(0.048) 
-0.137
***
 
(0.049) 
-0.132
***
 
(0.048) 
-0.098
**
 
(0.048) 
-0.119
***
 
(0.049) 
-0.114
**
 
(0.048) 
-0.104
**
 
(0.048) 
-0.125
***
 
(0.049) 
-0.120
**
 
(0.048) 
-0.092
*
 
(0.049) 
-0.113
**
 
(0.049) 
-0.108
**
 
(0.048) 
-0.069 
(0.052) 
-0.087
*
 
(0.054) 
-0.090
*
 
(0.053) 
-0.050 
(0.052) 
-0.068 
(0.054) 
-0.072 
(0.054) 
-0.057 
(0.053) 
-0.076 
(0.054) 
-0.078 
(0.054) 
-0.045 
(0.053) 
-0.063 
(0.055) 
-0.066 
(0.054) 
MSA 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.094
***
 
(0.032) 
0.102
***
 
(0.033) 
0.097
***
 
(0.031) 
0.084
***
 
(0.033) 
0.092
***
 
(0.033) 
0.086
***
 
(0.031) 
0.085
***
 
(0.033) 
0.093
***
 
(0.033) 
0.087
***
 
(0.031) 
0.078
**
 
(0.033) 
0.086
***
 
(0.033) 
0.080
***
 
(0.031) 
0.129
***
 
(0.034) 
0.140
***
 
(0.035) 
0.136
***
 
(0.034) 
0.119
***
 
(0.035) 
0.131
***
 
(0.035) 
0.127
***
 
(0.034) 
0.120
***
 
(0.035) 
0.131
***
 
(0.035) 
0.126
***
 
(0.034) 
0.114
***
 
(0.035) 
0.125
***
 
(0.035) 
0.120
***
 
(0.034) 
Region (Base: NE)         
MW 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.083
**
 
(0.043) 
-0.074
*
 
(0.044) 
-0.058 
(0.043) 
-0.088
**
 
(0.043) 
-0.079
*
 
(0.044) 
-0.063 
(0.043) 
-0.094
**
 
(0.043) 
-0.085
**
 
(0.044) 
-0.069
*
 
(0.043) 
-0.096
**
 
(0.043) 
-0.087
**
 
(0.044) 
-0.071
*
 
(0.043) 
-0.125
***
 
(0.045) 
-0.115
***
 
(0.046) 
-0.094
**
 
(0.046) 
-0.129
***
 
(0.045) 
-0.119
***
 
(0.046) 
-0.098
**
 
(0.046) 
-0.136
***
 
(0.045) 
-0.126
***
 
(0.046) 
-0.105
**
 
(0.046) 
-0.137
***
 
(0.045) 
-0.127
***
 
(0.047) 
-0.107
**
 
(0.046) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
S 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.083
**
 
(0.039) 
-0.077
**
 
(0.039) 
-0.059 
(0.039) 
-0.079
**
 
(0.039) 
-0.073
*
 
(0.040) 
-0.054 
(0.039) 
-0.081
**
 
(0.039) 
-0.075
**
 
(0.039) 
-0.056 
(0.039) 
-0.078
**
 
(0.039) 
-0.073
*
 
(0.040) 
-0.053 
(0.039) 
-0.045 
(0.041) 
-0.043 
(0.042) 
-0.023 
(0.042) 
-0.040 
(0.041) 
-0.037 
(0.042) 
-0.018 
(0.042) 
-0.043 
(0.041) 
-0.041 
(0.042) 
-0.021 
(0.042) 
-0.040 
(0.041) 
-0.038 
(0.042) 
-0.018 
(0.042) 
W 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.008 
(0.041) 
0.019 
(0.042) 
0.023 
(0.041) 
0.000 
(0.042) 
0.011 
(0.042) 
0.014 
(0.041) 
0.004 
(0.041) 
0.016 
(0.042) 
0.019 
(0.041) 
-0.002 
(0.042) 
0.010 
(0.042) 
0.013 
(0.041) 
-0.043 
(0.043) 
-0.032 
(0.044) 
-0.020 
(0.044) 
-0.051 
(0.043) 
-0.040 
(0.045) 
-0.028 
(0.044) 
-0.047 
(0.043) 
-0.035 
(0.045) 
-0.024 
(0.044) 
-0.052 
(0.043) 
-0.041 
(0.045) 
-0.029 
(0.044) 
MoHlth 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.016
***
 
(0.001) 
0.015
***
 
(0.001) 
0.015
***
 
(0.001) 
0.016
***
 
(0.001) 
0.015
***
 
(0.001) 
0.015
***
 
(0.001) 
0.016
***
 
(0.001) 
0.015
***
 
(0.001) 
0.015
***
 
(0.001) 
0.016
***
 
(0.001) 
0.015
***
 
(0.001) 
0.015
***
 
(0.001) 
0.020
***
 
(0.001) 
0.019
***
 
(0.001) 
0.020
***
 
(0.001) 
0.019
***
 
(0.001) 
0.018
***
 
(0.001) 
0.019
***
 
(0.001) 
0.019
***
 
(0.001) 
0.018
***
 
(0.001) 
0.019
***
 
(0.001) 
0.019
***
 
(0.001) 
0.018
***
 
(0.001) 
0.019
***
 
(0.001) 
FaHlth 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.011
***
 
(0.002) 
0.010
***
 
(0.001) 
0.010
***
 
(0.001) 
0.010
***
 
(0.002) 
0.010
***
 
(0.001) 
0.009
***
 
(0.001) 
0.010
***
 
(0.002) 
0.010
***
 
(0.001) 
0.010
***
 
(0.001) 
0.010
***
 
(0.002) 
0.009
***
 
(0.001) 
0.009
***
 
(0.001) 
0.014
***
 
(0.002) 
0.013
***
 
(0.001) 
0.014
***
 
(0.002) 
0.013
***
 
(0.002) 
0.012
***
 
(0.001) 
0.013
***
 
(0.002) 
0.013
***
 
(0.002) 
0.012
***
 
(0.001) 
0.013
***
 
(0.002) 
0.012
***
 
(0.002) 
0.012
***
 
(0.001) 
0.012
***
 
(0.002) 
Msmok 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.016 
(0.037) 
0.028 
(0.037) 
0.023 
(0.036) 
0.028 
(0.037) 
0.041 
(0.037) 
0.036 
(0.036) 
0.027 
(0.037) 
0.039 
(0.037) 
0.035 
(0.036) 
0.034 
(0.037) 
0.047 
(0.037) 
0.043 
(0.036) 
-0.041 
(0.038) 
-0.030 
(0.039) 
-0.039 
(0.038) 
-0.029 
(0.039) 
-0.018 
(0.039) 
-0.028 
(0.039) 
-0.030 
(0.039) 
-0.020 
(0.039) 
-0.029 
(0.039) 
-0.023 
(0.039) 
-0.013 
(0.039) 
-0.022 
(0.039) 
Fsmok 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.041 
(0.031) 
-0.040 
(0.032) 
-0.050
*
 
(0.031) 
-0.034 
(0.031) 
-0.033 
(0.032) 
-0.043 
(0.031) 
-0.027 
(0.032) 
-0.026 
(0.032) 
-0.036 
(0.031) 
-0.024 
(0.032) 
-0.023 
(0.032) 
-0.033 
(0.031) 
-0.037 
(0.034) 
-0.033 
(0.034) 
-0.046 
(0.034) 
-0.031 
(0.034) 
-0.027 
(0.034) 
-0.040 
(0.034) 
-0.024 
(0.034) 
-0.0209 
(0.0350) 
-0.033 
(0.034) 
-0.021 
(0.034) 
-0.018 
(0.035) 
-0.030 
(0.034) 
Panel (Base: 6)         
7 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.048 
(0.048) 
-0.047 
(0.049) 
-0.040 
(0.047) 
-0.041 
(0.048) 
-0.040 
(0.049) 
-0.032 
(0.047) 
-0.033 
(0.048) 
-0.032 
(0.049) 
-0.025 
(0.047) 
-0.030 
(0.048) 
-0.029 
(0.049) 
-0.021 
(0.047) 
-0.062 
(0.052) 
-0.061 
(0.054) 
-0.054 
(0.052) 
-0.056 
(0.052) 
-0.055 
(0.054) 
-0.047 
(0.052) 
-0.047 
(0.052) 
-0.046 
(0.054) 
-0.038 
(0.052) 
-0.044 
(0.052) 
-0.043 
(0.054) 
-0.036 
(0.052) 
8 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.016 
(0.049) 
0.019 
(0.050) 
0.020 
(0.048) 
0.026 
(0.049) 
0.029 
(0.050) 
0.030 
(0.048) 
0.037 
(0.049) 
0.041 
(0.050) 
0.042 
(0.048) 
0.041 
(0.049) 
0.044 
(0.050) 
0.046 
(0.048) 
-0.016 
(0.053) 
-0.009 
(0.055) 
-0.020 
(0.053) 
-0.006 
(0.053) 
-0.000 
(0.055) 
-0.011 
(0.053) 
0.006 
(0.053) 
0.011 
(0.055) 
0.001 
(0.054) 
0.009 
(0.053) 
0.014 
(0.055) 
0.005 
(0.054) 
9 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.042 
(0.048) 
-0.044 
(0.048) 
-0.041 
(0.046) 
-0.033 
(0.048) 
-0.035 
(0.048) 
-0.032 
(0.046) 
-0.019 
(0.048) 
-0.020 
(0.048) 
-0.016 
(0.047) 
-0.016 
(0.048) 
-0.018 
(0.048) 
-0.013 
(0.046) 
-0.078 
(0.051) 
-0.086
*
 
(0.052) 
-0.082
*
 
(0.051) 
-0.069 
(0.051) 
-0.077 
(0.052) 
-0.073 
(0.051) 
-0.055 
(0.051) 
-0.062 
(0.053) 
-0.058 
(0.051) 
-0.052 
(0.051) 
-0.060 
(0.053) 
-0.055 
(0.051) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
10 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.024 
(0.048) 
-0.023 
(0.048) 
-0.029 
(0.046) 
-0.012 
(0.048) 
-0.011 
(0.048) 
-0.016 
(0.046) 
0.003 
(0.048) 
0.004 
(0.048) 
-0.000 
(0.046) 
0.008 
(0.048) 
0.009 
(0.048) 
0.003 
(0.046) 
-0.029 
(0.052) 
-0.036 
(0.053) 
-0.032 
(0.051) 
-0.017 
(0.052) 
-0.023 
(0.053) 
-0.021 
(0.051) 
-0.001 
(0.052) 
-0.008 
(0.053) 
-0.005 
(0.051) 
0.004 
(0.052) 
-0.003 
(0.053) 
0.000 
(0.051) 
11 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.051 
(0.050) 
0.045 
(0.051) 
0.044 
(0.049) 
0.065 
(0.051) 
0.059 
(0.051) 
0.057 
(0.049) 
0.080 
(0.050) 
0.075 
(0.051) 
0.074 
(0.049) 
0.086
*
 
(0.051) 
0.080 
(0.051) 
0.079
*
 
(0.049) 
0.059 
(0.054) 
0.052 
(0.056) 
0.049 
(0.054) 
0.072 
(0.054) 
0.065 
(0.056) 
0.061 
(0.054) 
0.088
*
 
(0.055) 
0.081 
(0.056) 
0.079 
(0.054) 
0.093
*
 
(0.055) 
0.086 
(0.056) 
0.083 
(0.054) 
12 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.238
***
 
(0.055) 
0.240
***
 
(0.057) 
0.221
***
 
(0.055) 
0.260
***
 
(0.056) 
0.263
***
 
(0.057) 
0.243
***
 
(0.056) 
0.269
***
 
(0.056) 
0.272
***
 
(0.057) 
0.253
***
 
(0.056) 
0.281
***
 
(0.056) 
0.283
***
 
(0.057) 
0.264
***
 
(0.056) 
0.164
***
 
(0.058) 
0.154
***
 
(0.060) 
0.127
**
 
(0.059) 
0.186
***
 
(0.059) 
0.175
***
 
(0.060) 
0.147
***
 
(0.059) 
0.195
***
 
(0.059) 
0.185
***
 
(0.060) 
0.158
***
 
(0.059) 
0.207
***
 
(0.059) 
0.196
***
 
(0.060) 
0.168
***
 
(0.060) 
13 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.125
***
 
(0.049) 
0.131
***
 
(0.050) 
0.126
***
 
(0.048) 
0.147
***
 
(0.049) 
0.153
***
 
(0.050) 
0.148
***
 
(0.048) 
0.156
***
 
(0.049) 
0.162
***
 
(0.050) 
0.158
***
 
(0.048) 
0.168
***
 
(0.049) 
0.174
***
 
(0.050) 
0.169
***
 
(0.049) 
0.085
*
 
(0.052) 
0.088
*
 
(0.054) 
0.077 
(0.053) 
0.106
**
 
(0.053) 
0.108
**
 
(0.054) 
0.097
**
 
(0.053) 
0.116
**
 
(0.053) 
0.117
**
 
(0.054) 
0.107
**
 
(0.053) 
0.127
**
 
(0.053) 
0.128
***
 
(0.054) 
0.118
**
 
(0.053) 
14 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.131
***
 
(0.051) 
0.132
***
 
(0.052) 
0.113
**
 
(0.052) 
0.161
***
 
(0.052) 
0.162
***
 
(0.052) 
0.143
***
 
(0.052) 
0.160
***
 
(0.052) 
0.161
***
 
(0.052) 
0.142
***
 
(0.052) 
0.179
***
 
(0.052) 
0.180
***
 
(0.052) 
0.161
***
 
(0.052) 
0.132
**
 
(0.056) 
0.122
**
 
(0.057) 
0.110
**
 
(0.057) 
0.161
***
 
(0.056) 
0.151
**
 
(0.057) 
0.138
**
 
(0.057) 
0.162
***
 
(0.056) 
0.152
***
 
(0.057) 
0.140
***
 
(0.057) 
0.180
***
 
(0.056) 
0.170
***
 
(0.057) 
0.157
***
 
(0.057) 
15 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.086 
(0.055) 
0.083 
(0.056) 
0.082 
(0.054) 
0.113
**
 
(0.055) 
0.110
**
 
(0.056) 
0.109
**
 
(0.054) 
0.132
**
 
(0.055) 
0.129
**
 
(0.056) 
0.129
**
 
(0.054) 
0.144
***
 
(0.055) 
0.141
***
 
(0.056) 
0.142
***
 
(0.054) 
0.066 
(0.058) 
0.055 
(0.059) 
0.047 
(0.057) 
0.092
*
 
(0.058) 
0.080 
(0.059) 
0.071 
(0.057) 
0.112
**
 
(0.058) 
0.099
*
 
(0.060) 
0.092 
(0.058) 
0.125
**
 
(0.058) 
0.111
*
 
(0.060) 
0.103
*
 
(0.058) 
Constant 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.665
***
 
(0.112) 
-0.649
***
 
(0.114) 
-0.737 
(0.111) 
-1.495
***
 
(0.179) 
-1.482
***
 
(0.179) 
0.086 
(0.167) 
-0.504
***
 
(0.114) 
-0.490
***
 
(0.116) 
-0.909 
(0.113) 
-1.191
***
 
(0.180) 
-1.185
***
 
(0.181) 
-0.225 
(0.168) 
-0.646
***
 
(0.118) 
-0.639
***
 
(0.121) 
-0.690 
(0.119) 
-1.458
***
 
(0.177) 
-1.426
***
 
(0.175) 
0.059 
(0.165) 
-0.488
***
 
(0.120) 
-0.483
***
 
(0.124) 
-0.857 
(0.121) 
-1.157
***
 
(0.181) 
-1.143
***
 
(0.179) 
-0.240 
(0.169) 
µ Oprob 0.638 
(0.110) 
1.468 
(0.166) 
0.473 
(0.112) 
1.159 
(0.167) 
0.646 
(0.117) 
1.399 
(0.165) 
0.484 
(0.120) 
1.104 
(0.169) 
Wald Chi-
squared 
(df) 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
1821.39 
(58) 
1279.01 
(29) 
1292.24 
(29) 
1875.48 
(60) 
1320.10 
(30) 
1344.62 
(30) 
1868.79 
(62) 
1319.09 
(31) 
1337.35 
(31) 
1907.14 
(64) 
1349.50 
(32) 
1377.48 
(32) 
 
 
1329.05 
(25) 
1395.38 
(29) 
 
 
1376.49 
(30) 
1451.21 
(30) 
 
 
1356.09 
(31) 
1428.79 
(31) 
 
1389 (32) 
1466.05 
(32) 
Log 
pseudo 
likelihood 
Biprob 
Prob 
Oprob 
-19822.61 
-12786 
-14155.52 
-19775.81 
-12744.26 
-14111.10 
-19767.53 
-12740.00 
-14104.34 
-19741.18 
-12716.06 
-14079.28 
 
-11570.64 
-12769.58 
 
-11536.06 
-12735.87 
 
-11530.50 
-12726.22 
 
-11510.4 
-12707.44 
Pseudo 
R2 
Prob 
Oprob 
0.089 
0.080 
0.093 
0.083 
0.093 
0.083 
0.095 
0.085 
0.0985 
0.0893 
0.1012 
0.0917 
0.1016 
0.0924 
0.1032 
0.0937 
ρ 
 
χ2(1) 
Biprob 
0.895 
(0.005) 
4016.02 
0.894 
(0.005) 
3998.19 
0.894 
(0.005) 
3987.31 
0.894 
(0.005) 
3978.05 
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A.4: Estimated Marginal Effects for Sample 1 
(N = 31,756) 
Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
MoSch  
(Base: No Degree) 
        
HSD/GED 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
6.403
***
 
(0.900) 
6.490
***
 
(0.909) 
6.251
***
 
(0.868) 
5.683
***
 
(0.889) 
5.759
***
 
(0.898) 
5.513
***
 
(0.855) 
5.588
***
 
(0.884) 
5.658
***
 
(0.893) 
5.384
***
 
(0.850) 
5.210
***
 
(0.877) 
5.270
***
 
(0.886) 
4.993
***
 
(0.842) 
5.602
***
 
(0.859) 
5.855
***
 
(0.882) 
5.617
***
 
(0.844) 
4.971
***
 
(0.843) 
5.218
***
 
(0.865) 
5.001
***
 
(0.825) 
4.907
***
 
(0.844) 
5.151
***
 
(0.865) 
4.887
***
 
(0.826) 
4.577
***
 
(0.834) 
4.814
***
 
(0.855) 
4.565
***
 
(0.815) 
College 
Degree 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
10.560
***
 
(0.996) 
10.787
***
 
(1.003) 
10.508
***
 
(0.974) 
9.389
***
 
(1.009) 
9.632
***
 
(1.014) 
9.346
***
 
(0.982) 
9.214
***
 
(1.000) 
9.446
***
 
(1.007) 
9.102
***
 
(0.976) 
8.582
***
 
(1.006) 
8.819
***
 
(1.012) 
8.476
***
 
(0.979) 
8.777
***
 
(0.939) 
9.152
***
 
(0.962) 
8.869
***
 
(0.938) 
7.753
***
 
(0.943) 
8.156
***
 
(0.964) 
7.906
***
 
(0.936) 
7.631
***
 
(0.945) 
8.027
***
 
(0.967) 
7.698
***
 
(0.940) 
7.077
***
 
(0.946) 
7.483
***
 
(0.967) 
7.181
***
 
(0.938) 
FaSch  
(Base: No Degree)         
HSD/GED 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
4.517
***
 
(0.850) 
4.566
***
 
(0.857) 
4.208
***
 
(0.833) 
4.049
***
 
(0.837) 
4.115
***
 
(0.843) 
3.782
***
 
(0.818) 
3.794
***
 
(0.839) 
3.856
***
 
(0.845) 
3.484
***
 
(0.818) 
3.586
***
 
(0.831) 
3.656
***
 
(0.836) 
3.302
***
 
(0.809) 
3.289
***
 
(0.795) 
3.344
***
 
(0.809) 
2.820
***
 
(0.784) 
2.889
***
 
(0.781) 
2.972
***
 
(0.794) 
2.481
***
 
(0.768) 
2.687
***
 
(0.785) 
2.764
***
 
(0.796) 
2.239
***
 
(0.770) 
2.508
***
 
(0.776) 
2.598
***
 
(0.786) 
2.094
***
 
(0.760) 
College 
Degree 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
7.438
***
 
(0.992) 
7.600
***
 
(0.996) 
7.210
***
 
(0.983) 
6.417
***
 
(1.000) 
6.609
***
 
(1.003) 
6.234
***
 
(0.988) 
6.181
***
 
(1.003) 
6.368
***
 
(1.006) 
5.932
***
 
(0.989) 
5.640
***
 
(1.006) 
5.841
***
 
(1.009) 
5.420
***
 
(0.991) 
5.114
***
 
(0.939) 
5.302
***
 
(0.948) 
4.648
***
 
(0.940) 
4.223
***
 
(0.944) 
4.468
***
 
(0.951) 
3.857
***
 
(0.944) 
4.039
***
 
(0.953) 
4.290
***
 
(0.959) 
3.611
***
 
(0.952) 
3.566
***
 
(0.954) 
3.841
***
 
(0.959) 
3.194
***
 
(0.953) 
Pinc 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
 
1.770
***
 
(0.298) 
1.759
***
 
(0.294) 
1.761
***
 
(0.272) 
 
1.393
***
 
(0.287) 
1.397
***
 
(0.283) 
1.387
***
 
(0.259) 
 
1.546
***
 
(0.253) 
1.465
***
 
(0.241) 
1.409
***
 
(0.224) 
 
1.213
***
 
(0.249) 
1.167
***
 
(0.236) 
1.101
***
 
(0.220) 
Insur  
(Base: Any Private)         
Only 
Public 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
  
-4.944
***
 
(0.710) 
-4.879
***
 
(0.715) 
-5.081
***
 
(0.689) 
-3.939
***
 
(0.733) 
-3.866
***
 
(0.736) 
-4.072
***
 
(0.707) 
  
-4.316
***
 
(0.670) 
-4.117
***
 
(0.682) 
-4.244
***
 
(0.661) 
-3.441
***
 
(0.685) 
-3.269
***
 
(0.694) 
-3.443
***
 
(0.671) 
None 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
  
-1.237 
(0.926) 
-1.331 
(0.923) 
-1.608
*
 
(0.905) 
-0.696 
(0.929) 
-0.785 
(0.925) 
-1.064 
(0.906) 
  
-0.703 
(0.863) 
-0.590 
(0.860) 
-0.759 
(0.840) 
-0.234 
(0.863) 
-0.142 
(0.859) 
-0.339 
(0.839) 
Age 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.304
***
 
(0.064) 
-0.283
***
 
(0.064) 
-0.265
***
 
(0.063) 
-0.320
***
 
(0.064) 
-0.300
***
 
(0.064) 
-0.282
***
 
(0.063) 
-0.359
***
 
(0.065) 
-0.337
***
 
(0.064) 
-0.321
***
 
(0.063) 
-0.363
***
 
(0.064) 
-0.342
***
 
(0.064) 
-0.325
***
 
(0.063) 
-0.635
***
 
(0.060) 
-0.609
***
 
(0.060) 
-0.607
***
 
(0.059) 
-0.647
***
 
(0.060) 
-0.622
***
 
(0.059) 
-0.619
***
 
(0.059) 
-0.685
***
 
(0.061) 
-0.658
***
 
(0.060) 
-0.656
***
 
(0.059) 
-0.686
***
 
(0.060) 
-0.660
***
 
(0.060) 
-0.658
***
 
(0.059) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
Female 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
1.001
***
 
(0.398) 
0.824
**
 
(0.398) 
0.812
**
 
(0.390) 
0.961
**
 
(0.398) 
0.782
**
 
(0.398) 
0.767
**
 
(0.390) 
1.040
***
 
(0.397) 
0.864
**
 
(0.397) 
0.850
**
 
(0.389) 
1.003
***
 
(0.397) 
0.824
**
 
(0.397) 
0.809
**
 
(0.389) 
2.016
***
 
(0.369) 
1.683
***
 
(0.367) 
1.688
***
 
(0.361) 
1.978
***
 
(0.368) 
1.643
***
 
(0.366) 
1.646
***
 
(0.361) 
2.047
*** 
(0.368) 
1.712
***
 
(0.366) 
1.715
***
 
(0.361) 
2.013
***
 
(0.368) 
1.676
***
 
(0.365) 
1.680
***
 
(0.360) 
Brthrd 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
1.758
***
 
(0.454) 
1.844
***
 
(0.452) 
1.894
***
 
(0.452) 
1.914
*** 
(0.455) 
2.004
***
 
(0.453) 
2.057
***
 
(0.452) 
1.827
***
 
(0.454) 
1.918
***
 
(0.452) 
1.969
***
 
(0.452) 
1.937
***
 
(0.454) 
2.030
***
 
(0.452) 
2.082
***
 
(0.451) 
1.290
***
 
(0.419) 
1.263
***
 
(0.409) 
0.971
**
 
(0.410) 
1.426
***
 
(0.419) 
1.397
***
 
(0.409) 
1.101
***
 
(0.409) 
1.352
***
 
(0.418) 
1.327
***
 
(0.408) 
1.036
***
 
(0.408) 
1.447
***
 
(0.418) 
1.421
***
 
(0.408) 
1.126
***
 
(0.407) 
Chldrn 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.218 
(0.259) 
0.217 
(0.259) 
0.203 
(0.263) 
0.258 
(0.258) 
0.259 
(0.258) 
0.247 
(0.261) 
0.352 
(0.260) 
0.355 
(0.260) 
0.346 
(0.263) 
0.356 
(0.259) 
0.359 
(0.259) 
0.352 
(0.262) 
-0.411
*
 
(0.244) 
-0.408
*
 
(0.242) 
-0.509
**
 
(0.247) 
-0.376 
(0.243) 
-0.372 
(0.241) 
-0.472
**
 
(0.245) 
-0.293 
(0.244) 
-0.296 
(0.242) 
-0.394
*
 
(0.246) 
-0.289 
(0.243) 
-0.291 
(0.241) 
-0.387
*
 
(0.245) 
Child_5 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.140 
(0.743) 
-0.126 
(0.749) 
-0.079 
(0.731) 
0.050 
(0.743) 
0.057 
(0.749) 
0.100 
(0.731) 
0.028 
(0.741) 
0.032 
(0.747) 
0.079 
(0.729) 
0.143 
(0.742) 
0.144 
(0.747) 
0.189 
(0.730) 
1.055 
(0.703) 
1.124
*
 
(0.696) 
1.306
**
 
(0.681) 
1.220
*
 
(0.702) 
1.279
*
 
(0.696) 
1.455
**
 
(0.681) 
1.199
*
 
(0.702) 
1.253
*
 
(0.695) 
1.431
**
 
(0.679) 
1.300
*
 
(0.702) 
1.352
**
 
(0.695) 
1.525
**
 
(0.679) 
Race (Base: White)         
Black 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-3.544
***
 
(0.965) 
-3.718
***
 
(0.981) 
-3.500
***
 
(0.949) 
-3.151
***
 
(0.963) 
-3.335
***
 
(0.979) 
-3.124
***
 
(0.948) 
-3.052
***
 
(0.968) 
-3.235
***
 
(0.984) 
-3.002
***
 
(0.954) 
-2.828
***
 
(0.966) 
-3.015
***
 
(0.982) 
-2.789
***
 
(0.952) 
-3.088
***
 
(0.912) 
-3.221
***
 
(0.935) 
-2.862
***
 
(0.903) 
-2.734
***
 
(0.910) 
-2.880
***
 
(0.933) 
-2.539
***
 
(0.901) 
-2.641
***
 
(0.916) 
-2.776
***
 
(0.938) 
-2.405
***
 
(0.906) 
-2.438
***
 
(0.913) 
-2.577
***
 
(0.935) 
-2.224
***
 
(0.903) 
Hispanic 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-6.389
***
 
(0.748) 
-6.598
***
 
(0.754) 
-6.358
***
 
(0.730) 
-5.899
***
 
(0.746) 
-6.111
***
 
(0.753) 
-5.870
***
 
(0.728) 
-5.551
***
 
(0.753) 
-5.751
***
 
(0.759) 
-5.466
***
 
(0.733) 
-5.350
***
 
(0.752) 
-5.552
***
 
(0.758) 
-5.268
***
 
(0.732) 
-4.199
***
 
(0.708) 
-4.375
***
 
(0.715) 
-4.008
***
 
(0.694) 
-3.779
***
 
(0.709) 
-3.981
***
 
(0.715) 
-3.630
***
 
(0.693) 
-3.517
***
 
(0.715) 
-3.735
***
 
(0.720) 
-3.343
***
 
(0.697) 
-3.344
***
 
(0.715) 
-3.569
***
 
(0.720) 
-3.186
***
 
(0.697) 
Other 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-2.437
**
 
(1.046) 
-2.831
***
 
(1.063) 
-2.753
***
 
(1.047) 
-2.046
**
 
(1.046) 
-2.448
**
 
(1.064) 
-2.374
**
 
(1.050) 
-2.196
**
 
(1.055) 
-2.604
**
 
(1.074) 
-2.512
**
 
(1.058) 
-1.939
*
 
(1.053) 
-2.348
**
 
(1.072) 
-2.261
**
 
(1.058) 
-1.281 
(1.001) 
-1.581 
(1.019) 
-1.648
*
 
(1.023) 
-0.933 
(0.998) 
-1.236 
(1.016) 
-1.314 
(1.020) 
-1.069 
(1.013) 
-1.387 
(1.031) 
-1.442 
(1.037) 
-0.842 
(1.009) 
-1.153 
(1.026) 
-1.220 
(1.032) 
MSA 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
2.176
***
 
(0.769) 
2.375
***
 
(0.790) 
2.239
***
 
(0.748) 
1.926
***
 
(0.764) 
2.125
***
 
(0.784) 
1.986
***
 
(0.743) 
1.946
***
 
(0.765) 
2.139
***
 
(0.785) 
1.996
***
 
(0.743) 
1.788
**
 
(0.761) 
1.982
***
 
(0.780) 
1.839
***
 
(0.739) 
2.699
***
 
(0.750) 
2.912
***
 
(0.769) 
2.810
***
 
(0.737) 
2.478
***
 
(0.745) 
2.701
***
 
(0.764) 
2.603
***
 
(0.732) 
2.488
***
 
(0.747) 
2.700
***
 
(0.765) 
2.590
***
 
(0.733) 
2.349
***
 
(0.744) 
2.567
***
 
(0.762) 
2.461
***
 
(0.730) 
Region (Base: NE)         
MW 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-1.860
**
 
(0.955) 
-1.667
*
 
(0.976) 
-1.319 
(0.965) 
-1.956
**
 
(0.957) 
-1.758
*
 
(0.978) 
-1.413 
(0.967) 
-2.112
**
 
(0.956) 
-1.906
**
 
(0.977) 
-1.559
*
 
(0.966) 
-2.140
**
 
(0.957) 
-1.932
**
 
(0.978) 
-1.588
*
 
(0.967) 
-2.525
***
 
(0.894) 
-2.283
***
 
(0.913) 
-1.883
**
 
(0.907) 
-2.595
***
 
(0.895) 
-2.357
***
 
(0.915) 
-1.959
**
 
(0.910) 
-2.749
***
 
(0.896) 
-2.498
***
 
(0.915) 
-2.102
**
 
(0.909) 
-2.765
***
 
(0.897) 
-2.518
***
 
(0.916) 
-2.124
**
 
(0.910) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
S 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-1.854
**
 
(0.857) 
-1.730
**
 
(0.868) 
-1.328 
(0.859) 
-1.747
**
 
(0.857) 
-1.618
*
 
(0.868) 
-1.207 
(0.860) 
-1.792
**
 
(0.854) 
-1.673
**
 
(0.864) 
-1.252 
(0.857) 
-1.735
**
 
(0.854) 
-1.609
*
 
(0.865) 
-1.183 
(0.858) 
-0.874 
(0.786) 
-0.817 
(0.795) 
-0.440 
(0.792) 
-0.765 
(0.784) 
-0.712 
(0.793) 
-0.335 
(0.791) 
-0.838 
(0.783) 
-0.784 
(0.790) 
-0.397 
(0.788) 
-0.777 
(0.782) 
-0.725 
(0.790) 
-0.337 
(0.787) 
W 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.181 
(0.887) 
0.420 
(0.893) 
0.495 
(0.890) 
-0.008 
(0.890) 
0.240 
(0.897) 
0.310 
(0.894) 
0.095 
(0.885) 
0.344 
(0.891) 
0.422 
(0.888) 
-0.036 
(0.888) 
0.218 
(0.894) 
0.292 
(0.891) 
-0.836 
(0.831) 
-0.609 
(0.839) 
-0.390 
(0.837) 
-0.990 
(0.834) 
-0.755 
(0.843) 
-0.536 
(0.841) 
-0.903 
(0.830) 
-0.664 
(0.836) 
-0.448 
(0.834) 
-1.011 
(0.832) 
-0.770 
(0.839) 
-0.551 
(0.837) 
MoHlth 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.367
***
 
(0.032) 
0.352
***
 
(0.032) 
0.355
***
 
(0.031) 
0.360
***
 
(0.032) 
0.345
***
 
(0.032) 
0.348
***
 
(0.031) 
0.354
***
 
(0.032) 
0.338
***
 
(0.032) 
0.341
***
 
(0.031) 
0.351
***
 
(0.032) 
0.336
***
 
(0.032) 
0.338
***
 
(0.031) 
0.391
***
 
(0.029) 
0.374
***
 
(0.030) 
0.386
***
 
(0.029) 
0.385
***
 
(0.029) 
0.367
***
 
(0.030) 
0.380
***
 
(0.029) 
0.379
***
 
(0.029) 
0.361
***
 
(0.030) 
0.373
***
 
(0.029) 
0.376
***
 
(0.029) 
0.359
***
 
(0.030) 
0.371
***
 
(0.029) 
FaHlth 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.247
***
 
(0.035) 
0.242
***
 
(0.035) 
0.238
***
 
(0.034) 
0.227
***
 
(0.035) 
0.222
***
 
(0.035) 
0.218
***
 
(0.034) 
0.232
***
 
(0.035) 
0.227
***
 
(0.035) 
0.222
***
 
(0.034) 
0.219
***
 
(0.035) 
0.214
***
 
(0.035) 
0.209
***
 
(0.034) 
0.274
***
 
(0.032) 
0.264
***
 
(0.033) 
0.268
***
 
(0.031) 
0.256
***
 
(0.033) 
0.247
***
 
(0.033) 
0.251
***
 
(0.032) 
0.260
***
 
(0.032) 
0.250
***
 
(0.032) 
0.253
***
 
(0.031) 
0.248
***
 
(0.032) 
0.239
***
 
(0.032) 
0.243
***
 
(0.031) 
Msmok 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.357 
(0.814) 
0.631 
(0.820) 
0.528 
(0.793) 
0.616 
(0.807) 
0.899 
(0.812) 
0.809 
(0.785) 
0.590 
(0.810) 
0.860 
(0.814) 
0.768 
(0.786) 
0.749 
(0.805) 
1.028 
(0.808) 
0.943 
(0.781) 
-0.825 
(0.792) 
-0.606 
(0.795) 
-0.786 
(0.780) 
-0.589 
(0.785) 
-0.369 
(0.787) 
-0.547 
(0.772) 
-0.615 
(0.788) 
-0.411 
(0.789) 
-0.583 
(0.774) 
-0.471 
(0.783) 
-0.260 
(0.784) 
-0.433 
(0.769) 
Fsmok 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.933 
(0.721) 
-0.908 
(0.730) 
-1.139
*
 
(0.719) 
-0.764 
(0.715) 
-0.742 
(0.725) 
-0.978 
(0.713) 
-0.602 
(0.716) 
-0.587 
(0.725) 
-0.812 
(0.713) 
-0.531 
(0.712) 
-0.517 
(0.721) 
-0.745 
(0.709) 
-0.759 
(0.688) 
-0.667 
(0.696) 
-0.907 
(0.687) 
-0.615 
(0.683) 
-0.542 
(0.690) 
-0.789 
(0.682) 
-0.475 
(0.685) 
-0.409 
(0.690) 
-0.644 
(0.682) 
-0.416 
(0.682) 
-0.357 
(0.687) 
-0.597 
(0.679) 
Panel (Base: 6)         
7 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-1.149 
(1.159) 
-1.140 
(1.181) 
-0.972 
(1.124) 
-0.981 
(1.164) 
-0.973 
(1.190) 
-0.781 
(1.132) 
-0.798 
(1.169) 
-0.781 
(1.196) 
-0.603 
(1.139) 
-0.728 
(1.171) 
-0.713 
(1.200) 
-0.517 
(1.143) 
-1.323 
(1.111) 
-1.277 
(1.129) 
-1.112 
(1.070) 
-1.187 
(1.119) 
-1.153 
(1.140) 
-0.977 
(1.079) 
-1.009 
(1.125) 
-0.974 
(1.145) 
-0.805 
(1.087) 
-0.955 
(1.129) 
-0.927 
(1.151) 
-0.748 
(1.090) 
8 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.373 
(1.140) 
0.451 
(1.163) 
0.470 
(1.119) 
0.599 
(1.145) 
0.676 
(1.172) 
0.697 
(1.127) 
0.870 
(1.148) 
0.961 
(1.175) 
0.999 
(1.131) 
0.959 
(1.151) 
1.048 
(1.180) 
1.085 
(1.136) 
-0.321 
(1.101) 
-0.196 
(1.116) 
-0.406 
(1.085) 
-0.131 
(1.105) 
-0.017 
(1.123) 
-0.235 
(1.092) 
0.123 
(1.111) 
0.234 
(1.128) 
0.029 
(1.098) 
0.197 
(1.113) 
0.303 
(1.132) 
0.094 
(1.101) 
9 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-1.004 
(1.151) 
-1.063 
(1.171) 
-0.986 
(1.120) 
-0.788 
(1.154) 
-0.858 
(1.178) 
-0.770 
(1.127) 
-0.451 
(1.159) 
-0.500 
(1.182) 
-0.406 
(1.131) 
-0.379 
(1.160) 
-0.437 
(1.185) 
-0.335 
(1.135) 
-1.669 
(1.100) 
-1.820
*
 
(1.124) 
-1.722
*
 
(1.069) 
-1.482 
(1.104) 
-1.654 
(1.130) 
-1.556 
(1.075) 
-1.174 
(1.110) 
-1.334 
(1.134) 
-1.231 
(1.081) 
-1.112 
(1.111) 
-1.285 
(1.137) 
-1.179 
(1.083) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
10 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.572 
(1.137) 
-0.555 
(1.151) 
-0.689 
(1.108) 
-0.277 
(1.139) 
-0.266 
(1.156) 
-0.401 
(1.114) 
0.081 
(1.145) 
0.101 
(1.162) 
-0.020 
(1.118) 
0.200 
(1.146) 
0.215 
(1.164) 
0.093 
(1.121) 
-0.606 
(1.080) 
-0.738 
(1.091) 
-0.661 
(1.038) 
-0.350 
(1.082) 
-0.492 
(1.096) 
-0.425 
(1.042) 
-0.025 
(1.090) 
-0.183 
(1.103) 
-0.103 
(1.050) 
0.081 
(1.091) 
-0.078 
(1.104) 
-0.003 
(1.051) 
11 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
1.168 
(1.147) 
1.047 
(1.161) 
1.010 
(1.116) 
1.484 
(1.151) 
1.360 
(1.166) 
1.318 
(1.122) 
1.834
*
 
(1.150) 
1.724 
(1.166) 
1.708 
(1.121) 
1.965
*
 
(1.153) 
1.849 
(1.170) 
1.828* 
(1.125) 
1.177 
(1.078) 
1.021 
(1.086) 
0.956 
(1.045) 
1.443 
(1.081) 
1.274 
(1.091) 
1.200 
(1.049) 
1.773
*
 
(1.087) 
1.594 
(1.094) 
1.540 
(1.052) 
1.881
*
 
(1.088) 
1.697 
(1.097) 
1.637 
(1.055) 
12 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
4.981
***
 
(1.119) 
4.927
***
 
(1.121) 
4.576
***
 
(1.109) 
5.453
***
 
(1.121) 
5.392
***
 
(1.124) 
5.041
***
 
(1.112) 
5.667
***
 
(1.126) 
5.605
***
 
(1.129) 
5.274
***
 
(1.117) 
5.909
***
 
(1.127) 
5.842
***
 
(1.130) 
5.510
***
 
(1.118) 
3.101
***
 
(1.080) 
2.826
***
 
(1.079) 
2.356
**
 
(1.075) 
3.512
***
 
(1.081) 
3.216
***
 
(1.081) 
2.728
**
 
(1.077) 
3.722
***
 
(1.087) 
3.418
***
 
(1.086) 
2.959
***
 
(1.082) 
3.930
***
 
(1.087) 
3.615
***
 
(1.087) 
3.144
***
 
(1.083) 
13 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
2.764
***
 
(1.074) 
2.865
***
 
(1.081) 
2.761
***
 
(1.048) 
3.243
***
 
(1.078) 
3.341
***
 
(1.087) 
3.235
***
 
(1.055) 
3.466
***
 
(1.083) 
3.558
***
 
(1.093) 
3.473
***
 
(1.060) 
3.716
***
 
(1.085) 
3.809
***
 
(1.095) 
3.720
***
 
(1.062) 
1.675
*
 
(1.027) 
1.677
*
 
(1.030) 
1.482 
(1.003) 
2.090
**
 
(1.029) 
2.069
**
 
(1.034) 
1.854
*
 
(1.006) 
2.298
**
 
(1.038) 
2.260
**
 
(1.042) 
2.071
**
 
(1.014) 
2.515
**
 
(1.038) 
2.469
**
 
(1.043) 
2.265
**
 
(1.015) 
14 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
2.894
***
 
(1.118) 
2.879
***
 
(1.124) 
2.490
**
 
(1.138) 
3.533
***
 
(1.117) 
3.523
***
 
(1.122) 
3.146
***
 
(1.131) 
3.545
***
 
(1.125) 
3.531
***
 
(1.131) 
3.158
***
 
(1.143) 
3.937
***
 
(1.122) 
3.928
***
 
(1.128) 
3.562
***
 
(1.135) 
2.549
**
 
(1.060) 
2.290
**
 
(1.057) 
2.069
**
 
(1.058) 
3.094
***
 
(1.056) 
2.814
***
 
(1.053) 
2.576
**
 
(1.051) 
3.142
***
 
(1.066) 
2.857
***
 
(1.063) 
2.643
***
 
(1.063) 
3.473
***
 
(1.062) 
3.181
***
 
(1.059) 
2.951
***
 
(1.056) 
15 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
1.932
*
 
(1.227) 
1.861 
(1.238) 
1.837 
(1.192) 
2.527
**
 
(1.217) 
2.458
**
 
(1.228) 
2.446
**
 
(1.183) 
2.949
**
 
(1.218) 
2.876
**
 
(1.228) 
2.891
**
 
(1.183) 
3.230
***
 
(1.212) 
3.160
***
 
(1.223) 
3.179
***
 
(1.178) 
1.316 
(1.137) 
1.075 
(1.152) 
0.908 
(1.111) 
1.834
*
 
(1.132) 
1.555 
(1.146) 
1.374 
(1.105) 
2.224
**
 
(1.135) 
1.933
*
 
(1.147) 
1.789
*
 
(1.104) 
2.469
**
 
(1.132) 
2.159
*
 
(1.143) 
2.005
*
 
(1.101) 
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A.5: Estimated Coefficients for Sample 2  
(N = 13,524) 
Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
MoSch  
(Base: No Degree) 
        
HSD/GED 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.180
***
 
(0.038) 
0.184
***
 
(0.038) 
0.185
***
 
(0.036) 
0.166
***
 
(0.039) 
0.170
***
 
(0.039) 
0.169
***
 
(0.037) 
0.158
***
 
(0.039) 
0.161
***
 
(0.038) 
0.162
***
 
(0.037) 
0.150
***
 
(0.039) 
0.153
***
 
(0.039) 
0.153
***
 
(0.037) 
0.238
***
 
(0.042) 
0.244
***
 
(0.042) 
0.239
***
 
(0.040) 
0.221
***
 
(0.042) 
0.226
***
 
(0.043) 
0.222
***
 
(0.040) 
0.223
***
 
(0.042) 
0.227
***
 
(0.042) 
0.220
***
 
(0.040) 
0.211
***
 
(0.042) 
0.215
***
 
(0.043) 
0.208
***
 
(0.041) 
College 
Degree 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.323
***
 
(0.052) 
0.338
***
 
(0.053) 
0.318
***
 
(0.051) 
0.298
***
 
(0.054) 
0.313
***
 
(0.054) 
0.288
***
 
(0.053) 
0.253
***
 
(0.054) 
0.265
***
 
(0.055) 
0.243
***
 
(0.053) 
0.240
***
 
(0.055) 
0.253
***
 
(0.056) 
0.227
***
 
(0.054) 
0.361
***
 
(0.056) 
0.385
***
 
(0.057) 
0.355
***
 
(0.055) 
0.329
***
 
(0.057) 
0.352
***
 
(0.059) 
0.322
***
 
(0.057) 
0.309
***
 
(0.058) 
0.330
***
 
(0.059) 
0.291
***
 
(0.057) 
0.288
***
 
(0.059) 
0.309
***
 
(0.061) 
0.272
***
 
(0.058) 
Minc 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
 
0.014
**
 
(0.006) 
0.014
**
 
(0.006) 
0.017
***
 
(0.006) 
 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.011
*
 
(0.006) 
 
0.019
***
 
(0.007) 
0.019
***
 
(0.007) 
0.019
***
 
(0.006) 
 
0.015
**
 
(0.007) 
0.015
***
 
(0.007) 
0.014
**
 
(0.007) 
Insur  
(Base: Any Private)         
Only 
Public 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
  
-0.201
***
 
(0.038) 
-0.210
***
 
(0.039) 
-0.215
***
 
(0.037) 
-0.191
***
 
(0.039) 
-0.200
***
 
(0.039) 
-0.203
***
 
(0.038) 
  
-0.153
***
 
(0.041) 
-0.163
***
 
(0.042) 
-0.189
***
 
(0.040) 
-0.137
***
 
(0.041) 
-0.147
***
 
(0.043) 
-0.174
***
 
(0.041) 
None 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
  
-0.071 
(0.064) 
-0.083 
(0.064) 
-0.086 
(0.063) 
-0.062 
(0.065) 
-0.074 
(0.065) 
-0.074 
(0.064) 
  
0.039 
(0.069) 
0.020 
(0.069) 
-0.002 
(0.067) 
0.053 
(0.069) 
0.035 
(0.070) 
0.011 
(0.068) 
Age 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.008
**
 
(0.004) 
-0.007
**
 
(0.003) 
-0.006
*
 
(0.003) 
-0.009
**
 
(0.004) 
-0.008
**
 
(0.003) 
-0.007
**
 
(0.003) 
-0.010
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.009
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.008
**
 
(0.003) 
-0.010
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.010
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.009
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.032
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.032
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.033
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.033
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.033
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.034
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.034
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.034
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.035
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.035
***
 
(0.004) 
0.035
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.036
***
 
(0.004) 
Female 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.040
*
 
(0.024) 
0.036 
(0.024) 
0.044
*
 
(0.023) 
0.041
*
 
(0.024) 
0.037 
(0.024) 
0.045
**
 
(0.023) 
0.043
*
 
(0.024) 
0.039
*
 
(0.024) 
0.047
**
 
(0.023) 
0.043
*
 
(0.024) 
0.039
*
 
(0.024) 
0.047
**
 
(0.023) 
0.133
***
 
(0.025) 
0.127
***
 
(0.026) 
0.139
***
 
(0.025) 
0.133
***
 
(0.025) 
0.127
***
 
(0.026) 
0.140
***
 
(0.025) 
0.135
***
 
(0.025) 
0.129
***
 
(0.026) 
0.142
***
 
(0.025) 
0.135
***
 
(0.025) 
0.130
***
 
(0.026) 
0.143
***
 
(0.025) 
Brthrd 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.042 
(0.030) 
0.047
*
 
(0.029) 
0.041 
(0.029) 
0.046 
(0.030) 
0.051
*
 
(0.030) 
0.045
*
 
(0.029) 
0.045 
(0.030) 
0.051
*
 
(0.029) 
0.044 
(0.029) 
0.048 
(0.030) 
0.053
*
 
(0.030) 
0.047
*
 
(0.029) 
0.016 
(0.030) 
0.026 
(0.030) 
0.018 
(0.029) 
0.022 
(0.030) 
0.031 
(0.030) 
0.023 
(0.029) 
0.019 
(0.030) 
0.029 
(0.030) 
0.021 
(0.029) 
0.022 
(0.030) 
0.032 
(0.030) 
0.024 
(0.029) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
Chldrn 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.018 
(0.016) 
-0.019 
(0.016) 
-0.020 
(0.015) 
-0.017 
(0.016) 
-0.018 
(0.016) 
-0.019 
(0.015) 
-0.014 
(0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.016) 
-0.016 
(0.015) 
-0.013 
(0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.015) 
-0.052
***
 
(0.017) 
-0.053
***
 
(0.017) 
-0.053
***
 
(0.016) 
-0.051
***
 
(0.017) 
-0.052
***
 
(0.017) 
-0.052
***
 
(0.016) 
-0.049
***
 
(0.017) 
-0.050
***
 
(0.017) 
-0.049
***
 
(0.016) 
-0.049
***
 
(0.017) 
-0.050
***
 
(0.017) 
-0.049
***
 
(0.016) 
Child_5 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.028 
(0.044) 
0.030 
(0.044) 
0.031 
(0.042) 
0.030 
(0.044) 
0.033 
(0.044) 
0.035 
(0.042) 
0.036 
(0.044) 
0.039 
(0.044) 
0.040 
(0.042) 
0.037 
(0.044) 
0.040 
(0.044) 
0.042 
(0.042) 
0.056 
(0.046) 
0.056 
(0.047) 
0.065 
(0.044) 
0.059 
(0.046) 
0.059 
(0.047) 
0.069 
(0.044) 
0.062 
(0.046) 
0.062 
(0.047) 
0.073
*
 
(0.044) 
0.064 
(0.046) 
0.065 
(0.047) 
0.075
*
 
(0.044) 
Race (Base: White)         
Black 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.097
**
 
(0.043) 
-0.109
***
 
(0.043) 
-0.117
***
 
(0.041) 
-0.092
**
 
(0.043) 
-0.104
***
 
(0.043) 
-0.111
***
 
(0.041) 
-0.064 
(0.043) 
-0.076
*
 
(0.043) 
-0.083
**
 
(0.041) 
-0.063 
(0.043) 
-0.074
*
 
(0.043) 
-0.081
**
 
(0.041) 
0.029 
(0.044) 
0.023 
(0.045) 
0.011 
(0.043) 
0.036 
(0.044) 
0.030 
(0.045) 
0.018 
(0.043) 
0.057 
(0.044) 
0.054 
(0.046) 
0.046 
(0.044) 
0.060 
(0.044) 
0.057 
(0.046) 
0.049 
(0.044) 
Hispanic 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.177
***
 
(0.046) 
-0.187
***
 
(0.046) 
-0.180
***
 
(0.044) 
-0.172
***
 
(0.046) 
-0.182
***
 
(0.046) 
-0.174
***
 
(0.044) 
-0.147
***
 
(0.046) 
-0.156
***
 
(0.047) 
-0.148
***
 
(0.045) 
-0.145
***
 
(0.046) 
-0.154
***
 
(0.047) 
-0.146
***
 
(0.045) 
0.015 
(0.049) 
0.010 
(0.050) 
0.020 
(0.047) 
0.021 
(0.049) 
0.017 
(0.050) 
0.027 
(0.047) 
0.036 
(0.049) 
0.034 
(0.050) 
0.048 
(0.048) 
0.038 
(0.049) 
0.036 
(0.050) 
0.051 
(0.048) 
Other 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.081 
(0.072) 
-0.078 
(0.074) 
-0.110 
(0.073) 
-0.075 
(0.072) 
-0.072 
(0.074) 
-0.103 
(0.073) 
-0.060 
(0.072) 
-0.056 
(0.074) 
-0.088 
(0.072) 
-0.057 
(0.072) 
-0.054 
(0.074) 
-0.084 
(0.073) 
0.001 
(0.078) 
0.008 
(0.081) 
0.007 
(0.080) 
0.008 
(0.078) 
0.015 
(0.081) 
0.014 
(0.081) 
0.017 
(0.078) 
0.026 
(0.081) 
0.028 
(0.080) 
0.020 
(0.078) 
0.030 
(0.081) 
0.032 
(0.081) 
MSA 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.123
***
 
(0.044) 
0.125
***
 
(0.044) 
0.107
***
 
(0.041) 
0.121
***
 
(0.044) 
0.123
***
 
(0.044) 
0.105
***
 
(0.041) 
0.108
***
 
(0.044) 
0.110
***
 
(0.044) 
0.092
**
 
(0.042) 
0.108
***
 
(0.044) 
0.109
***
 
(0.044) 
0.092
**
 
(0.042) 
0.109
**
 
(0.046) 
0.114
***
 
(0.047) 
0.100
**
 
(0.045) 
0.107
**
 
(0.046) 
0.112
***
 
(0.047) 
0.098
**
 
(0.045) 
0.096
**
 
(0.046) 
0.101
**
 
(0.047) 
0.084
**
 
(0.045) 
0.096
**
 
(0.046) 
0.100
**
 
(0.047) 
0.084
**
 
(0.045) 
Region (Base: NE)         
MW 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.018 
(0.054) 
-0.018 
(0.054) 
-0.006 
(0.052) 
-0.020 
(0.054) 
-0.021 
(0.054) 
-0.009 
(0.052) 
-0.029 
(0.054) 
-0.029 
(0.054) 
-0.018 
(0.052) 
-0.031 
(0.054) 
-0.031 
(0.054) 
-0.020 
(0.052) 
-0.010 
(0.056) 
-0.008 
(0.057) 
-0.002 
(0.054) 
-0.013 
(0.056) 
-0.011 
(0.057) 
-0.006 
(0.054) 
-0.021 
(0.056) 
-0.019 
(0.057) 
-0.015 
(0.054) 
-0.023 
(0.056) 
-0.021 
(0.057) 
-0.017 
(0.054) 
S 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.042 
(0.047) 
0.038 
(0.048) 
0.054 
(0.046) 
0.042 
(0.047) 
0.038 
(0.048) 
0.055 
(0.045) 
0.039 
(0.048) 
0.036 
(0.048) 
0.052 
(0.046) 
0.039 
(0.048) 
0.036 
(0.048) 
0.053 
(0.046) 
0.107
**
 
(0.049) 
0.105
**
 
(0.050) 
0.108
**
 
(0.047) 
0.108
**
 
(0.049) 
0.106
**
 
(0.050) 
0.109
**
 
(0.047) 
0.101
**
 
(0.049) 
0.098
**
 
(0.050) 
0.102
**
 
(0.047) 
0.102
**
 
(0.049) 
0.099
**
 
(0.050) 
0.102
**
 
(0.047) 
W 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.097
*
 
(0.053) 
0.096
*
 
(0.053) 
0.110
**
 
(0.051) 
0.095
*
 
(0.053) 
0.093
*
 
(0.053) 
0.107
**
 
(0.051) 
0.094
*
 
(0.053) 
0.094
*
 
(0.053) 
0.108
**
 
(0.051) 
0.092
*
 
(0.053) 
0.092
*
 
(0.053) 
0.106
**
 
(0.051) 
0.150
***
 
(0.056) 
0.149
***
 
(0.057) 
0.138
***
 
(0.054) 
0.147
***
 
(0.056) 
0.145
***
 
(0.057) 
0.134
***
 
(0.055) 
0.145
***
 
(0.056) 
0.143
***
 
(0.057) 
0.132
***
 
(0.054) 
0.142
***
 
(0.056) 
0.140
***
 
(0.057) 
0.129
***
 
(0.054) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
MoHlth 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.019
***
 
(0.002) 
0.018
***
 
(0.001) 
0.018
***
 
(0.001) 
0.019
***
 
(0.002) 
0.018
***
 
(0.001) 
0.018
***
 
(0.001) 
0.018
***
 
(0.002) 
0.017
***
 
(0.001) 
0.018
***
 
(0.001) 
0.018
***
 
(0.002) 
0.017
***
 
(0.001) 
0.018
***
 
(0.001) 
0.024
***
 
(0.002) 
0.023
***
 
(0.002) 
0.025
***
 
(0.002) 
0.024
***
 
(0.002) 
0.023
***
 
(0.002) 
0.024
***
 
(0.002) 
0.023
***
 
(0.002) 
0.023
***
 
(0.002) 
0.024
***
 
(0.002) 
0.023
***
 
(0.002) 
0.022
***
 
(0.002) 
0.024
***
 
(0.002) 
Msmok 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.021 
(0.036) 
0.021 
(0.037) 
0.019 
(0.035) 
0.025 
(0.036) 
0.025 
(0.037) 
0.023 
(0.035) 
0.036 
(0.037) 
0.036 
(0.037) 
0.033 
(0.035) 
0.037 
(0.037) 
0.037 
(0.037) 
0.035 
(0.035) 
-0.026 
(0.039) 
-0.020 
(0.039) 
-0.037 
(0.038) 
-0.022 
(0.039) 
-0.016 
(0.039) 
-0.033 
(0.038) 
-0.015 
(0.039) 
-0.009 
(0.040) 
-0.024 
(0.038) 
-0.013 
(0.039) 
-0.006 
(0.039) 
-0.021 
(0.038) 
Panel (Base: 6)         
7 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.075 
(0.070) 
0.070 
(0.071) 
0.050 
(0.067) 
0.077 
(0.070) 
0.071 
(0.071) 
0.052 
(0.067) 
0.087 
(0.070) 
0.082 
(0.071) 
0.063 
(0.067) 
0.087 
(0.070) 
0.083 
(0.071) 
0.064 
(0.067) 
-0.035 
(0.074) 
-0.040 
(0.076) 
-0.032 
(0.073) 
-0.033 
(0.074) 
-0.037 
(0.076) 
-0.028 
(0.072) 
-0.026 
(0.074) 
-0.031 
(0.076) 
-0.021 
(0.072) 
-0.025 
(0.074) 
-0.029 
(0.076) 
-0.019 
(0.072) 
8 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.032 
(0.069) 
0.027 
(0.069) 
0.020 
(0.066) 
0.035 
(0.069) 
0.029 
(0.069) 
0.022 
(0.066) 
0.052 
(0.069) 
0.046 
(0.069) 
0.040 
(0.066) 
0.052 
(0.069) 
0.047 
(0.069) 
0.041 
(0.066) 
-0.087 
(0.074) 
-0.093 
(0.076) 
-0.097 
(0.073) 
-0.084 
(0.074) 
-0.090 
(0.075) 
-0.093 
(0.073) 
-0.072 
(0.074) 
-0.077 
(0.076) 
-0.078 
(0.073) 
-0.071 
(0.074) 
-0.075 
(0.076) 
-0.076 
(0.073) 
9 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.071 
(0.070) 
-0.073 
(0.070) 
-0.067 
(0.066) 
-0.065 
(0.070) 
-0.068 
(0.070) 
-0.061 
(0.066) 
-0.053 
(0.070) 
-0.055 
(0.071) 
-0.048 
(0.066) 
-0.051 
(0.070) 
-0.053 
(0.071) 
-0.045 
(0.066) 
-0.161
**
 
(0.075) 
-0.165
**
 
(0.076) 
-0.137
**
 
(0.072) 
-0.155
**
 
(0.075) 
-0.158
**
 
(0.076) 
-0.130
*
 
(0.072) 
-0.148
**
 
(0.075) 
-0.151
**
 
(0.077) 
-0.121
*
 
(0.073) 
-0.144
*
 
(0.075) 
-0.146
**
 
(0.077) 
-0.117
*
 
(0.073) 
10 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.001 
(0.072) 
-0.010 
(0.072) 
-0.024 
(0.069) 
0.005 
(0.072) 
-0.007 
(0.072) 
-0.019 
(0.068) 
0.027 
(0.072) 
0.017 
(0.072) 
0.004 
(0.069) 
0.029 
(0.072) 
0.018 
(0.072) 
0.006 
(0.069) 
-0.166
**
 
(0.077) 
-0.180
**
 
(0.078) 
-0.171
**
 
(0.074) 
-0.161
**
 
(0.077) 
-0.174
**
 
(0.078) 
-0.165
**
 
(0.074) 
-0.143
*
 
(0.077) 
-0.156
**
 
(0.078) 
-0.145
**
 
(0.074) 
-0.140
*
 
(0.077) 
-0.153
**
 
(0.078) 
-0.142
**
 
(0.074) 
11 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.025 
(0.068) 
0.018 
(0.068) 
0.026 
(0.064) 
0.029 
(0.068) 
0.021 
(0.068) 
0.029 
(0.064) 
0.051 
(0.068) 
0.045 
(0.069) 
0.053 
(0.065) 
0.052 
(0.068) 
0.046 
(0.069) 
0.054 
(0.065) 
-0.033 
(0.074) 
-0.040 
(0.076) 
-0.025 
(0.073) 
-0.029 
(0.074) 
-0.036 
(0.076) 
-0.021 
(0.073) 
-0.012 
(0.074) 
-0.019 
(0.076) 
-0.001 
(0.073) 
-0.011 
(0.074) 
-0.017 
(0.076) 
0.001 
(0.073) 
12 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.084 
(0.075) 
0.079 
(0.076) 
0.067 
(0.073) 
0.089 
(0.075) 
0.084 
(0.076) 
0.073 
(0.073) 
0.108 
(0.076) 
0.103 
(0.076) 
0.092 
(0.073) 
0.111 
(0.075) 
0.106 
(0.076) 
0.095 
(0.073) 
0.008 
(0.080) 
0.000 
(0.083) 
0.012 
(0.081) 
0.014 
(0.081) 
0.006 
(0.083) 
0.018 
(0.081) 
0.027 
(0.081) 
0.019 
(0.083) 
0.033 
(0.081) 
0.030 
(0.081) 
0.023 
(0.083) 
0.036 
(0.081) 
13 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.143
**
 
(0.066) 
0.138
**
 
(0.067) 
0.116
*
 
(0.064) 
0.149
**
 
(0.066) 
0.143
**
 
(0.067) 
0.123
**
 
(0.064) 
0.167
***
 
(0.067) 
0.162
***
 
(0.067) 
0.141
**
 
(0.064) 
0.169
***
 
(0.067) 
0.164
***
 
(0.067) 
0.144
**
 
(0.064) 
0.010 
(0.071) 
0.004 
(0.073) 
0.009 
(0.071) 
0.016 
(0.071) 
0.012 
(0.073) 
0.016 
(0.071) 
0.030 
(0.071) 
0.026 
(0.073) 
0.033 
(0.071) 
0.034 
(0.071) 
0.030 
(0.073) 
0.037 
(0.071) 
  
129 
 
 
Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
14 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.084 
(0.071) 
0.080 
(0.071) 
0.075 
(0.068) 
0.093 
(0.071) 
0.089 
(0.072) 
0.085 
(0.068) 
0.113 
(0.072) 
0.110 
(0.072) 
0.106 
(0.068) 
0.118
*
 
(0.072) 
0.115
*
 
(0.072) 
0.111
*
 
(0.068) 
0.013 
(0.076) 
0.010 
(0.078) 
0.017 
(0.074) 
0.025 
(0.076) 
0.023 
(0.078) 
0.030 
(0.074) 
0.040 
(0.076) 
0.037 
(0.078) 
0.048 
(0.074) 
0.048 
(0.076) 
0.046 
(0.078) 
0.056 
(0.075) 
15 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.239
***
 
(0.072) 
0.227
***
 
(0.072) 
0.204
***
 
(0.070) 
0.246
***
 
(0.072) 
0.235
***
 
(0.072) 
0.213*** 
(0.070) 
0.274
***
 
(0.073) 
0.264
***
 
(0.073) 
0.242
***
 
(0.071) 
0.277
***
 
(0.073) 
0.267
***
 
(0.073) 
0.246
***
 
(0.071) 
0.001 
(0.077) 
-0.007 
(0.078) 
-0.011 
(0.075) 
0.010 
(0.077) 
0.004 
(0.078) 
0.000 
(0.076) 
0.029 
(0.078) 
0.023 
(0.079) 
0.023 
(0.076) 
0.034 
(0.078) 
0.029 
(0.079) 
0.028 
(0.076) 
Constant 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.311
***
 
(0.124) 
-0.276
**
 
(0.125) 
-0.973 
(0.120) 
-0.442
***
 
(0.135) 
-0.406
***
 
(0.136) 
-0.819 
(0.131) 
-0.152 
(0.128) 
-0.108 
(0.129) 
-1.148 
(0.124) 
-0.244
*
 
(0.142) 
-0.197 
(0.143) 
-1.032 
(0.138) 
-0.243
*
 
(0.131) 
-0.224
*
 
(0.134) 
-0.897 
(0.132) 
-0.411
***
 
(0.143) 
-0.396
***
 
(0.146) 
-0.724 
(0.143) 
-0.118 
(0.135) 
-0.091 
(0.138) 
-1.055 
(0.135) 
-0.268
*
 
(0.150) 
-0.243
*
 
(0.153) 
-0.911 
(0.149) 
µ Oprob 0.277 
(0.118) 
0.432 
(0.129) 
0.106 
(0.122) 
0.222 
(0.135) 
0.271 
(0.130) 
0.445 
(0.141) 
0.117 
(0.134) 
0.262 
(0.147) 
Wald Chi-
squared 
(df) 
Biprob 
Prob 
Oprob 
649.43 
(50) 
275.04 
(25) 
287.33 
(25) 
663.7 (52) 
282.02 
(26) 
295.78 
(26) 
699.14 
(54) 
309.92 
(27) 
322.79 
(27) 
706.64 
(56) 
312.42 
(28) 
325.94 
(28) 
 
480.03 
(25) 
564.45 
(25) 
 
493.45 
(26) 
582.29 
(26) 
 
512.77 
(27) 
600.91 
(27) 
 
519.98 
(28) 
610.09 
(28) 
Log 
Pseudo 
likelihood 
Biprob 
Prob 
Oprob 
-11171.32 
-6893.27 
-7911.13 
-11164.94 
-6889.40 
-7905.32 
-11146.20 
-6870.67 
-7886.15 
-11142.39 
-6869.20 
-7883.51 
 
-6378.65 
-7418.15 
 
-6372.43 
-7411.51 
 
-6362.68 
-7397.00 
 
-6358.84 
-7393.32 
Pseudo 
R2 
Prob 
Oprob 
0.034 
0.030 
0.035 
0.031 
0.037 
0.033 
0.037 
0.034 
0.063 
0.061 
0.064 
0.062 
0.065 
0.064 
0.066 
0.064 
ρ 
 
χ2(1) 
Biprob 
0.853 
(0.008) 
2093.32 
0.853 
(0.008) 
2092 
0.853 
(0.008) 
2085.67 
0.853 
(0.008) 
2085.83 
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A.6: Estimated Marginal Effects for Sample 2  
(N = 13,524) 
Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
MoSch  
(Base: No Degree) 
        
HSD/GED 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
5.396
***
 
(1.180) 
5.609
***
 
(1.202) 
5.649
***
 
(1.144) 
4.961
***
 
(1.196) 
5.171
***
 
(1.219) 
5.139
***
 
(1.160) 
4.682
***
 
(1.174) 
4.856
***
 
(1.196) 
4.893
***
 
(1.136) 
4.445
***
 
(1.187) 
4.623
***
 
(1.211) 
4.598
***
 
(1.149) 
6.622
***
 
(1.190) 
6.976
***
 
(1.236) 
6.806
***
 
(1.169) 
6.110
***
 
(1.205) 
6.432
***
 
(1.252) 
6.277
***
 
(1.182) 
6.127
***
 
(1.187) 
6.441
***
 
(1.233) 
6.186
***
 
(1.164) 
5.778
***
 
(1.199) 
6.073
***
 
(1.246) 
5.849
***
 
(1.174) 
College 
Degree 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
9.195
***
 
(1.446) 
9.713
***
 
(1.478) 
9.190
***
 
(1.447) 
8.467
***
 
(1.497) 
8.992
***
 
(1.529) 
8.337
***
 
(1.494) 
7.235
***
 
(1.525) 
7.686
***
 
(1.561) 
7.098
***
 
(1.516) 
6.863
***
 
(1.557) 
7.326
***
 
(1.593) 
6.634
***
 
(1.546) 
9.582
***
 
(1.432) 
10.371
***
 
(1.479) 
9.624
***
 
(1.438) 
8.722
***
 
(1.483) 
9.485
***
 
(1.534) 
8.741
***
 
(1.486) 
8.218
***
 
(1.508) 
8.952
***
 
(1.559) 
7.963
***
 
(1.516) 
7.669
***
 
(1.540) 
8.387
***
 
(1.594) 
7.431
***
 
(1.546) 
Minc 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
 
0.414
**
 
(0.182) 
0.418
**
 
(0.185) 
0.495
***
 
(0.183)  
0.265 
(0.186) 
0.262 
(0.188) 
0.339
*
 
(0.187)  
0.487
***
 
(0.178) 
0.509
***
 
(0.183) 
0.509
***
 
(0.173)  
0.394
**
 
(0.181) 
0.407
**
 
(0.187) 
0.386
**
 
(0.176) 
Insur  
(Base: Any Private)         
Only 
Public 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
  
-5.588
***
 
(1.037) 
-5.889
***
 
(1.062) 
6.042
***
 
(1.018) 
-5.324
***
 
(1.055) 
-5.631
***
 
(1.079) 
-5.706
***
 
(1.036)   
-3.949
***
 
(1.027) 
-4.271
***
 
(1.072) 
-4.934
***
 
(1.015) 
-3.541
***
 
(1.048) 
-3.860
***
 
(1.094) 
-4.546
***
 
(1.034) 
None 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
  
-1.885 
(1.718) 
-2.217 
(1.754) 
-2.302 
(1.719) 
-1.640 
(1.730) 
-1.976 
(1.767) 
-1.990 
(1.735)   
0.917 
(1.617) 
0.492 
(1.654) 
-0.056 
(1.608) 
1.274 
(1.634) 
0.850 
(1.672) 
0.274 
(1.626) 
Age 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.227
**
 
(0.111) 
-0.223
**
 
(0.112) 
-0.195
*
 
(0.108) 
-0.252
**
 
(0.111) 
-0.249
**
 
(0.113) 
-0.225
**
 
(0.109) 
-0.281
***
 
(0.111) 
-0.278
***
 
(0.113) 
-0.250
**
 
(0.109) 
-0.295
***
 
(0.112) 
-0.292
***
 
(0.113) 
-0.268
***
 
(0.110) 
-0.845
***
 
(0.105) 
-0.861
***
 
(0.110) 
-0.889
***
 
(0.105) 
-0.873
***
 
(0.105) 
-0.891
***
 
(0.110) 
-0.919
***
 
(0.105) 
-0.891
***
 
(0.105) 
-0.909
***
 
(0.110) 
-0.943
***
 
(0.105) 
-0.910
***
 
(0.105) 
-0.930
***
 
(0.110) 
-0.962
***
 
(0.106) 
Female 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
1.159
*
 
(0.691) 
1.067 
(0.704) 
1.293
*
 
(0.687) 
1.166
*
 
(0.691) 
1.076 
(0.704) 
1.305
**
 
(0.687) 
1.215
*
 
(0.690) 
1.134
*
 
(0.704) 
1.361
**
 
(0.687) 
1.218
*
 
(0.690) 
1.137
*
 
(0.704) 
1.366
**
 
(0.687) 
3.484
***
 
(0.663) 
3.404
***
 
(0.684) 
3.742
***
 
(0.660) 
3.490
***
 
(0.663) 
3.418
***
 
(0.685) 
3.759
***
 
(0.660) 
3.533
***
 
(0.663) 
3.465
***
 
(0.684) 
3.811
***
 
(0.660) 
3.535
***
 
(0.663) 
3.472
***
 
(0.685) 
3.819
***
 
(0.660) 
Brthrd 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
1.196 
(0.858) 
1.393
*
 
(0.868) 
1.198 
(0.846) 
1.309 
(0.861) 
1.503
*
 
(0.871) 
1.327
*
 
(0.850) 
1.292 
(0.857) 
1.484
*
 
(0.867) 
1.290 
(0.845) 
1.359 
(0.859) 
1.548
*
 
(0.870) 
1.371
*
 
(0.849) 
0.433 
(0.782) 
0.707 
(0.804) 
0.482 
(0.783) 
0.568 
(0.782) 
0.844 
(0.805) 
0.618 
(0.785) 
0.486 
(0.781) 
0.769 
(0.803) 
0.556 
(0.782) 
0.587 
(0.781) 
0.870 
(0.804) 
0.651 
(0.784) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
Chldrn 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.511 
(0.474) 
-0.571 
(0.479) 
-0.586 
(0.451) 
-0.487 
(0.473) 
-0.549 
(0.478) 
-0.560 
(0.450) 
-0.394 
(0.472) 
-0.452 
(0.477) 
-0.469 
(0.451) 
-0.385 
(0.471) 
-0.444 
(0.476) 
-0.458 
(0.449) 
-1.365
***
 
(0.449) 
-1.438
***
 
(0.469) 
-1.417
***
 
(0.442) 
-1.338
***
 
(0.447) 
-1.410
***
 
(0.468) 
-1.388
***
 
(0.441) 
-1.285
***
 
(0.447) 
-1.352
***
 
(0.467) 
-1.321
***
 
(0.440) 
-1.272
***
 
(0.446) 
-1.338
***
 
(0.467) 
-1.307
***
 
(0.439) 
Child_5 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.794 
(1.254) 
0.880 
(1.286) 
0.915 
(1.226) 
0.872 
(1.253) 
0.969 
(1.286) 
1.026 
(1.226) 
1.027 
(1.253) 
1.136 
(1.286) 
1.176 
(1.226) 
1.067 
(1.253) 
1.180 
(1.286) 
1.238 
(1.226) 
1.461 
(1.205) 
1.494 
(1.255) 
1.750 
(1.191) 
1.553 
(1.206) 
1.594 
(1.256) 
1.851 
(1.192) 
1.630 
(1.204) 
1.675 
(1.255) 
1.952
*
 
(1.191) 
1.687 
(1.205) 
1.738 
(1.256) 
2.013
*
 
(1.192) 
Race (Base: White)         
Black 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-2.681
**
 
(1.165) 
-3.038
***
 
(1.196) 
-3.262
***
 
(1.142) 
-2.549
**
 
(1.167) 
-2.906
***
 
(1.198) 
-3.101
***
 
(1.144) 
-1.773 
(1.184) 
-2.132
*
 
(1.216) 
-2.342
**
 
(1.163) 
-1.729 
(1.185) 
-2.085
*
 
(1.217) 
-2.280
**
 
(1.164) 
0.775 
(1.163) 
0.629 
(1.221) 
0.294 
(1.164) 
0.944 
(1.164) 
0.807 
(1.224) 
0.479 
(1.166) 
1.510 
(1.174) 
1.455 
(1.237) 
1.243 
(1.183) 
1.580 
(1.174) 
1.528 
(1.238) 
1.316 
(1.184) 
Hispanic 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-5.036
***
 
(1.298) 
-5.377
***
 
(1.337) 
-5.159
***
 
(1.272) 
-4.905
***
 
(1.299) 
-5.240
***
 
(1.338) 
-4.994
***
 
(1.273) 
-4.186
***
 
(1.316) 
-4.503
***
 
(1.355) 
-4.277
***
 
(1.291) 
-4.149
***
 
(1.316) 
-4.462
***
 
(1.356) 
-4.222
***
 
(1.292) 
0.405 
(1.297) 
0.275 
(1.355) 
0.527 
(1.273) 
0.567 
(1.297) 
0.457 
(1.356) 
0.713 
(1.274) 
0.960 
(1.309) 
0.925 
(1.371) 
1.306 
(1.290) 
1.013 
(1.309) 
0.990 
(1.371) 
1.371 
(1.290) 
Other 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-2.209 
(2.010) 
-2.150 
(2.091) 
-3.071 
(2.096) 
-2.062 
(2.014) 
-1.991 
(2.096) 
-2.880 
(2.101) 
-1.650 
(2.006) 
-1.573 
(2.089) 
-2.469 
(2.090) 
-1.578 
(2.009) 
-1.497 
(2.092) 
-2.371 
(2.094) 
0.024 
(2.066) 
0.214 
(2.179) 
0.178 
(2.165) 
0.205 
(2.074) 
0.412 
(2.189) 
0.369 
(2.175) 
0.448 
(2.074) 
0.707 
(2.188) 
0.768 
(2.175) 
0.545 
(2.079) 
0.821 
(2.195) 
0.868 
(2.182) 
MSA 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
3.636
***
 
(1.332) 
3.763
***
 
(1.373) 
3.214
***
 
(1.281) 
3.584
***
 
(1.330) 
3.709
***
 
(1.372) 
3.155
***
 
(1.278) 
3.168
**
 
(1.327) 
3.291
***
 
(1.368) 
2.746
**
 
(1.276) 
3.156
**
 
(1.326) 
3.278
***
 
(1.367) 
2.732
**
 
(1.275) 
2.952
**
 
(1.283) 
3.183
**
 
(1.355) 
2.767
**
 
(1.268) 
2.887
**
 
(1.281) 
3.116
**
 
(1.353) 
2.708
**
 
(1.267) 
2.592
**
 
(1.273) 
2.790
**
 
(1.345) 
2.322
**
 
(1.258) 
2.574
**
 
(1.272) 
2.773
**
 
(1.344) 
2.311
*
 
(1.258) 
Region (Base: NE)         
MW 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-0.518 
(1.591) 
-0.550 
(1.646) 
-0.196 
(1.588) 
-0.600 
(1.590) 
-0.632 
(1.645) 
-0.296 
(1.587) 
-0.859 
(1.592) 
-0.893 
(1.647) 
-0.552 
(1.590) 
-0.901 
(1.591) 
-0.934 
(1.647) 
-0.607 
(1.589) 
-0.276 
(1.572) 
-0.216 
(1.652) 
-0.060 
(1.553) 
-0.376 
(1.571) 
-0.324 
(1.652) 
-0.177 
(1.552) 
-0.573 
(1.564) 
-0.544 
(1.646) 
-0.427 
(1.548) 
-0.638 
(1.563) 
-0.616 
(1.646) 
-0.500 
(1.547) 
S 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
1.213 
(1.382) 
1.129 
(1.420) 
1.608 
(1.369) 
1.222 
(1.379) 
1.143 
(1.417) 
1.627 
(1.365) 
1.121 
(1.377) 
1.069 
(1.4162 
1.552 
(1.365) 
1.123 
(1.375) 
1.073 
(1.414) 
1.558 
(1.362) 
2.870
**
 
(1.335) 
2.872
**
 
(1.400) 
2.971
**
 
(1.319) 
2.885
**
 
(1.331) 
2.893
**
 
(1.395) 
2.991
**
 
(1.313) 
2.696
**
 
(1.327) 
2.677
**
 
(1.392) 
2.773
**
 
(1.310) 
2.706
**
 
(1.323) 
2.689
**
 
(1.389) 
2.785
**
 
(1.307) 
W 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
2.761
*
 
(1.502) 
2.768
*
 
(1.545) 
3.179
**
 
(1.498) 
2.684
*
 
(1.502) 
2.695
*
 
(1.546) 
3.090
**
 
(1.499) 
2.654
*
 
(1.492) 
2.693
*
 
(1.536) 
3.113
**
 
(1.488) 
2.604
*
 
(1.493) 
2.643
*
 
(1.537) 
3.046
**
 
(1.488) 
3.957
***
 
(1.471) 
4.006
***
 
(1.539) 
3.731
***
 
(1.478) 
3.863
***
 
(1.472) 
3.909
***
 
(1.541) 
3.626
***
 
(1.478) 
3.789
***
 
(1.461) 
3.823
***
 
(1.529) 
3.541
***
 
(1.466) 
3.709
***
 
(1.463) 
3.743
***
 
(1.531) 
3.460
***
 
(1.468) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
MoHlth 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.547
***
 
(0.043) 
0.538
***
 
(0.045) 
0.545
***
 
(0.043) 
0.544
***
 
(0.043) 
0.536
***
 
(0.045) 
0.542
***
 
(0.043) 
0.528
***
 
(0.044) 
0.518
***
 
(0.045) 
0.524
***
 
(0.043) 
0.527
***
 
(0.044) 
0.517
***
 
(0.045) 
0.523
***
 
(0.043) 
0.620
***
 
(0.042) 
0.622
***
 
(0.045) 
0.660
***
 
(0.044) 
0.617
***
 
(0.042) 
0.619
***
 
(0.045) 
0.656
***
 
(0.044) 
0.604
***
 
(0.042) 
0.604
***
 
(0.045) 
0.640
***
 
(0.044) 
0.603
***
 
(0.042) 
0.603
***
 
(0.045) 
0.639
***
 
(0.044) 
Msmok 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.609 
(1.033) 
0.631 
(1.068) 
0.569 
(1.021) 
0.708 
(1.031) 
0.728 
(1.066) 
0.681 
(1.020) 
1.013 
(1.030) 
1.037 
(1.065) 
0.975 
(1.018) 
1.058 
(1.029) 
1.080 
(1.064) 
1.030 
(1.018) 
-0.694 
(1.025) 
-0.553 
(1.067) 
-0.998 
(1.027) 
-0.573 
(1.022) 
-0.432 
(1.064) 
-0.879 
(1.025) 
-0.399 
(1.021) 
-0.239 
(1.064) 
-0.640 
(1.023) 
-0.331 
(1.019) 
-0.172 
(1.062) 
-0.577 
(1.022) 
Panel (Base: 6)         
7 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
2.182 
(2.039) 
2.067 
(2.094) 
1.489 
(1.988) 
2.238 
(2.040) 
2.124 
(2.096) 
1.557 
(1.990) 
2.550 
(2.056) 
2.455 
(2.114) 
1.894 
(2.006) 
2.574 
(2.056) 
2.479 
(2.114) 
1.923 
(2.007) 
-0.902 
(1.913) 
-1.057 
(1.990) 
-0.838 
(1.901) 
-0.839 
(1.915) 
-0.979 
(1.994) 
-0.748 
(1.905) 
-0.676 
(1.927) 
-0.823 
(2.008) 
-0.562 
(1.920) 
-0.638 
(1.927) 
-0.773 
(2.010) 
-0.508 
(1.922) 
8 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.962 
(2.033) 
0.816 
(2.084) 
0.597 
(1.978) 
1.039 
(2.036) 
0.891 
(2.088) 
0.682 
(1.980) 
1.537 
(2.052) 
1.417 
(2.107) 
1.211 
(2.000) 
1.563 
(2.053) 
1.440 
(2.108) 
1.239 
(2.000) 
-2.285 
(1.945) 
-2.504 
(2.024) 
-2.609 
(1.967) 
-2.216 
(1.948) 
-2.406 
(2.029) 
-2.504 
(1.969) 
-1.898 
(1.955) 
-2.083 
(2.040) 
-2.122 
(1.984) 
-1.877 
(1.957) 
-2.037 
(2.043) 
-2.075 
(1.984) 
9 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
-2.163 
(2.142) 
-2.294 
(2.198) 
-2.079 
(2.047) 
-2.001 
(2.142) 
-2.131 
(2.200) 
-1.891 
(2.049) 
-1.646 
(2.167) 
-1.745 
(2.230) 
-1.521 
(2.077) 
-1.565 
(2.167) 
-1.665 
(2.230) 
-1.421 
(2.077) 
-4.359
**
 
(2.024) 
-4.564
**
 
(2.122) 
-3.761
**
 
(1.980) 
-4.188
**
 
(2.026) 
-4.373
**
 
(2.125) 
-3.568
*
 
(1.983) 
-4.008
**
 
(2.045) 
-4.201
**
 
(2.150) 
-3.352
*
 
(2.008) 
-3.902
*
 
(2.045) 
-4.077
**
 
(2.151) 
-3.234
*
 
(2.010) 
10 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.018 
(2.156) 
-0.332 
(2.205) 
-0.730 
(2.098) 
0.142 
(2.158) 
-0.215 
(2.207) 
-0.603 
(2.098) 
0.820 
(2.172) 
0.525 
(2.225) 
0.139 
(2.116) 
0.870 
(2.172) 
0.568 
(2.225) 
0.187 
(2.115) 
-4.488
**
 
(2.093) 
-5.008
**
 
(2.182) 
-4.776
**
 
(2.073) 
-4.356
**
 
(2.093) 
-4.851
**
 
(2.184) 
-4.615
**
 
(2.076) 
-3.866
*
 
(2.104) 
-4.356
**
 
(2.197) 
-4.055
**
 
(2.089) 
-3.803
*
 
(2.103) 
-4.272
**
 
(2.198) 
-3.972
**
 
(2.090) 
11 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
0.754 
(2.022) 
0.554 
(2.066) 
0.785 
(1.931) 
0.858 
(2.025) 
0.652 
(2.070) 
0.892 
(1.936) 
1.524 
(2.039) 
1.365 
(2.088) 
1.599 
(1.952) 
1.558 
(2.040) 
1.395 
(2.090) 
1.632 
(1.954) 
-0.841 
(1.896) 
-1.055 
(1.978) 
-0.656 
(1.906) 
-0.739 
(1.902) 
-0.941 
(1.986) 
-0.546 
(1.914) 
-0.315 
(1.909) 
-0.489 
(1.994) 
-0.026 
(1.924) 
-0.279 
(1.912) 
-0.441 
(1.999) 
0.017 
(1.929) 
12 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
2.435 
(2.180) 
2.323 
(2.238) 
1.971 
(2.137) 
2.588 
(2.178) 
2.480 
(2.238) 
2.151 
(2.132) 
3.155 
(2.188) 
3.065 
(2.250) 
2.721 
(2.147) 
3.225 
(2.187) 
3.135 
(2.250) 
2.807 
(2.143) 
0.194 
(2.032) 
-0.007 
(2.134) 
0.301 
(2.080) 
0.344 
(2.035) 
0.160 
(2.138) 
0.467 
(2.081) 
0.679 
(2.040) 
0.487 
(2.144) 
0.852 
(2.089) 
0.758 
(2.042) 
0.585 
(2.146) 
0.943 
(2.090) 
13 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
4.077
**
 
(1.887) 
3.965
**
 
(1.933) 
3.364
*
 
(1.857) 
4.234
**
 
(1.890) 
4.125
**
 
(1.937) 
3.545
**
 
(1.861) 
4.754
***
 
(1.911) 
4.689
***
 
(1.960) 
4.095
**
 
(1.880) 
4.830
***
 
(1.912) 
4.761
***
 
(1.962) 
4.182
**
 
(1.882) 
0.254 
(1.791) 
0.106 
(1.865) 
0.225 
(1.815) 
0.412 
(1.797) 
0.303 
(1.872) 
0.420 
(1.823) 
0.763 
(1.804) 
0.657 
(1.883) 
0.844 
(1.833) 
0.851 
(1.807) 
0.775 
(1.887) 
0.953 
(1.837) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
14 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
2.432 
(2.063) 
2.367 
(2.107) 
2.200 
(1.984) 
2.700 
(2.067) 
2.631 
(2.111) 
2.506 
(1.988) 
3.292 
(2.082) 
3.267 
(2.128) 
3.114 
(2.004) 
3.430
*
 
(2.085) 
3.400 
(2.131) 
3.281
*
 
(2.006) 
0.334 
(1.909) 
0.244 
(1.979) 
0.431 
(1.898) 
0.639 
(1.909) 
0.575 
(1.982) 
0.769 
(1.903) 
1.001 
(1.913) 
0.957 
(1.986) 
1.235 
(1.907) 
1.200 
(1.912) 
1.173 
(1.987) 
1.444 
(1.910) 
15 
Biprob 
 
Prob 
 
Oprob 
6.533
***
 
(1.954) 
6.291
***
 
(1.997) 
5.667
***
 
(1.936) 
6.746
***
 
(1.953) 
6.507
***
 
(1.996) 
5.920
***
 
(1.936) 
7.497
***
 
(1.969) 
7.312
***
 
(2.014) 
6.713
***
 
(1.947) 
7.594
***
 
(1.967) 
7.406
***
 
(2.013) 
6.831
***
 
(1.947) 
0.016 
(1.951) 
-0.178 
(2.019) 
-0.277 
(1.959) 
0.252 
(1.951) 
0.093 
(2.019) 
-0.005 
(1.961) 
0.729 
(1.967) 
0.587 
(2.038) 
0.592 
(1.977) 
0.856 
(1.966) 
0.742 
(2.037) 
0.738 
(1.978) 
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A.7: Estimated Marginal Effects on the Bivariate Probit Model by Sex 
Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
MoSch 
(Base: No 
Degree) 
         
HSD/GED 
Male 
 
Female 
6.980
***
 
(1.120) 
5.833
***
 
(1.097) 
6.277
***
 
(1.106) 
5.084
***
 
(1.084) 
6.243
***
 
(1.097) 
4.959
***
 
(1.080) 
5.866
***
 
(1.088) 
4.577
***
 
(1.071) 
6.691
***
 
(1.076) 
4.622
***
 
(1.033) 
6.023
***
 
(1.058) 
4.011
***
 
(1.012) 
5.973
***
 
(1.052) 
3.957 
(1.017) 
5.618
***
 
(1.041) 
3.643
***
 
(1.005) 
College 
Degree 
Male 
 
Female 
10.500
***
 
(1.258) 
10.685
***
 
(1.232) 
9.402
***
 
(1.275) 
9.409
***
 
(1.246) 
9.173
***
 
(1.265) 
9.344
***
 
(1.236) 
8.595
***
 
(1.272) 
8.643
***
 
(1.243) 
9.424
***
 
(1.189) 
8.234
***
 
(1.152) 
8.385
***
 
(1.196) 
7.190
***
 
(1.156) 
8.161
***
 
(1.195) 
7.202 
(1.157) 
7.614
***
 
(1.197) 
6.621
***
 
(1.160) 
FaSch 
(Base: No 
Degree) 
         
HSD/GED 
Male 
 
Female 
4.644
***
 
(1.064) 
4.367
***
 
(1.032) 
4.214
***
 
(1.049) 
3.858
***
 
(1.017) 
3.897
***
 
(1.044) 
3.667
***
 
(1.024) 
3.717
***
 
(1.035) 
3.429
***
 
(1.014) 
3.067
***
 
(0.992) 
3.449
***
 
(0.956) 
2.679
***
 
(0.976) 
3.031
***
 
(0.939) 
2.383
**
 
(0.972) 
2.926 
(0.948) 
2.223
**
 
(0.963) 
2.726
***
 
(0.936) 
College 
Degree 
Male 
 
Female 
7.495
***
 
(1.253) 
7.358
***
 
(1.224) 
6.502
***
 
(1.265) 
6.311
***
 
(1.236) 
6.146
***
 
(1.261) 
6.184
***
 
(1.243) 
5.641
***
 
(1.267) 
5.614
***
 
(1.247) 
5.003
***
 
(1.198) 
5.128
***
 
(1.141) 
4.079
***
 
(1.208) 
4.260
***
 
(1.149) 
3.732
***
 
(1.209) 
4.231 
(1.160) 
3.266
***
 
(1.215) 
3.750
***
 
(1.161) 
Pinc 
Male 
 
Female 
 
1.636
***
 
(0.368) 
1.948
***
 
(0.369) 
 
1.252
***
 
(0.353) 
1.559
***
 
(0.359) 
 
1.536
***
 
(0.335) 
1.601
***
 
(0.305) 
 
1.173
***
 
(0.323) 
1.291
***
 
(0.313) 
Insur 
(Base: 
Any 
Private) 
         
Only 
Public 
Male 
 
Female 
  
-5.279
***
 
(0.888) 
-4.606
***
 
(0.895) 
-4.329
***
 
(0.912) 
-3.540
***
 
(0.928) 
  
-4.959
***
 
(0.859) 
-3.718 
(0.812) 
-4.066
***
 
(0.875) 
-2.839
***
 
(0.839) 
None 
Male 
 
Female 
  
-0.044 
(1.109) 
-2.518
**
 
(1.203) 
0.411 
(1.112) 
-1.864 
(1.204) 
  
-0.462 
(1.066) 
-0.974 
(1.069) 
-0.031 
(1.067) 
-0.442 
(1.066) 
Age 
Male 
 
Female 
-0.174
**
 
(0.087) 
-0.438
***
 
(0.084) 
-0.190
**
 
(0.086) 
-0.454
***
 
(0.084) 
-0.240
***
 
(0.087) 
-0.482
***
 
(0.084) 
-0.244
***
 
(0.087) 
-0.485
***
 
(0.084) 
-0.581
***
 
(0.082) 
-0.686
***
 
(0.078) 
-0.594
***
 
(0.081) 
-0.697
***
 
(0.078) 
-0.640
***
 
(0.082) 
-0.727 
(0.079) 
-0.642
***
 
(0.082) 
-0.729
***
 
(0.078) 
Brthrd 
Male 
 
Female 
1.228
*
 
(0.674) 
2.306
***
 
(0.656) 
1.348
**
 
(0.673) 
2.512
***
 
(0.656) 
1.271
*
 
(0.672) 
2.377
*** 
(0.657) 
1.352
**
 
(0.672) 
2.527
***
 
(0.656) 
0.743 
(0.638) 
1.829
***
 
(0.597) 
0.857 
(0.636) 
1.996
***
 
(0.596) 
0.781 
(0.636) 
1.908 
(0.596) 
0.859 
(0.635) 
2.029
***
 
(0.596) 
Chldrn 
Male 
 
Female 
0.208 
(0.316) 
0.221 
(0.310) 
0.251 
(0.314) 
0.259 
(0.309) 
0.343 
(0.316) 
0.354 
(0.311) 
0.350 
(0.315) 
0.353 
(0.310) 
-0.687
**
 
(0.300) 
-0.118 
(0.284) 
-0.648
**
 
(0.298) 
-0.086 
(0.283) 
-0.560
*
 
(0.300) 
-0.008 
(0.284) 
-0.554
*
 
(0.298) 
-0.008 
(0.284) 
Child_5 
Male 
 
Female 
0.242 
(0.940) 
-0.532 
(0.930) 
0.421 
(0.939) 
-0.333 
(0.929) 
0.374 
(0.936) 
-0.351 
(0.928) 
0.486 
(0.936) 
-0.234 
(0.928) 
1.955
**
 
(0.900) 
0.114 
(0.861) 
2.128
**
 
(0.900) 
0.274 
(0.861) 
2.081
**
 
(0.900) 
0.262 
(0.860) 
2.189
**
 
(0.899) 
0.358 
(0.860) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
Race 
(Base: 
White) 
         
Black 
Male 
 
Female 
-3.594
***
 
(1.226) 
-3.496
***
 
(1.187) 
-3.264
***
 
(1.228) 
-3.020
***
 
(1.183) 
-3.100
**
 
(1.231) 
-3.030
***
 
(1.194) 
-2.918
**
 
(1.230) 
-2.747
**
 
(1.190) 
-3.306
***
 
(1.212) 
-2.921
***
 
(1.086) 
-2.983
**
 
(1.214) 
-2.522
**
 
(1.080) 
-2.839
**
 
(1.221) 
-2.513 
(1.089) 
-2.661
**
 
(1.221) 
-2.275
**
 
(1.083) 
Hispanic 
Male 
 
Female 
-6.226
***
 
(0.937) 
-6.495
***
 
(0.949) 
-5.790
***
 
(0.936) 
-5.935
***
 
(0.950) 
-5.408
***
 
(0.948) 
-5.646
***
 
(0.955) 
-5.249
***
 
(0.947) 
-5.395
***
 
(0.956) 
-4.023
***
 
(0.911) 
-4.357
***
 
(0.864) 
-3.618
***
 
(0.913) 
-3.912
***
 
(0.863) 
-3.252
***
 
(0.924) 
-3.757 
(0.870) 
-3.102
***
 
(0.925) 
-3.557
***
 
(0.870) 
Other 
Male 
 
Female 
-2.596
**
 
(1.304) 
-2.263
*
 
(1.332) 
-2.142
*
 
(1.302) 
-1.966 
(1.337) 
-2.311
*
 
(1.315) 
-2.086 
(1.345) 
-2.024 
(1.311) 
-1.886 
(1.346) 
-0.606 
(1.206) 
-2.102
*
 
(1.269) 
-0.176 
(1.198) 
-1.857 
(1.277) 
-0.322 
(1.215) 
-1.973 
(1.290) 
-0.051 
(1.207) 
-1.804 
(1.292) 
MSA 
Male 
 
Female 
2.463
***
 
(0.955) 
1.871
*
 
(0.973) 
2.209
**
 
(0.948) 
1.627
*
 
(0.968) 
2.118
**
 
(0.948) 
1.760
*
 
(0.972) 
1.974
**
 
(0.943) 
1.591
*
 
(0.968) 
3.053
***
 
(0.950) 
2.360
***
 
(0.913) 
2.818
***
 
(0.945) 
2.152
**
 
(0.908) 
2.742
***
 
(0.945) 
2.233 
(0.913) 
2.610
***
 
(0.941) 
2.087
**
 
(0.909) 
Region 
(Base: 
NE) 
         
MW 
Male 
 
Female 
-1.836 
(1.215) 
-1.885 
(1.206) 
-1.905 
(1.215) 
-2.014
*
 
(1.209) 
-2.141
*
 
(1.211) 
-2.082
*
 
(1.211) 
-2.145
*
 
(1.212) 
-2.140
*
 
(1.212) 
-2.567
**
 
(1.141) 
-2.484
**
 
(1.114) 
-2.620
**
 
(1.142) 
-2.574
**
 
(1.114) 
-2.852
***
 
(1.141) 
-2.662 
(1.116) 
-2.846
***
 
(1.142) 
-2.700
**
 
(1.116) 
S 
Male 
 
Female 
-2.684
**
 
(1.102) 
-1.073 
(1.075) 
-2.550
**
 
(1.101) 
-0.997 
(1.076) 
-2.682
***
 
(1.095) 
-0.936 
(1.074) 
-2.599
**
 
(1.095) 
-0.911 
(1.075) 
-1.259 
(1.025) 
-0.546 
(0.959) 
-1.117 
(1.022) 
-0.467 
(0.956) 
-1.234 
(1.019) 
-0.501 
(0.957) 
-1.146 
(1.018) 
-0.467 
(0.955) 
W 
Male 
 
Female 
-0.132 
(1.128) 
0.423 
(1.118) 
-0.313 
(1.130) 
0.229 
(1.122) 
-0.211 
(1.120) 
0.353 
(1.119) 
-0.332 
(1.123) 
0.213 
(1.122) 
-0.883 
(1.065) 
-0.864 
(1.015) 
-1.041 
(1.068) 
-1.010 
(1.016) 
-0.947 
(1.059) 
-0.934 
(1.014) 
-1.053 
(1.062) 
-1.041 
(1.015) 
MoHlth 
Male 
 
Female 
0.370
***
 
(0.040) 
0.361
***
 
(0.039) 
0.365
***
 
(0.040) 
0.352
***
 
(0.039) 
0.353
***
 
(0.040) 
0.351
***
 
(0.039) 
0.352
***
 
(0.040) 
0.346
***
 
(0.039) 
0.393
***
 
(0.037) 
0.388
***
 
(0.036) 
0.388
*** 
(0.037) 
0.381
***
 
(0.036) 
0.377
***
 
(0.037) 
0.379 
(0.036) 
0.376
***
 
(0.037) 
0.375
***
 
(0.036) 
FaHlth 
Male 
 
Female 
0.241
***
 
(0.045) 
0.252
***
 
(0.044) 
0.220
***
 
(0.045) 
0.232
***
 
(0.044) 
0.225
***
 
(0.045) 
0.237
***
 
(0.043) 
0.212
***
 
(0.045) 
0.225
***
 
(0.043) 
0.292
***
 
(0.042) 
0.254
***
 
(0.040) 
0.272
***
 
(0.042) 
0.238
***
 
(0.040) 
0.277
***
 
(0.042) 
0.240 
(0.040) 
0.265
***
 
(0.042) 
0.230
***
 
(0.040) 
Msmok 
Male 
 
Female 
0.595 
(1.013) 
0.153 
(1.045) 
0.882 
(1.004) 
0.378 
(1.039) 
0.840 
(1.008) 
0.376 
(1.038) 
1.021 
(1.001) 
0.505 
(1.036) 
-0.781 
(1.001) 
-0.871 
(0.984) 
-0.501 
(0.992) 
-0.676 
(0.978) 
-0.553 
(0.998) 
-0.683 
(0.977) 
-0.377 
(0.992) 
-0.571 
(0.974) 
Fsmok 
Male 
 
Female 
-1.630
*
 
(0.902) 
-0.243 
(0.889) 
-1.478
*
 
(0.895) 
-0.048 
(0.883) 
-1.254 
(0.894) 
0.040 
(0.886) 
-1.200 
(0.890) 
0.133 
(0.882) 
-1.002 
(0.850) 
-0.532 
(0.833) 
-0.866 
(0.846) 
-0.374 
(0.826) 
-0.661 
(0.845) 
-0.301 
(0.830) 
-0.613 
(0.843) 
-0.225 
(0.826) 
Panel 
(Base: 6) 
         
7 
Male 
 
Female 
-0.750 
(1.447) 
-1.568 
(1.422) 
-0.594 
(1.449) 
-1.385 
(1.436) 
-0.429 
(1.462) 
-1.232 
(1.434) 
-0.364 
(1.461) 
-1.157 
(1.442) 
-0.958 
(1.398) 
-1.704 
(1.310) 
-0.825 
(1.402) 
-1.562 
(1.330) 
-0.656 
(1.419) 
-1.374 
(1.324) 
-0.606 
(1.419) 
-1.316 
(1.337) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
8 
Male 
 
Female 
0.726 
(1.426) 
0.005 
(1.405) 
0.926 
(1.431) 
0.261 
(1.414) 
1.343 
(1.430) 
0.371 
(1.417) 
1.402 
(1.433) 
0.496 
(1.423) 
0.280 
(1.364) 
-0.920 
(1.334) 
0.461 
(1.368) 
-0.718 
(1.342) 
0.842 
(1.373) 
-0.568 
(1.351) 
0.893 
(1.375) 
-0.470 
(1.355) 
9 
Male 
 
Female 
0.076 
(1.453) 
-2.277 
(1.430) 
0.268 
(1.456) 
-2.027 
(1.440) 
0.723 
(1.464) 
-1.802 
(1.442) 
0.777 
(1.464) 
-1.704 
(1.447) 
-0.726 
(1.392) 
-2.725
**
 
(1.321) 
-0.543 
(1.395) 
-2.523
*
 
(1.331) 
-0.126 
(1.410) 
-2.317 
(1.331) 
-0.075 
(1.409) 
-2.237
*
 
(1.337) 
10 
Male 
 
Female 
-0.346 
(1.451) 
-0.929 
(1.395) 
-0.129 
(1.457) 
-0.527 
(1.398) 
0.419 
(1.459) 
-0.407 
(1.409) 
0.472 
(1.462) 
-0.197 
(1.409) 
-0.905 
(1.370) 
-0.343 
(1.264) 
-0.704 
(1.371) 
-0.014 
(1.269) 
-0.213 
(1.382) 
0.143 
(1.279) 
-0.164 
(1.381) 
0.320 
(1.280) 
11 
Male 
 
Female 
3.206
**
 
(1.404) 
-0.947 
(1.418) 
3.461
***
 
(1.410) 
0.555 
(1.425) 
3.937
***
 
(1.414) 
-0.390 
(1.424) 
4.019
***
 
(1.418) 
-0.197 
(1.428) 
2.540
*
 
(1.341) 
-0.234 
(1.299) 
2.761
**
 
(1.345) 
0.086 
(1.304) 
3.211
**
 
(1.356) 
0.296 
(1.312) 
3.274
**
 
(1.357) 
0.457 
(1.314) 
12 
Male 
 
Female 
6.395
***
 
(1.397) 
3.454
**
 
(1.436) 
6.832
***
 
(1.400) 
3.966
***
 
(1.436) 
7.158
***
 
(1.406) 
4.034
***
 
(1.445) 
7.367
***
 
(1.408) 
4.312
***
 
(1.443) 
4.874
***
 
(1.364) 
1.213 
(1.346) 
5.271
***
 
(1.366) 
1.639 
(1.347) 
5.592
***
 
(1.375) 
1.750 
(1.354) 
5.774
***
 
(1.375) 
1.984 
(1.353) 
13 
Male 
 
Female 
2.954
**
 
(1.364) 
2.538
**
 
(1.298) 
3.368
***
 
(1.371) 
3.104
**
 
(1.303) 
3.759
***
 
(1.374) 
3.114
**
 
(1.308) 
3.950
***
 
(1.378) 
3.439
***
 
(1.310) 
1.455 
(1.308) 
1.841 
(1.202) 
1.844 
(1.309) 
2.298
*
 
(1.207) 
2.195
*
 
(1.319) 
2.360 
(1.215) 
2.375
*
 
(1.319) 
2.625
**
 
(1.218) 
14 
Male 
 
Female 
4.344
***
 
(1.401) 
1.379 
(1.371) 
4.851
***
 
(1.396) 
2.197 
(1.376) 
5.101
***
 
(1.405) 
1.892 
(1.379) 
5.381
***
 
(1.400) 
2.434
*
 
(1.380) 
4.188
***
 
(1.315) 
0.884 
(1.275) 
4.650
***
 
(1.309) 
1.549 
(1.275) 
4.878
***
 
(1.323) 
1.387 
(1.281) 
5.129
***
 
(1.317) 
1.831 
(1.280) 
15 
Male 
 
Female 
2.505
* 
(1.543) 
1.276 
(1.483) 
2.999
**
 
(1.537) 
2.001 
(1.473) 
3.654
**
 
(1.533) 
2.139 
(1.474) 
3.853
***
 
(1.530) 
2.525
*
 
(1.468) 
0.898 
(1.485) 
1.731 
(1.326) 
1.367 
(1.479) 
2.313
*
 
(1.325) 
1.974 
(1.479) 
2.490 
(1.325) 
2.160 
(1.476) 
2.803
**
 
(1.325) 
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A.8: Estimated Marginal Effects on the Bivariate Probit Model by Age-Group 
Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
MoSch (Base: No 
Degree)         
HSD/GED 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
6.360
***
 
(1.243) 
6.340
***
 
(1.294) 
6.729
***
 
(1.413) 
5.881
***
 
(1.228) 
5.622
***
 
(1.287) 
5.752
***
 
(1.393) 
5.729
***
 
(1.224) 
5.520
***
 
(1.275) 
5.763
***
 
(1.402) 
5.490
***
 
(1.216) 
5.173
***
 
(1.269) 
5.212
***
 
(1.388) 
4.906
***
 
(1.069) 
5.779
***
 
(1.285) 
6.729
***
 
(1.435) 
4.411
***
 
(1.039) 
5.072
***
 
(1.268) 
6.055
***
 
(1.429) 
4.428
***
 
(1.049) 
5.044
***
 
(1.267) 
5.949
***
 
(1.425) 
4.133
***
 
(1.030) 
4.690
***
 
(1.256) 
5.599
***
 
(1.422) 
College 
Degree 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
10.756
***
 
(1.410) 
10.559
***
 
(1.477) 
10.613
***
 
(1.592) 
9.956
***
 
(1.415) 
9.390
***
 
(1.516) 
9.100
***
 
(1.606) 
9.550
***
 
(1.421) 
9.226
***
 
(1.491) 
9.329
***
 
(1.603) 
9.164
***
 
(1.423) 
8.628
***
 
(1.506) 
8.408
***
 
(1.610) 
8.200
***
 
(1.179) 
9.387
***
 
(1.425) 
9.118
***
 
(1.631) 
7.415
***
 
(1.169) 
8.228
***
 
(1.452) 
8.069
***
 
(1.652) 
7.342
***
 
(1.188) 
8.201
***
 
(1.439) 
8.046
***
 
(1.637) 
6.896
***
 
(1.179) 
7.586
***
 
(1.449) 
7.462
***
 
(1.651) 
FaSch (Base: No 
Degree)         
HSD/GED 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
3.704
***
 
(1.127) 
4.045
***
 
(1.186) 
6.081
***
 
(1.409) 
3.476
***
 
(1.116) 
3.564
***
 
(1.171) 
5.273
***
 
(1.386) 
3.140
***
 
(1.109) 
3.398
***
 
(1.174) 
5.109
***
 
(1.401) 
3.071
***
 
(1.104) 
3.175
***
 
(1.164) 
4.683
***
 
(1.382) 
3.121
***
 
(0.928) 
2.411
**
 
(1.138) 
4.431
***
 
(1.436) 
2.893
***
 
(0.910) 
1.952
*
 
(1.119) 
3.931
***
 
(1.416) 
2.715
***
 
(0.912) 
1.864
*
 
(1.127) 
3.647
***
 
(1.430) 
2.624
***
 
(0.902) 
1.639 
(1.113) 
3.418
**
 
(1.414) 
College 
Degree 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
5.673
***
 
(1.407) 
6.501
***
 
(1.450) 
10.382
***
 
(1.610) 
5.066
***
 
(1.421) 
5.327
***
 
(1.474) 
9.033
***
 
(1.620) 
4.546
***
 
(1.431) 
5.230
***
 
(1.476) 
9.053
***
 
(1.626) 
4.286
***
 
(1.437) 
4.585
***
 
(1.487) 
8.257
***
 
(1.625) 
3.671
***
 
(1.188) 
4.279
***
 
(1.392) 
7.496
***
 
(1.664) 
3.043
***
 
(1.199) 
3.099
**
 
(1.412) 
6.598
***
 
(1.665) 
2.827
**
 
(1.216) 
3.168
**
 
(1.416) 
6.398
***
 
(1.682) 
2.510
**
 
(1.220) 
2.484
*
 
(1.425) 
5.926
***
 
(1.676) 
Pinc 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
 
1.123
***
 
(0.341) 
1.933
***
 
(0.538) 
2.324
***
 
(0.500) 
 
0.800
**
 
(0.339) 
1.507
***
 
(0.509) 
1.935
***
 
(0.486) 
 
1.112
***
 
(0.267) 
1.924
***
 
(0.484) 
1.589
***
 
(0.481) 
 
0.922
***
 
(0.263) 
1.566
***
 
(0.464) 
1.195
***
 
(0.480) 
Insur 
(Base: Any Private)         
Only 
Public 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
  
-3.901
***
 
(0.936) 
-5.220
***
 
(1.072) 
-5.576
***
 
(1.214) 
-3.308
***
 
(0.960) 
-4.150
***
 
(1.115) 
-4.222
***
 
(1.238) 
  
-2.833
***
 
(0.755) 
-4.610
***
 
(1.032) 
-4.864
***
 
(1.238) 
-2.155
***
 
(0.771) 
-3.503
***
 
(1.057) 
-4.041
***
 
(1.277) 
None 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
  
-2.060 
(1.379) 
-0.098 
(1.381) 
-1.955 
(1.438) 
-1.769 
(1.380) 
0.441 
(1.385) 
-1.147 
(1.440) 
  
-2.090
*
 
(1.151) 
-0.170 
(1.370) 
-0.643 
(1.419) 
-1.720 
(1.148) 
0.390 
(1.369) 
-0.147 
(1.428) 
Female 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
1.460
**
 
(0.633) 
1.531
**
 
(0.686) 
-0.251 
(0.743) 
1.421
**
 
(0.633) 
1.462
**
 
(0.685) 
-0.248 
(0.740) 
1.501
**
 
(0.633) 
1.505
**
 
(0.684) 
-0.186 
(0.740) 
1.467
**
 
(0.633) 
1.456
**
 
(0.684) 
-0.198 
(0.738) 
1.516
***
 
(0.527) 
2.352
***
 
(0.654) 
1.899
***
 
(0.742) 
1.467
***
 
(0.525) 
2.284
***
 
(0.652) 
1.900
***
 
(0.741) 
1.546
***
 
(0.527) 
2.329
***
 
(0.653) 
1.958
***
 
(0.740) 
1.500
***
 
(0.526) 
2.281
***
 
(0.652) 
1.950
***
 
(0.739) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
Brthrd 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
3.841
***
 
(0.718) 
0.368 
(0.774) 
0.074 
(0.776) 
3.888
***
 
(0.716) 
0.432 
(0.775) 
0.407 
(0.785) 
3.848
***
 
(0.718) 
0.436 
(0.773) 
-0.023 
(0.773) 
3.881
***
 
(0.716) 
0.472 
(0.774) 
0.274 
(0.781) 
3.018
***
 
(0.568) 
-0.436 
(0.744) 
-0.708 
(0.763) 
3.064
***
 
(0.564) 
-0.376 
(0.743) 
-0.483 
(0.772) 
3.024
***
 
(0.567) 
-0.372 
(0.741) 
-0.792 
(0.759) 
3.061
***
 
(0.565) 
-0.338 
(0.741) 
-0.613 
(0.768) 
Chldrn 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
0.164 
(0.329) 
0.065 
(0.386) 
0.119 
(0.391) 
0.177 
(0.328) 
0.104 
(0.385) 
0.209 
(0.391) 
0.246 
(0.329) 
0.202 
(0.387) 
0.278 
(0.394) 
0.244 
(0.328) 
0.204 
(0.386) 
0.316 
(0.394) 
-0.258 
(0.274) 
-0.403 
(0.382) 
-0.707
*
 
(0.395) 
-0.244 
(0.272) 
-0.367 
(0.380) 
-0.639
*
 
(0.394) 
-0.194 
(0.275) 
-0.278 
(0.380) 
-0.563 
(0.396) 
-0.197 
(0.274) 
-0.279 
(0.380) 
-0.537 
(0.395) 
Child_5 
6-11 
 
12-17 
0.577 
(0.955) 
0.268 
(1.210) 
0.786 
(0.955) 
0.471 
(1.206) 
0.812 
(0.955) 
0.562 
(1.207) 
0.930 
(0.955) 
0.661 
(1.205) 
1.303 
(0.943) 
1.081 
(1.230) 
1.517
*
 
(0.941) 
1.200 
(1.229) 
1.502 
(0.942) 
1.341 
(1.231) 
1.633
*
 
(0.940) 
1.392 
(1.230) 
Race (Base: White)         
Black 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
-2.424
*
 
(1.349) 
-2.834
**
 
(1.401) 
-5.172
***
 
(1.612) 
-2.269
*
 
(1.351) 
-2.321
*
 
(1.401) 
-4.609
***
 
(1.608) 
-2.153 
(1.373) 
-2.161 
(1.394) 
-4.638
***
 
(1.612) 
-2.082 
(1.372) 
-1.876 
(1.394) 
-4.279
***
 
(1.606) 
-1.584 
(1.100) 
-3.217
**
 
(1.412) 
-4.708
***
 
(1.664) 
-1.442 
(1.101) 
-2.682
**
 
(1.415) 
-4.302
***
 
(1.662) 
-1.424 
(1.123) 
-2.595
*
 
(1.410) 
-4.176
***
 
(1.666) 
-1.340 
(1.119) 
-2.284
*
 
(1.412) 
-3.941
**
 
(1.662) 
Hispanic 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
-7.395
***
 
(1.042) 
-7.163
***
 
(1.132) 
-4.088
***
 
(1.213) 
-7.045
***
 
(1.044) 
-6.628
***
 
(1.133) 
-3.561
***
 
(1.211) 
-6.460
***
 
(1.047) 
-6.460
***
 
(1.149) 
-3.406
***
 
(1.228) 
-6.350
***
 
(1.048) 
-6.213
***
 
(1.148) 
-3.172
***
 
(1.227) 
-5.901
***
 
(0.857) 
-4.988
***
 
(1.111) 
-0.285 
(1.225) 
-5.571
***
 
(0.856) 
-4.459
***
 
(1.115) 
0.074 
(1.226) 
-5.206
***
 
(0.861) 
-4.365
***
 
(1.128) 
0.173 
(1.236) 
-5.099
***
 
(0.861) 
-4.106
***
 
(1.129) 
0.323 
(1.237) 
Other 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
-3.931
***
 
(1.456) 
-3.085
**
 
(1.633) 
0.077 
(1.706) 
-3.907
***
 
(1.464) 
-2.379 
(1.613) 
0.761 
(1.700) 
-3.961
***
 
(1.477) 
-2.721
*
 
(1.640) 
0.539 
(1.704) 
-3.939
***
 
(1.480) 
-2.251 
(1.623) 
0.993 
(1.699) 
-3.137
***
 
(1.245) 
-1.870 
(1.556) 
1.653 
(1.762) 
-3.142
***
 
(1.258) 
-1.153 
(1.531) 
2.085 
(1.746) 
-3.200
***
 
(1.282) 
-1.542 
(1.570) 
2.040 
(1.752) 
-3.188
***
 
(1.284) 
-1.041 
(1.547) 
2.294 
(1.741) 
MSA 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
0.878 
(1.074) 
3.206
***
 
(1.162) 
2.426
**
 
(1.192) 
0.759 
(1.069) 
2.946
***
 
(1.154) 
2.046
*
 
(1.179) 
0.768 
(1.072) 
2.940
***
 
(1.157) 
2.165
*
 
(1.185) 
0.700 
(1.069) 
2.786
**
 
(1.152) 
1.900
*
 
(1.175) 
1.643
*
 
(0.931) 
3.631
***
 
(1.166) 
3.107
***
 
(1.227) 
1.533
*
 
(0.926) 
3.365
***
 
(1.158) 
2.829
**
 
(1.219) 
1.576
*
 
(0.933) 
3.392
***
 
(1.161) 
2.825
**
 
(1.221) 
1.502
*
 
(0.929) 
3.225
***
 
(1.156) 
2.646
**
 
(1.216) 
Region (Base: NE)         
MW 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
-2.292
*
 
(1.425) 
-2.358
*
 
(1.429) 
-0.833 
(1.525) 
-2.369
*
 
(1.428) 
-2.425
*
 
(1.432) 
-0.935 
(1.523) 
-2.510
*
 
(1.428) 
-2.633
*
 
(1.432) 
-1.006 
(1.528) 
-2.530
*
 
(1.430) 
-2.629
*
 
(1.434) 
-1.063 
(1.525) 
-1.285 
(1.205) 
-3.202
**
 
(1.386) 
-3.203
**
 
(1.498) 
-1.358 
(1.207) 
-3.273
**
 
(1.386) 
-3.249
**
 
(1.497) 
-1.429 
(1.213) 
-3.457
***
 
(1.390) 
-3.398
**
 
(1.495) 
-1.453 
(1.214) 
-3.460
***
 
(1.389) 
-3.411
**
 
(1.494) 
S 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
-1.358 
(1.283) 
-2.131
*
 
(1.269) 
-2.157 
(1.397) 
-1.353 
(1.284) 
-1.906 
(1.275) 
-1.966 
(1.392) 
-1.264 
(1.278) 
-2.131
*
 
(1.264) 
-2.064 
(1.400) 
-1.273 
(1.279) 
-1.986 
(1.268) 
-1.959 
(1.396) 
-0.495 
(1.084) 
-1.796 
(1.210) 
-0.240 
(1.334) 
-0.463 
(1.083) 
-1.565 
(1.204) 
-0.131 
(1.331) 
-0.406 
(1.081) 
-1.796 
(1.206) 
-0.252 
(1.332) 
-0.394 
(1.081) 
-1.644 
(1.202) 
-0.200 
(1.331) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
W 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
0.613 
(1.302) 
-0.531 
(1.320) 
0.203 
(1.423) 
0.451 
(1.307) 
-0.650 
(1.328) 
-0.046 
(1.425) 
0.454 
(1.302) 
-0.569 
(1.317) 
0.208 
(1.421) 
0.363 
(1.306) 
-0.654 
(1.322) 
-0.005 
(1.423) 
0.346 
(1.079) 
-0.973 
(1.271) 
-2.474
*
 
(1.421) 
0.202 
(1.084) 
-1.097 
(1.272) 
-2.632
*
 
(1.424) 
0.242 
(1.083) 
-1.010 
(1.268) 
-2.474
*
 
(1.415) 
0.151 
(1.086) 
-1.106 
(1.269) 
-2.593
*
 
(1.419) 
MoHlth 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
0.317
***
 
(0.046) 
0.363
***
 
(0.048) 
0.426
***
 
(0.049) 
0.314
***
 
(0.046) 
0.362
***
 
(0.048) 
0.407
***
 
(0.049) 
0.311
***
 
(0.046) 
0.344
***
 
(0.048) 
0.410
***
 
(0.049) 
0.310
***
 
(0.046) 
0.346
***
 
(0.048) 
0.398
***
 
(0.049) 
0.228
***
 
(0.037) 
0.429
***
 
(0.046) 
0.545
***
 
(0.049) 
0.226
***
 
(0.037) 
0.427
***
 
(0.046) 
0.532
***
 
(0.049) 
0.225
***
 
(0.037) 
0.411
***
 
(0.046) 
0.531
***
 
(0.049) 
0.224
***
 
(0.037) 
0.414
***
 
(0.046) 
0.524
***
 
(0.049) 
FaHlth 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
0.148
***
 
(0.051) 
0.299
***
 
(0.053) 
0.296
***
 
(0.054) 
0.138
***
 
(0.051) 
0.273
***
 
(0.054) 
0.269
***
 
(0.054) 
0.141
***
 
(0.051) 
0.279
***
 
(0.053) 
0.276
***
 
(0.054) 
0.135
***
 
(0.051) 
0.262
***
 
(0.053) 
0.258
***
 
(0.054) 
0.166
***
 
(0.041) 
0.338
***
 
(0.052) 
0.354
***
 
(0.053) 
0.155
***
 
(0.041) 
0.312
***
 
(0.052) 
0.336
***
 
(0.054) 
0.161
***
 
(0.041) 
0.321
***
 
(0.051) 
0.335
***
 
(0.053) 
0.153
***
 
(0.041) 
0.303
***
 
(0.052) 
0.324
***
 
(0.054) 
Msmok 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
0.908 
(1.227) 
0.438 
(1.220) 
-0.020 
(1.251) 
1.081 
(1.224) 
0.691 
(1.204) 
0.359 
(1.240) 
1.181 
(1.220) 
0.536 
(1.219) 
0.250 
(1.245) 
1.264 
(1.220) 
0.710 
(1.207) 
0.501 
(1.237) 
1.265 
(0.998) 
-1.457 
(1.263) 
-2.016 
(1.319) 
1.430 
(0.990) 
-1.194 
(1.248) 
-1.747 
(1.312) 
1.444 
(0.992) 
-1.354 
(1.263) 
-1.768 
(1.312) 
1.538 
(0.987) 
-1.167 
(1.251) 
-1.605 
(1.308) 
Fsmok 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
-0.037 
(1.010) 
-1.165 
(1.077) 
-1.856
*
 
(1.106) 
0.085 
(1.005) 
-0.974 
(1.069) 
-1.673 
(1.098) 
0.256 
(1.004) 
-0.827 
(1.071) 
-1.542 
(1.103) 
0.298 
(1.002) 
-0.740 
(1.065) 
-1.464 
(1.098) 
-0.033 
(0.844) 
-0.873 
(1.035) 
-1.968
*
 
(1.146) 
0.071 
(0.839) 
-0.689 
(1.025) 
-1.839
*
 
(1.143) 
0.162 
(0.840) 
-0.578 
(1.030) 
-1.695 
(1.145) 
0.203 
(0.837) 
-0.492 
(1.023) 
-1.642 
(1.143) 
Panel (Base: 6)         
7 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
-3.380
**
 
(1.675) 
-0.536 
(1.654) 
0.869 
(1.826) 
-3.280
**
 
(1.686) 
-0.391 
(1.667) 
1.150 
(1.830) 
-3.200
**
 
(1.692) 
-0.048 
(1.680) 
1.246 
(1.834) 
-3.158
*
 
(1.697) 
-0.015 
(1.686) 
1.404 
(1.835) 
-2.260 
(1.414) 
-0.533 
(1.648) 
-0.598 
(1.846) 
-2.162 
(1.427) 
-0.396 
(1.664) 
-0.422 
(1.854) 
-2.144 
(1.434) 
-0.113 
(1.679) 
-0.271 
(1.851) 
-2.100 
(1.440) 
-0.081 
(1.685) 
-0.183 
(1.857) 
8 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
-0.035 
(1.555) 
1.013 
(1.586) 
0.127 
(1.892) 
0.099 
(1.562) 
1.298 
(1.595) 
0.428 
(1.899) 
0.267 
(1.567) 
1.752 
(1.602) 
0.606 
(1.900) 
0.315 
(1.571) 
1.853 
(1.606) 
0.760 
(1.904) 
-0.155 
(1.347) 
-0.364 
(1.638) 
-0.537 
(1.880) 
-0.018 
(1.350) 
-0.092 
(1.648) 
-0.356 
(1.887) 
0.100 
(1.351) 
0.266 
(1.656) 
-0.083 
(1.898) 
0.153 
(1.353) 
0.362 
(1.660) 
-0.003 
(1.900) 
9 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
-1.481 
(1.568) 
-1.499 
(1.707) 
0.351 
(1.832) 
-1.390 
(1.574) 
-1.256 
(1.716) 
0.746 
(1.838) 
-1.165 
(1.577) 
-0.737 
(1.734) 
0.904 
(1.845) 
-1.148 
(1.580) 
-0.681 
(1.737) 
1.120 
(1.847) 
-0.556 
(1.312) 
-1.887 
(1.674) 
-2.273 
(1.912) 
-0.457 
(1.318) 
-1.644 
(1.683) 
-2.031 
(1.912) 
-0.343 
(1.323) 
-1.229 
(1.699) 
-1.794 
(1.927) 
-0.317 
(1.326) 
-1.168 
(1.702) 
-1.684 
(1.925) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
10 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
0.701 
(1.521) 
-2.688 
(1.706) 
0.240 
(1.847) 
0.861 
(1.527) 
-2.330 
(1.710) 
0.649 
(1.849) 
1.182 
(1.526) 
-1.816 
(1.725) 
0.835 
(1.860) 
1.226 
(1.530) 
-1.671 
(1.724) 
1.057 
(1.858) 
0.667 
(1.235) 
-1.270 
(1.625) 
-1.532 
(1.950) 
0.837 
(1.238) 
-0.922 
(1.630) 
-1.247 
(1.954) 
1.004 
(1.246) 
-0.533 
(1.647) 
-0.962 
(1.959) 
1.062 
(1.247) 
-0.385 
(1.646) 
-0.820 
(1.960) 
11 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
0.636 
(1.588) 
0.104 
(1.681) 
2.856 
(1.824) 
0.816 
(1.594) 
0.523 
(1.692) 
3.204
*
 
(1.829) 
1.104 
(1.591) 
0.983 
(1.692) 
3.474
*
 
(1.831) 
1.161 
(1.595) 
1.157 
(1.698) 
3.644
**
 
(1.834) 
-0.441 
(1.369) 
0.486 
(1.623) 
3.804
**
 
(1.750) 
-0.248 
(1.369) 
0.898 
(1.631) 
4.037
**
 
(1.759) 
-0.107 
(1.377) 
1.249 
(1.635) 
4.381
***
 
(1.762) 
-0.034 
(1.377) 
1.432 
(1.637) 
4.486
***
 
(1.767) 
12 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
5.473
***
 
(1.520) 
3.164
*
 
(1.731) 
6.347
***
 
(1.886) 
5.716
***
 
(1.524) 
3.827
**
 
(1.736) 
6.900
***
 
(1.882) 
5.922
***
 
(1.530) 
4.059
**
 
(1.737) 
7.054
***
 
(1.909) 
6.028
***
 
(1.532) 
4.405
**
 
(1.741) 
7.355
***
 
(1.901) 
3.732
***
 
(1.258) 
1.050 
(1.735) 
4.053
**
 
(1.922) 
3.985
***
 
(1.260) 
1.736 
(1.731) 
4.433
**
 
(1.927) 
4.042
***
 
(1.269) 
1.842 
(1.740) 
4.690
**
 
(1.936) 
4.174
***
 
(1.269) 
2.220 
(1.737) 
4.872
***
 
(1.938) 
13 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
1.048 
(1.527) 
2.804
*
 
(1.492) 
4.965
***
 
(1.719) 
1.349 
(1.530) 
3.285
**
 
(1.505) 
5.643
***
 
(1.723) 
1.517 
(1.535) 
3.766
***
 
(1.518) 
5.637
***
 
(1.728) 
1.661 
(1.536) 
3.979
***
 
(1.523) 
6.054
***
 
(1.730) 
1.010 
(1.280) 
1.115 
(1.559) 
3.331
**
 
(1.735) 
1.315 
(1.281) 
1.602 
(1.565) 
3.792
**
 
(1.739) 
1.332 
(1.295) 
1.957 
(1.573) 
3.926
**
 
(1.754) 
1.507 
(1.293) 
2.181 
(1.575) 
4.189
**
 
(1.754) 
14 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
3.823
***
 
(1.483) 
0.617 
(1.684) 
4.311
**
 
(1.821) 
4.245
***
 
(1.480) 
1.353 
(1.675) 
5.047
***
 
(1.826) 
4.255
***
 
(1.488) 
1.530 
(1.699) 
4.882
***
 
(1.834) 
4.491
***
 
(1.485) 
1.962 
(1.688) 
5.369
***
 
(1.837) 
2.478
**
 
(1.239) 
1.947 
(1.608) 
3.155
*
 
(1.860) 
2.900
**
 
(1.233) 
2.667
*
 
(1.599) 
3.660
**
 
(1.862) 
2.773
**
 
(1.249) 
2.731
*
 
(1.622) 
3.682
**
 
(1.862) 
3.046
**
 
(1.243) 
3.173
**
 
(1.611) 
3.995
**
 
(1.863) 
15 
0-5 
 
6-11 
 
12-17 
2.617 
(1.692) 
-0.273 
(1.767) 
3.551
*
 
(1.944) 
2.955
*
 
(1.681) 
0.308 
(1.761) 
4.511
**
 
(1.930) 
3.337
**
 
(1.679) 
0.916 
(1.771) 
4.655
**
 
(1.933) 
3.468
**
 
(1.674) 
1.159 
(1.766) 
5.210
***
 
(1.923) 
1.275 
(1.401) 
0.118 
(1.758) 
2.948 
(1.904) 
1.635 
(1.389) 
0.695 
(1.756) 
3.586 
(1.908) 
1.791 
(1.395) 
1.141 
(1.766) 
3.953
**
 
(1.899) 
1.958 
(1.388) 
1.395 
(1.763) 
4.289
**
 
(1.901) 
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A.9: Estimated Marginal Effects on the Bivariate Probit Model by Race 
Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
MoSch 
(Base: No 
Degree) 
         
HSD/GED 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
3.182
***
 
(1.113) 
5.244
**
 
(2.549) 
7.901
***
 
(1.324) 
4.737
*
 
(2.606) 
2.444
**
 
(1.111) 
4.517
*
 
(2.652) 
7.066
***
 
(1.334) 
4.663
*
 
(2.606) 
2.366
**
 
(1.125) 
4.826
*
 
(2.575) 
6.932
***
 
(1.320) 
4.517
*
 
(2.576) 
1.961
*
 
(1.121) 
4.372
*
 
(2.650) 
6.474
***
 
(1.324) 
4.496
*
 
(2.577) 
3.087
***
 
(1.087) 
4.033
*
 
(2.259) 
6.793
***
 
(1.259) 
2.959 
(2.704) 
2.529
**
 
(1.078) 
3.477 
(2.347) 
6.033
***
 
(1.255) 
2.890 
(2.707) 
2.363
**
 
(1.092) 
3.653
*
 
(2.281) 
5.995
***
 
(1.258) 
2.684 
(2.656) 
2.088
**
 
(1.085) 
3.337 
(2.345) 
5.565
***
 
(1.254) 
2.671 
(2.652) 
College 
Degree 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
6.823
***
 
(1.255) 
8.906
***
 
(3.060) 
12.796
***
 
(1.985) 
10.328
***
 
(2.884) 
5.620
***
 
(1.272) 
7.626
**
 
(3.253) 
11.062
***
 
(2.008) 
10.166
***
 
(2.892) 
5.512
***
 
(1.281) 
8.079
***
 
(3.113) 
10.859
***
 
(1.988) 
9.877
***
 
(2.894) 
4.837
***
 
(1.284) 
7.316
**
 
(3.253) 
9.892
***
 
(2.000) 
9.826
***
 
(2.898) 
5.827
***
 
(1.218) 
5.905
**
 
(2.762) 
11.466
***
 
(1.858) 
6.034
**
 
(2.896) 
4.919
***
 
(1.221) 
4.922
*
 
(2.924) 
9.886
***
 
(1.861) 
5.868
**
 
(2.902) 
4.676
***
 
(1.237) 
5.162
*
 
(2.801) 
9.861
***
 
(1.874) 
5.695
**
 
(2.860) 
4.219
***
 
(1.237) 
4.617 
(2.921) 
8.950
***
 
(1.874) 
5.614
**
 
(2.857) 
FaSch 
(Base: No 
Degree) 
         
HSD/GED 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
1.797
*
 
(1.076) 
1.999 
(2.598) 
6.948
***
 
(1.341) 
0.071 
(2.604) 
1.366 
(1.075) 
1.564 
(2.573) 
6.418
***
 
(1.339) 
-0.070 
(2.620) 
1.067 
(1.096) 
1.567 
(2.604) 
6.191
***
 
(1.337) 
-0.555 
(2.675) 
0.883 
(1.092) 
1.355 
(2.583) 
5.929
***
 
(1.335) 
-0.588 
(2.677) 
0.502 
(1.036) 
3.134 
(2.396) 
5.280
***
 
(1.275) 
1.624 
(2.604) 
0.179 
(1.032) 
2.782 
(2.370) 
4.789
***
 
(1.273) 
1.468 
(2.598) 
-0.147 
(1.040) 
2.708 
(2.397) 
4.675
***
 
(1.275) 
1.510 
(2.674) 
-0.267 
(1.037) 
2.541 
(2.377) 
4.418
***
 
(1.272) 
1.440 
(2.659) 
College 
Degree 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
3.872
***
 
(1.237) 
6.992
**
 
(3.133) 
10.055
***
 
(2.238) 
2.305 
(2.929) 
2.987
**
 
(1.247) 
6.068
**
 
(3.100) 
8.599
***
 
(2.254) 
1.892 
(2.997) 
2.797
**
 
(1.262) 
6.255
**
 
(3.167) 
8.066
***
 
(2.242) 
1.178 
(3.047) 
2.325
*
 
(1.263) 
5.748
*
 
(3.127) 
7.318
***
 
(2.251) 
1.025 
(3.075) 
2.045
*
 
(1.195) 
7.390
**
 
(2.950) 
5.397
***
 
(2.053) 
3.835 
(2.909) 
1.388 
(1.200) 
6.661
**
 
(2.922) 
4.057
**
 
(2.066) 
3.397 
(2.928) 
1.097 
(1.212) 
6.634
**
 
(2.989) 
3.750
*
 
(2.067) 
3.624 
(3.008) 
0.784 
(1.214) 
6.257
**
 
(2.954) 
3.031 
(2.073) 
3.363 
(2.996) 
Pinc 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
 
1.619
***
 
(0.371) 
1.491
* 
(0.899) 
2.891
***
 
(0.642) 
0.429 
(0.549) 
 
1.329
***
 
(0.351) 
1.222 
(0.948) 
2.246
***
 
(0.595) 
0.237 
(0.584) 
 
1.224
***
 
(0.335) 
1.150 
(0.857) 
2.629
***
 
(0.484) 
0.452 
(0.490) 
 
0.900
***
 
(0.337) 
0.871 
(0.891) 
2.099
***
 
(0.459) 
0.410 
(0.503) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
Insur 
(Base: 
Any 
Private) 
         
Only 
Public 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
  
-4.082
***
 
(0.886) 
-2.511 
(1.912) 
-7.845
***
 
(1.312) 
-2.727 
(2.086) 
-3.163
***
 
(0.919) 
-1.676 
(2.038) 
-6.431
***
 
(1.369) 
-2.516 
(2.151) 
  
-3.651
***
 
(0.856) 
-2.480 
(1.777) 
-6.622
***
 
(1.219) 
-0.901 
(2.076) 
-3.025
***
 
(0.882) 
-1.887 
(1.887) 
-5.309
***
 
(1.248) 
-0.530 
(2.139) 
None 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
  
0.094 
(1.356) 
-0.989 
(3.257) 
-3.681
**
 
(1.716) 
-0.487 
(3.379) 
0.467 
(1.362) 
-0.549 
(3.271) 
-2.692 
(1.729) 
-0.342 
(3.402) 
  
0.475 
(1.298) 
0.327 
(3.096) 
-2.518 
(1.611) 
-1.895 
(2.969) 
0.721 
(1.301) 
0.625 
(3.115) 
-1.598 
(1.615) 
-1.676 
(2.987) 
Age 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
-0.310
***
 
(0.083) 
-0.526
***
 
(0.205) 
-0.267
**
 
(0.122) 
0.141 
(0.198) 
-0.317
***
 
(0.082) 
-0.533
***
 
(0.205) 
-0.310
***
 
(0.121) 
0.143 
(0.198) 
-0.333
***
 
(0.083) 
-0.552
***
 
(0.206) 
-0.375
***
 
(0.123) 
0.132 
(0.198) 
-0.333
***
 
(0.082) 
-0.551
***
 
(0.206) 
-0.393
***
 
(0.123) 
0.133 
(0.199) 
-0.703
***
 
(0.078) 
-0.984
***
 
(0.188) 
-0.521
***
 
(0.112) 
-0.244 
(0.197) 
-0.706
***
 
(0.078) 
-0.988
***
 
(0.188) 
-0.559
***
 
(0.111) 
-0.241 
(0.196) 
-0.722
***
 
(0.078) 
-1.014
***
 
(0.189) 
-0.619
***
 
(0.113) 
-0.245 
(0.199) 
-0.721
***
 
(0.078) 
-1.011
***
 
(0.189) 
-0.635
***
 
(0.113) 
-0.241 
(0.197) 
Female 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
0.911
*
 
(0.496) 
1.052 
(1.215) 
0.801 
(0.776) 
1.430 
(1.190) 
0.867
*
 
(0.495) 
1.060 
(1.215) 
0.780 
(0.774) 
1.382 
(1.190) 
0.934
*
 
(0.494) 
1.119 
(1.216) 
0.845 
(0.773) 
1.408 
(1.188) 
0.891
*
 
(0.494) 
1.107 
(1.216) 
0.823 
(0.772) 
1.385 
(1.187) 
1.971
***
 
(0.474) 
2.630
**
 
(1.175) 
2.034
***
 
(0.707) 
0.460 
(1.098) 
1.941
***
 
(0.473) 
2.633
**
 
(1.174) 
2.008
***
 
(0.705) 
0.413 
(1.096) 
1.986
***
 
(0.473) 
2.673
**
 
(1.174) 
2.075
***
 
(0.705) 
0.423 
(1.095) 
1.960
***
 
(0.472) 
2.662
**
 
(1.172) 
2.050
***
 
(0.704) 
0.387 
(1.095) 
Brthrd 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
1.795
***
 
(0.556) 
2.377 
(1.507) 
1.714
**
 
(0.890) 
0.071 
(1.362) 
1.919
***
 
(0.557) 
2.527
*
 
(1.518) 
1.999
**
 
(0.889) 
0.114 
(1.360) 
1.842
***
 
(0.556) 
2.480
*
 
(1.505) 
1.832
**
 
(0.890) 
0.088 
(1.355) 
1.933
***
 
(0.557) 
2.574
*
 
(1.515) 
2.033
**
 
(0.889) 
0.109 
(1.353) 
0.498 
(0.553) 
3.090
**
 
(1.347) 
2.068
***
 
(0.797) 
-0.842 
(1.208) 
0.591 
(0.555) 
3.201
**
 
(1.346) 
2.330
***
 
(0.793) 
-0.800 
(1.211) 
0.543 
(0.553) 
3.181
**
 
(1.342) 
2.170
***
 
(0.794) 
-0.853 
(1.208) 
0.606 
(0.554) 
3.243
**
 
(1.342) 
2.360
***
 
(0.791) 
-0.816 
(1.210) 
Chldrn 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
0.406 
(0.293) 
0.510 
(0.722) 
-0.075 
(0.549) 
-0.658 
(0.712) 
0.420 
(0.291) 
0.585 
(0.722) 
-0.033 
(0.545) 
-0.624 
(0.709) 
0.560
*
 
(0.293) 
0.649 
(0.728) 
0.023 
(0.553) 
-0.577 
(0.709) 
0.535
*
 
(0.291) 
0.666 
(0.729) 
0.034 
(0.549) 
-0.568 
(0.708) 
-0.559
**
 
(0.274) 
0.276 
(0.662) 
-0.622 
(0.515) 
-0.394 
(0.653) 
-0.543
**
 
(0.273) 
0.337 
(0.660) 
-0.587 
(0.508) 
-0.357 
(0.650) 
-0.425 
(0.276) 
0.420 
(0.673) 
-0.538 
(0.514) 
-0.383 
(0.653) 
-0.437 
(0.276) 
0.435 
(0.672) 
-0.529 
(0.509) 
-0.359 
(0.652) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
Child_5 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
0.053 
(0.897) 
1.732 
(2.239) 
-1.790 
(1.493) 
2.040 
(2.290) 
0.302 
(0.897) 
1.837 
(2.245) 
-1.477 
(1.490) 
2.038 
(2.285) 
0.263 
(0.898) 
1.769 
(2.236) 
-1.366 
(1.489) 
1.977 
(2.299) 
0.429 
(0.899) 
1.838 
(2.243) 
-1.199 
(1.487) 
1.987 
(2.298) 
1.382 
(0.869) 
1.742 
(2.097) 
-0.731 
(1.393) 
2.490 
(2.293) 
1.566
*
 
(0.870) 
1.829 
(2.100) 
-0.450 
(1.390) 
2.487 
(2.282) 
1.582
*
 
(0.869) 
1.765 
(2.106) 
-0.386 
(1.391) 
2.433 
(2.306) 
1.690
**
 
(0.870) 
1.819 
(2.108) 
-0.230 
(1.389) 
2.446 
(2.297) 
MSA 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
1.513
**
 
(0.712) 
5.809
**
 
(2.398) 
1.675 
(1.797) 
2.979 
(2.640) 
1.168
*
 
(0.711) 
5.579
**
 
(2.411) 
1.703 
(1.783) 
2.955 
(2.641) 
1.250
*
 
(0.709) 
5.742
**
 
(2.408) 
1.617 
(1.783) 
2.750 
(2.672) 
1.016 
(0.708) 
5.583
**
 
(2.414) 
1.643 
(1.775) 
2.754 
(2.670) 
1.817
***
 
(0.698) 
7.354
***
 
(2.233) 
1.816 
(1.667) 
4.738
*
 
(2.527) 
1.556
**
 
(0.701) 
7.210
***
 
(2.245) 
1.852 
(1.654) 
4.708
*
 
(2.526) 
1.588
**
 
(0.699) 
7.338
***
 
(2.241) 
1.748 
(1.653) 
4.648
*
 
(2.539) 
1.429
**
 
(0.701) 
7.246
***
 
(2.248) 
1.783 
(1.646) 
4.653
*
 
(2.532) 
Region 
(Base: 
NE) 
         
MW 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
-0.832 
(0.946) 
-2.177 
(3.052) 
-8.806
***
 
(2.797) 
5.964
**
 
(2.611) 
-0.830 
(0.944) 
-1.861 
(3.034) 
-9.755
***
 
(2.820) 
5.963
**
 
(2.608) 
-0.991 
(0.946) 
-1.959 
(3.041) 
-9.888
***
 
(2.793) 
5.752
**
 
(2.611) 
-0.961 
(0.945) 
-1.770 
(3.031) 
-10.414
***
 
(2.812) 
5.761
**
 
(2.611) 
-0.939 
(0.900) 
-3.385 
(2.788) 
-7.886
***
 
(2.566) 
-0.802 
(2.667) 
-0.929 
(0.899) 
-3.136 
(2.786) 
-8.762
***
 
(2.589) 
-0.808 
(2.662) 
-1.082 
(0.900) 
-3.201 
(2.785) 
-8.800
***
 
(2.564) 
-0.848 
(2.674) 
-1.056 
(0.900) 
-3.067 
(2.786) 
-9.315
***
 
(2.583) 
-0.838 
(2.671) 
S 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
-1.673
*
 
(0.917) 
-1.888 
(2.425) 
-3.610 
(2.273) 
3.574 
(2.423) 
-1.559
*
 
(0.914) 
-1.576 
(2.421) 
-4.032
*
 
(2.308) 
3.718 
(2.423) 
-1.601
*
 
(0.914) 
-1.694 
(2.432) 
-3.696
*
 
(2.272) 
3.591 
(2.428) 
-1.533
*
 
(0.912) 
-1.500 
(2.426) 
-4.030
*
 
(2.299) 
3.673 
(2.431) 
-0.270 
(0.885) 
0.984 
(2.283) 
-3.081 
(2.050) 
0.287 
(2.539) 
-0.180 
(0.881) 
1.228 
(2.278) 
-3.454
*
 
(2.079) 
0.433 
(2.534) 
-0.207 
(0.881) 
1.141 
(2.291) 
-3.214 
(2.044) 
0.251 
(2.535) 
-0.161 
(0.879) 
1.278 
(2.288) 
-3.527
*
 
(2.068) 
0.376 
(2.533) 
W 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
-0.828 
(1.035) 
-0.716 
(3.351) 
-0.422 
(2.233) 
4.233
*
 
(2.224) 
-0.894 
(1.033) 
-0.720 
(3.346) 
-1.318 
(2.273) 
4.229
*
 
(2.221) 
-0.907 
(1.037) 
-0.732 
(3.339) 
-0.770 
(2.230) 
4.194
*
 
(2.225) 
-0.951 
(1.035) 
-0.727 
(3.340) 
-1.397 
(2.261) 
4.200
*
 
(2.224) 
-1.128 
(0.990) 
-1.512 
(3.009) 
-2.113 
(2.001) 
-0.150 
(2.333) 
-1.164 
(0.989) 
-1.524 
(2.998) 
-2.935 
(2.039) 
-0.155 
(2.328) 
-1.197 
(0.992) 
-1.569 
(3.021) 
-2.416 
(1.993) 
-0.226 
(2.339) 
-1.219 
(0.991) 
-1.578 
(3.012) 
-3.019 
(2.025) 
-0.229 
(2.333) 
MoHlth 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
0.299
***
 
(0.036) 
0.280
***
 
(0.092) 
0.485
***
 
(0.068) 
0.223
**
 
(0.100) 
0.287
***
 
(0.036) 
0.270
***
 
(0.091) 
0.485
***
 
(0.068) 
0.222
**
 
(0.100) 
0.291
***
 
(0.036) 
0.270
***
 
(0.091) 
0.458
***
 
(0.068) 
0.215
**
 
(0.100) 
0.284
***
 
(0.036) 
0.265
***
 
(0.091) 
0.463
***
 
(0.068) 
0.216
**
 
(0.100) 
0.405
***
 
(0.033) 
0.265
***
 
(0.080) 
0.395
***
 
(0.065) 
0.315
***
 
(0.088) 
0.396
***
 
(0.033) 
0.257
***
 
(0.080) 
0.395
***
 
(0.064) 
0.314
***
 
(0.087) 
0.398
***
 
(0.033) 
0.254
***
 
(0.080) 
0.371
***
 
(0.064) 
0.309
***
 
(0.088) 
0.393
***
 
(0.033) 
0.250
***
 
(0.080) 
0.376
***
 
(0.064) 
0.309
***
 
(0.088) 
FaHlth 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
0.203
***
 
(0.040) 
0.194
*
 
(0.104) 
0.345
***
 
(0.075) 
0.147 
(0.105) 
0.187
***
 
(0.040) 
0.178
*
 
(0.106) 
0.310
***
 
(0.075) 
0.142 
(0.106) 
0.183
***
 
(0.039) 
0.183
*
 
(0.104) 
0.344
***
 
(0.075) 
0.127 
(0.105) 
0.174
***
 
(0.039) 
0.174
*
 
(0.105) 
0.317
***
 
(0.075) 
0.125 
(0.105) 
0.239
***
 
(0.037) 
0.289
***
 
(0.095) 
0.386
***
 
(0.069) 
0.095 
(0.096) 
0.227
***
 
(0.037) 
0.278
***
 
(0.096) 
0.353
***
 
(0.069) 
0.089 
(0.097) 
0.221
***
 
(0.036) 
0.277
***
 
(0.095) 
0.385
***
 
(0.069) 
0.094 
(0.095) 
0.215
***
 
(0.036) 
0.271
***
 
(0.096) 
0.358
***
 
(0.070) 
0.091 
(0.096) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
Msmok 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
-1.117 
(0.819) 
2.767 
(2.492) 
3.189 
(2.256) 
1.144 
(2.603) 
-0.899 
(0.818) 
3.043 
(2.507) 
3.282 
(2.258) 
1.257 
(2.574) 
-0.941 
(0.822) 
2.968 
(2.493) 
2.905 
(2.253) 
1.324 
(2.570) 
-0.808 
(0.821) 
3.133 
(2.505) 
3.042 
(2.256) 
1.375 
(2.553) 
-1.770
**
 
(0.821) 
0.990 
(2.117) 
1.402 
(2.057) 
0.382 
(2.421) 
-1.600
**
 
(0.822) 
1.190 
(2.136) 
1.478 
(2.056) 
0.499 
(2.393) 
-1.625
**
 
(0.824) 
1.218 
(2.120) 
1.180 
(2.050) 
0.406 
(2.417) 
-1.531
*
 
(0.825) 
1.322 
(2.135) 
1.297 
(2.051) 
0.491 
(2.393) 
Fsmok 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
-1.873
**
 
(0.803) 
1.291 
(2.003) 
-0.294 
(1.490) 
-3.698
*
 
(2.035) 
-1.640
**
 
(0.800) 
1.551 
(1.995) 
-0.132 
(1.480) 
-3.756
*
 
(2.022) 
-1.482
*
 
(0.811) 
1.458 
(1.993) 
-0.040 
(1.478) 
-3.532
*
 
(2.052) 
-1.375
*
 
(0.808) 
1.617 
(1.988) 
0.043 
(1.472) 
-3.570
*
 
(2.043) 
-1.252 
(0.796) 
0.531 
(1.814) 
-1.198 
(1.397) 
-0.824 
(2.036) 
-1.078 
(0.795) 
0.735 
(1.803) 
-1.064 
(1.388) 
-0.890 
(2.021) 
-0.913 
(0.807) 
0.727 
(1.802) 
-0.992 
(1.388) 
-0.789 
(2.055) 
-0.843 
(0.805) 
0.842 
(1.796) 
-0.925 
(1.383) 
-0.867 
(2.038) 
Panel 
(Base: 6) 
         
7 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
-2.047
*
 
(1.161) 
9.072
***
 
(3.500) 
-1.607 
(2.328) 
-4.686 
(3.860) 
-1.829 
(1.154) 
9.097
***
 
(3.501) 
-1.329 
(2.316) 
-4.664 
(3.860) 
-1.873
*
 
(1.153) 
9.413
***
 
(3.527) 
-0.871 
(2.323) 
-4.375 
(3.823) 
-1.733 
(1.149) 
9.322
***
 
(3.530) 
-0.774 
(2.315) 
-4.392 
(3.822) 
-2.359
**
 
(1.161) 
6.325
*
 
(3.367) 
-0.839 
(2.191) 
-3.052 
(3.867) 
-2.209
*
 
(1.159) 
6.348
*
 
(3.376) 
-0.583 
(2.178) 
-3.037 
(3.868) 
-2.189
*
 
(1.155) 
6.730
**
 
(3.410) 
-0.164 
(2.190) 
-3.019 
(3.830) 
-2.106
*
 
(1.155) 
6.670
**
 
(3.416) 
-0.071 
(2.180) 
-3.044 
(3.820) 
8 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
-0.119 
(1.202) 
2.928 
(3.051) 
0.617 
(2.419) 
-0.281 
(3.727) 
0.012 
(1.191) 
3.214 
(3.068) 
0.899 
(2.412) 
-0.127 
(3.725) 
0.146 
(1.193) 
3.131 
(3.040) 
1.614 
(2.414) 
0.218 
(3.696) 
0.199 
(1.186) 
3.295 
(3.056) 
1.667 
(2.410) 
0.267 
(3.697) 
-1.661 
(1.161) 
1.644 
(2.872) 
1.098 
(2.293) 
0.279 
(3.975) 
-1.562 
(1.153) 
1.874 
(2.879) 
1.337 
(2.281) 
0.441 
(3.964) 
-1.412 
(1.158) 
1.941 
(2.863) 
2.003 
(2.289) 
0.392 
(3.898) 
-1.379 
(1.153) 
2.063 
(2.869) 
2.037 
(2.281) 
0.483 
(3.892) 
9 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
-0.810 
(1.181) 
10.317
***
 
(3.480) 
-3.159 
(2.337) 
-3.981 
(3.566) 
-0.675 
(1.175) 
10.565
***
 
(3.483) 
-2.748 
(2.322) 
-3.931 
(3.562) 
-0.532 
(1.174) 
10.487
***
 
(3.491) 
-1.965 
(2.338) 
-3.630 
(3.553) 
-0.484 
(1.171) 
10.645
***
 
(3.485) 
-1.841 
(2.327) 
-3.637 
(3.549) 
-1.804 
(1.148) 
4.350 
(3.182) 
-1.605 
(2.177) 
-4.377 
(3.534) 
-1.698 
(1.143) 
4.564 
(3.181) 
-1.214 
(2.163) 
-4.322 
(3.523) 
-1.556 
(1.140) 
4.611 
(3.197) 
-0.534 
(2.178) 
-4.361 
(3.495) 
-1.523 
(1.138) 
4.733 
(3.192) 
-0.404 
(2.166) 
-4.346 
(3.480) 
10 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
-0.288 
(1.183) 
4.274 
(3.077) 
-1.662 
(2.312) 
-1.207 
(3.690) 
-0.034 
(1.184) 
4.630 
(3.055) 
-1.223 
(2.301) 
-1.123 
(3.680) 
0.065 
(1.188) 
4.502 
(3.064) 
-0.263 
(2.316) 
-0.656 
(3.682) 
0.204 
(1.187) 
4.718 
(3.048) 
-0.148 
(2.308) 
-0.652 
(3.677) 
-0.718 
(1.173) 
3.052 
(2.993) 
-0.554 
(2.172) 
-2.152 
(3.770) 
-0.519 
(1.172) 
3.332 
(2.963) 
-0.152 
(2.155) 
-2.063 
(3.769) 
-0.396 
(1.180) 
3.386 
(2.982) 
0.693 
(2.180) 
-2.076 
(3.711) 
-0.298 
(1.178) 
3.546 
(2.960) 
0.804 
(2.166) 
-2.058 
(3.705) 
11 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
0.575 
(1.295) 
3.706 
(3.174) 
1.049 
(2.371) 
2.450 
(3.910) 
0.834 
(1.286) 
3.948 
(3.165) 
1.637 
(2.371) 
2.523 
(3.905) 
1.048 
(1.285) 
3.867 
(3.156) 
2.441 
(2.371) 
2.827 
(3.906) 
1.162 
(1.281) 
4.016 
(3.152) 
2.666 
(2.373) 
2.838 
(3.902) 
0.222 
(1.218) 
4.914 
(3.129) 
1.390 
(2.256) 
2.922 
(4.204) 
0.408 
(1.214) 
5.091
*
 
(3.132) 
1.926 
(2.245) 
3.000 
(4.199) 
0.653 
(1.221) 
5.209
*
 
(3.132) 
2.640 
(2.259) 
2.927 
(4.172) 
0.722 
(1.218) 
5.306
*
 
(3.133) 
2.853 
(2.251) 
2.961 
(4.162) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
12 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
2.280
*
 
(1.344) 
13.705
***
 
(3.680) 
9.415
***
 
(2.739) 
-1.385 
(3.765) 
2.655
**
 
(1.343) 
14.184
***
 
(3.714) 
10.054
***
 
(2.723) 
-1.145 
(3.798) 
2.596
**
 
(1.346) 
13.957
***
 
(3.713) 
11.003
***
 
(2.722) 
-0.852 
(3.805) 
2.827
**
 
(1.345) 
14.267
***
 
(3.727) 
11.235
***
 
(2.713) 
-0.769 
(3.824) 
1.429 
(1.395) 
7.051
**
 
(3.419) 
6.364
***
 
(2.440) 
-1.428 
(3.648) 
1.709 
(1.394) 
7.437
**
 
(3.426) 
6.939
***
 
(2.428) 
-1.189 
(3.673) 
1.731 
(1.389) 
7.368
**
 
(3.446) 
7.787
***
 
(2.439) 
-1.193 
(3.631) 
1.882 
(1.389) 
7.595
**
 
(3.442) 
7.998
***
 
(2.431) 
-1.050 
(3.648) 
13 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
0.118 
(1.297) 
13.023
***
 
(3.240) 
3.548 
(2.252) 
1.645 
(3.675) 
0.547 
(1.297) 
13.563
***
 
(3.245) 
4.355
**
 
(2.256) 
1.762 
(3.680) 
0.610 
(1.301) 
13.372
***
 
(3.282) 
4.963
**
 
(2.256) 
1.868 
(3.665) 
0.847 
(1.301) 
13.699
***
 
(3.273) 
5.363
**
 
(2.257) 
1.929 
(3.672) 
-1.581 
(1.208) 
6.427
**
 
(3.105) 
5.171
**
 
(2.158) 
-1.448 
(3.534) 
-1.258 
(1.212) 
6.836
**
 
(3.083) 
5.897
***
 
(2.150) 
-1.315 
(3.537) 
-1.131 
(1.214) 
6.832
**
 
(3.135) 
6.425
***
 
(2.164) 
-1.516 
(3.504) 
-0.972 
(1.216) 
7.059
**
 
(3.110) 
6.792
***
 
(2.157) 
-1.407 
(3.508) 
14 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
2.301
*
 
(1.282) 
8.448
**
 
(3.456) 
2.935 
(2.456) 
1.549 
(3.570) 
2.836
**
 
(1.282) 
9.182
***
 
(3.514) 
3.925
*
 
(2.454) 
1.821 
(3.553) 
2.650
**
 
(1.275) 
8.772
***
 
(3.484) 
4.248
*
 
(2.456) 
1.949 
(3.583) 
3.006
**
 
(1.277) 
9.273
***
 
(3.522) 
4.820
**
 
(2.454) 
2.062 
(3.566) 
0.817 
(1.245) 
7.002
**
 
(3.106) 
4.868
**
 
(2.371) 
-0.473 
(3.472) 
1.218 
(1.245) 
7.544
**
 
(3.152) 
5.753
**
 
(2.359) 
-0.174 
(3.465) 
1.119 
(1.241) 
7.437
**
 
(3.136) 
6.088
***
 
(2.365) 
-0.402 
(3.425) 
1.356 
(1.242) 
7.770
***
 
(3.162) 
6.605
***
 
(2.355) 
-0.165 
(3.425) 
15 
White 
 
Black 
 
Hispan 
 
Other 
1.130 
(1.469) 
7.766
**
 
(3.599) 
0.751 
(2.588) 
3.394 
(3.836) 
1.665 
(1.448) 
8.454
**
 
(3.591) 
1.663 
(2.574) 
3.580 
(3.838) 
1.726 
(1.467) 
8.278
**
 
(3.568) 
2.762 
(2.587) 
4.133 
(3.818) 
2.034 
(1.451) 
8.661
**
 
(3.571) 
3.145 
(2.577) 
4.180 
(3.822) 
0.201 
(1.353) 
0.399 
(3.247) 
3.276 
(2.399) 
2.520 
(3.768) 
0.598 
(1.349) 
0.930 
(3.256) 
4.128
*
 
(2.386) 
2.713 
(3.765) 
0.724 
(1.364) 
0.993 
(3.194) 
5.099
**
 
(2.411) 
2.698 
(3.666) 
0.923 
(1.359) 
1.280 
(3.212) 
5.475
**
 
(2.400) 
2.780 
(3.664) 
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A.10: Estimated Marginal Effects on the Bivariate Probit Model  
by Economic Status 
Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
MoSch 
(Base: No 
Degree) 
         
HSD/GED 
Low 
 
High 
6.079
***
 
(1.237) 
5.589
***
 
(1.446) 
5.864
***
 
(1.235) 
4.840
***
 
(1.401) 
5.885
***
 
(1.238) 
5.178
***
 
(1.408) 
5.733
***
 
(1.237) 
4.623
***
 
(1.376) 
5.194
***
 
(1.189) 
4.977
***
 
(1.330) 
4.985
***
 
(1.186) 
4.424 
(1.292) 
5.066
***
 
(1.188) 
4.608
***
 
(1.305) 
4.916
***
 
(1.186) 
4.210
***
 
(1.277) 
College 
Degree 
Low 
 
High 
8.080
***
 
(1.823) 
8.958
***
 
(1.501) 
7.898
***
 
(1.825) 
7.730
***
 
(1.474) 
7.664
***
 
(1.835) 
8.365
***
 
(1.467) 
7.563
***
 
(1.836) 
7.417
***
 
(1.450) 
8.977
***
 
(1.652) 
6.731
***
 
(1.379) 
8.791
***
 
(1.654) 
5.815 
(1.357) 
8.660
***
 
(1.668) 
6.215
***
 
(1.360) 
8.550
***
 
(1.669) 
5.528
***
 
(1.346) 
FaSch 
(Base: No 
Degree) 
         
HSD/GED 
Low 
 
High 
3.932
***
 
(1.253) 
3.556
***
 
(1.176) 
3.827
***
 
(1.250) 
3.138
***
 
(1.144) 
3.736
***
 
(1.252) 
3.076
***
 
(1.156) 
3.668
***
 
(1.249) 
2.830
***
 
(1.132) 
3.072
***
 
(1.181) 
2.105
**
 
(1.081) 
2.964
***
 
(1.177) 
1.807 
(1.052) 
2.901
***
 
(1.177) 
1.681 
(1.066) 
2.829
**
 
(1.174) 
1.511 
(1.044) 
College 
Degree 
Low 
 
High 
8.770
***
 
(1.824) 
4.657
***
 
(1.285) 
8.477
***
 
(1.836) 
3.776
***
 
(1.276) 
8.092
***
 
(1.860) 
4.046
***
 
(1.270) 
7.906
***
 
(1.867) 
3.416
***
 
(1.263) 
5.604
***
 
(1.811) 
2.826
**
 
(1.185) 
5.306
***
 
(1.823) 
2.177 
(1.169) 
4.940
***
 
(1.855) 
2.290
**
 
(1.175) 
4.750
***
 
(1.862) 
1.834 
(1.163) 
Pinc 
Low 
 
High 
 
1.085
***
 
(0.406) 
2.559
***
 
(0.597) 
 
0.945
**
 
(0.403) 
2.281
***
 
(0.603) 
 
1.054
***
 
(0.356) 
1.926 
(0.527) 
 
0.924
***
 
(0.358) 
1.668
***
 
(0.531) 
Insur 
(Base: 
Any 
Private) 
         
Only 
Public 
Low 
 
High 
  
-3.318
***
 
(1.247) 
-3.464
***
 
(1.007) 
-2.952
**
 
(1.258) 
-2.750
***
 
(1.001) 
  
-2.984
***
 
(1.180) 
-2.798
***
 
(0.970) 
-2.626
**
 
(1.188) 
-2.288
**
 
(0.962) 
None 
Low 
 
High 
  
0.678 
(1.695) 
-0.733 
(1.062) 
0.895 
(1.701) 
-0.266 
(1.043) 
  
1.663 
(1.570) 
-1.300 
(1.023) 
1.876 
(1.574) 
-0.947 
(1.003) 
Age 
Low 
 
High 
-0.477
***
 
(0.113) 
-0.236
***
 
(0.071) 
-0.482
***
 
(0.113) 
-0.236
***
 
(0.071) 
-0.537
***
 
(0.114) 
-0.248
***
 
(0.072) 
-0.538
***
 
(0.114) 
-0.246
***
 
(0.071) 
-0.785
***
 
(0.106) 
-0.586
***
 
(0.068) 
-0.789
***
 
(0.105) 
-0.583 
(0.068) 
-0.849
***
 
(0.107) 
-0.595
***
 
(0.068) 
-0.849
***
 
(0.106) 
-0.591
***
 
(0.068) 
Female 
Low 
 
High 
0.802 
(0.713) 
1.154
***
 
(0.435) 
0.755 
(0.713) 
1.147
***
 
(0.435) 
0.830 
(0.713) 
1.185
***
 
(0.435) 
0.789 
(0.712) 
1.173
***
 
(0.434) 
2.785
***
 
(0.654) 
1.382
***
 
(0.412) 
2.741
***
 
(0.654) 
1.371 
(0.411) 
2.813
***
 
(0.653) 
1.412
***
 
(0.411) 
2.774
***
 
(0.653) 
1.398
***
 
(0.411) 
Brthrd 
Low 
 
High 
2.621
***
 
(0.803) 
1.308
***
 
(0.500) 
2.717
***
 
(0.803) 
1.476
***
 
(0.504) 
2.688
***
 
(0.803) 
1.321
***
 
(0.500) 
2.765
***
 
(0.803) 
1.468
***
 
(0.503) 
2.236
***
 
(0.740) 
0.741 
(0.467) 
2.329
***
 
(0.738) 
0.868 
(0.469) 
2.301
***
 
(0.737) 
0.747 
(0.467) 
2.376
***
 
(0.736) 
0.855
*
 
(0.469) 
Chldrn 
Low 
 
High 
0.548 
(0.450) 
0.567
**
 
(0.287) 
0.506 
(0.450) 
0.481
*
 
(0.287) 
0.553 
(0.450) 
0.600
**
 
(0.285) 
0.516 
(0.450) 
0.513
*
 
(0.286) 
-0.162 
(0.418) 
-0.165 
(0.271) 
-0.204 
(0.418) 
-0.225 
(0.271) 
-0.151 
(0.416) 
-0.137 
(0.271) 
-0.188 
(0.417) 
-0.196 
(0.271) 
147 
 
 
Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
Child_5 
Low 
 
High 
1.097 
(1.385) 
-0.642 
(0.764) 
1.187 
(1.385) 
-0.477 
(0.768) 
1.180 
(1.383) 
-0.556 
(0.761) 
1.249 
(1.384) 
-0.419 
(0.765) 
1.710 
(1.298) 
0.728 
(0.750) 
1.798 
(1.298) 
0.853 
(0.753) 
1.774 
(1.295) 
0.787 
(0.750) 
1.843 
(1.295) 
0.887 
(0.752) 
Race 
(Base: 
White) 
         
Black 
Low 
 
High 
-2.801 
(1.803) 
-2.938
***
 
(1.019) 
-2.691 
(1.804) 
-2.690
***
 
(1.015) 
-2.527 
(1.806) 
-2.782
***
 
(1.019) 
-2.445 
(1.806) 
-2.585
***
 
(1.015) 
-2.648 
(1.696) 
-2.525
***
 
(0.994) 
-2.532 
(1.697) 
-2.331 
(0.991) 
-2.352 
(1.697) 
-2.407
**
 
(0.996) 
-2.264 
(1.697) 
-2.256
**
 
(0.993) 
Hispanic 
Low 
 
High 
-8.317
***
 
(1.357) 
-2.788
***
 
(0.813) 
-8.240
***
 
(1.357) 
-2.387
***
 
(0.808) 
-8.105
***
 
(1.365) 
-2.367
***
 
(0.812) 
-8.075
***
 
(1.365) 
-2.109
***
 
(0.809) 
-5.066
***
 
(1.285) 
-1.853
**
 
(0.796) 
-4.989
***
 
(1.286) 
-1.556 
(0.791) 
-4.944
***
 
(1.290) 
-1.475
*
 
(0.798) 
-4.911
***
 
(1.290) 
-1.288
*
 
(0.794) 
Other 
Low 
 
High 
-3.142 
(2.210) 
-0.907 
(0.967) 
-2.878 
(2.208) 
-0.816 
(0.973) 
-3.078 
(2.221) 
-0.813 
(0.971) 
-2.849 
(2.219) 
-0.758 
(0.976) 
-1.620 
(2.138) 
-0.400 
(0.922) 
-1.354 
(2.130) 
-0.321 
(0.924) 
-1.546 
(2.152) 
-0.305 
(0.928) 
-1.314 
(2.144) 
-0.255 
(0.929) 
MSA 
Low 
 
High 
4.623
***
 
(1.435) 
-0.093 
(0.746) 
4.608
***
 
(1.434) 
-0.409 
(0.739) 
4.536
***
 
(1.434) 
-0.210 
(0.744) 
4.518
***
 
(1.434) 
-0.469 
(0.737) 
4.963
***
 
(1.385) 
0.634 
(0.752) 
4.952
***
 
(1.385) 
0.379 
(0.748) 
4.822
***
 
(1.384) 
0.534 
(0.751) 
4.807
***
 
(1.384) 
0.331 
(0.748) 
Region 
(Base: 
NE) 
         
MW 
Low 
 
High 
-4.978
**
 
(2.146) 
-0.454 
(0.859) 
-5.148
**
 
(2.154) 
-0.407 
(0.859) 
-5.250
**
 
(2.150) 
-0.605 
(0.858) 
-5.375
**
 
(2.156) 
-0.537 
(0.859) 
-3.618
*
 
(1.947) 
-1.941
**
 
(0.841) 
-3.772
**
 
(1.953) 
-1.898 
(0.841) 
-3.899
**
 
(1.949) 
-2.057
**
 
(0.841) 
-4.015
**
 
(1.953) 
-2.000
**
 
(0.841) 
S 
Low 
 
High 
-3.739
**
 
(1.843) 
-0.526 
(0.791) 
-3.750
**
 
(1.846) 
-0.452 
(0.791) 
-3.883
**
 
(1.839) 
-0.518 
(0.788) 
-3.897
**
 
(1.841) 
-0.463 
(0.789) 
-2.264 
(1.665) 
0.319 
(0.739) 
-2.259 
(1.665) 
0.369 
(0.739) 
-2.489 
(1.659) 
0.339 
(0.738) 
-2.491 
(1.659) 
0.375 
(0.738) 
W 
Low 
 
High 
-0.241 
(1.879) 
-0.113 
(0.840) 
-0.450 
(1.890) 
-0.102 
(0.842) 
-0.317 
(1.877) 
-0.149 
(0.836) 
-0.493 
(1.886) 
-0.133 
(0.838) 
-0.791 
(1.715) 
-1.248 
(0.815) 
-0.989 
(1.725) 
-1.242 
(0.816) 
-0.882 
(1.710) 
-1.267 
(0.812) 
-1.051 
(1.719) 
-1.259 
(0.813) 
MoHlth 
Low 
 
High 
0.399
***
 
(0.058) 
0.306
***
 
(0.033) 
0.400
***
 
(0.058) 
0.300
***
 
(0.033) 
0.391
***
 
(0.058) 
0.303
***
 
(0.033) 
0.393
***
 
(0.058) 
0.298
***
 
(0.033) 
0.423
***
 
(0.053) 
0.342
***
 
(0.031) 
0.423
***
 
(0.053) 
0.338 
(0.031) 
0.414
***
 
(0.053) 
0.340
***
 
(0.031) 
0.415
***
 
(0.053) 
0.336
***
 
(0.031) 
FaHlth 
Low 
 
High 
0.340
***
 
(0.064) 
0.150
***
 
(0.037) 
0.327
***
 
(0.064) 
0.143
***
 
(0.037) 
0.329
***
 
(0.064) 
0.146
***
 
(0.036) 
0.318
***
 
(0.064) 
0.140
***
 
(0.036) 
0.367
***
 
(0.058) 
0.187
***
 
(0.035) 
0.353
***
 
(0.058) 
0.180 
(0.035) 
0.354
***
 
(0.058) 
0.184
***
 
(0.035) 
0.343
***
 
(0.058) 
0.179
***
 
(0.035) 
Msmok 
Low 
 
High 
1.152 
(1.506) 
0.150 
(0.837) 
1.311 
(1.500) 
0.258 
(0.833) 
1.306 
(1.501) 
0.200 
(0.836) 
1.432 
(1.497) 
0.283 
(0.832) 
0.295 
(1.412) 
-1.450
*
 
(0.873) 
0.448 
(1.406) 
-1.351 
(0.868) 
0.454 
(1.404) 
-1.397 
(0.873) 
0.577 
(1.400) 
-1.323 
(0.869) 
Fsmok 
Low 
 
High 
1.525 
(1.264) 
-2.542
***
 
(0.806) 
1.531 
(1.262) 
-2.316
***
 
(0.797) 
1.666 
(1.261) 
-2.364
***
 
(0.801) 
1.659 
(1.260) 
-2.194
***
 
(0.794) 
0.891 
(1.212) 
-1.705
**
 
(0.759) 
0.894 
(1.210) 
-1.545 
(0.754) 
1.020 
(1.209) 
-1.564
**
 
(0.756) 
1.012 
(1.208) 
-1.448
**
 
(0.752) 
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Variables 
Physical Health Mental Health 
Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) Eqn. (I) Eqn. (II) Eqn. (III) Eqn. (IV) 
Panel 
(Base: 6) 
         
7 
Low 
 
High 
-3.983
*
 
(2.323) 
1.173 
(1.125) 
-3.895
*
 
(2.323) 
1.125 
(1.140) 
-3.712 
(2.340) 
1.314 
(1.123) 
-3.658 
(2.339) 
1.251 
(1.136) 
-2.545 
(2.204) 
-0.076 
(1.132) 
-2.467 
(2.206) 
-0.124 
(1.147) 
-2.244 
(2.224) 
0.014 
(1.132) 
-2.197 
(2.224) 
-0.041 
(1.144) 
8 
Low 
 
High 
-0.429 
(2.261) 
1.240 
(1.143) 
-0.360 
(2.266) 
1.296 
(1.148) 
-0.023 
(2.273) 
1.387 
(1.145) 
0.003 
(2.277) 
1.416 
(1.149) 
-0.322 
(2.215) 
0.223 
(1.074) 
-0.257 
(2.218) 
0.251 
(1.081) 
0.114 
(2.233) 
0.322 
(1.076) 
0.137 
(2.234) 
0.330 
(1.081) 
9 
Low 
 
High 
-3.078 
(2.288) 
1.055 
(1.124) 
-3.010 
(2.291) 
1.135 
(1.132) 
-2.555 
(2.304) 
1.184 
(1.128) 
-2.536 
(2.306) 
1.235 
(1.135) 
-2.732 
(2.189) 
-0.283 
(1.089) 
-2.658 
(2.191) 
-0.235 
(1.097) 
-2.171 
(2.205) 
-0.192 
(1.094) 
-2.148 
(2.206) 
-0.165 
(1.100) 
10 
Low 
 
High 
-1.701 
(2.256) 
0.825 
(1.123) 
-1.592 
(2.258) 
1.026 
(1.130) 
-1.150 
(2.272) 
1.075 
(1.125) 
-1.098 
(2.273) 
1.221 
(1.129) 
-0.350 
(2.153) 
-0.091 
(1.071) 
-0.240 
(2.155) 
0.054 
(1.075) 
0.246 
(2.168) 
0.060 
(1.076) 
0.298 
(2.168) 
0.163 
(1.077) 
11 
Low 
 
High 
1.275 
(2.303) 
1.410 
(1.140) 
1.453 
(2.306) 
1.552 
(1.144) 
1.962 
(2.312) 
1.609 
(1.140) 
2.058 
(2.315) 
1.711 
(1.143) 
1.933 
(2.208) 
1.079 
(1.045) 
2.108 
(2.209) 
1.187 
(1.050) 
2.643 
(2.227) 
1.202 
(1.048) 
2.737 
(2.227) 
1.276 
(1.052) 
12 
Low 
 
High 
8.232
***
 
(2.166) 
3.209
***
 
(1.172) 
8.499
***
 
(2.166) 
3.513
***
 
(1.172) 
8.851
***
 
(2.177) 
3.445
***
 
(1.173) 
9.025
***
 
(2.178) 
3.676
***
 
(1.172) 
5.948
***
 
(2.128) 
1.663 
(1.084) 
6.206
***
 
(2.130) 
1.883 
(1.084) 
6.586
***
 
(2.138) 
1.835
*
 
(1.088) 
6.753
***
 
(2.139) 
1.996
*
 
(1.087) 
13 
Low 
 
High 
4.382
**
 
(2.081) 
2.090
*
 
(1.110) 
4.606
**
 
(2.086) 
2.398
**
 
(1.113) 
4.968
**
 
(2.101) 
2.309
**
 
(1.110) 
5.112
**
 
(2.104) 
2.553
**
 
(1.112) 
3.975
**
 
(2.005) 
0.579 
(1.060) 
4.191
**
 
(2.008) 
0.809 
(1.057) 
4.565
**
 
(2.025) 
0.722 
(1.064) 
4.702
**
 
(2.027) 
0.899 
(1.061) 
14 
Low 
 
High 
1.565 
(2.259) 
4.266
***
 
(1.044) 
1.924 
(2.255) 
4.743
***
 
(1.045) 
2.185 
(2.270) 
4.426
***
 
(1.049) 
2.449 
(2.266) 
4.836
***
 
(1.048) 
2.285 
(2.170) 
3.271
***
 
(0.976) 
2.632 
(2.166) 
3.608 
(0.971) 
2.962 
(2.177) 
3.372
***
 
(0.982) 
3.217 
(2.174) 
3.652
***
 
(0.976) 
15 
Low 
 
High 
1.276 
(2.482) 
3.267
***
 
(1.114) 
1.534 
(2.479) 
3.717
***
 
(1.105) 
2.178 
(2.486) 
3.580
***
 
(1.114) 
2.323 
(2.484) 
3.929
***
 
(1.106) 
2.478 
(2.274) 
1.176 
(1.096) 
2.731 
(2.272) 
1.517 
(1.096) 
3.385 
(2.284) 
1.401 
(1.091) 
3.528 
(2.282) 
1.659 
(1.092) 
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ABSTRACT 
PARENTAL SCHOOLING AND CHILD HEALTH:  
EVIDENCE FROM MEDICAL EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY 
by 
UDBODHA USHAKAR RIJAL 
May 2016 
Advisor: Dr. Allen Charles Goodman 
Major: Economics 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
This study applies bivariate probit models to the Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey data set to explore the effects of parental schooling on the physical and mental 
health of child and the underlying mechanism of the transmission of these beneficial 
effects. Using the perceived physical and mental health status of child as the outcome 
variable, the results indicate that the benefits of parental schooling increases with levels 
of parental schooling; mother‟s schooling has greater impacts than father‟s; and the 
impacts of parental schooling on physical health of child is slightly larger than on mental 
health. For instance, relative to having No Degree at all, mother‟s having an HSD/GED 
(and College Degree) increases the probability that the reported physical health status 
of her child is Very Good/Excellent as opposed to Poor/Fair/Good by about 6.4% (and 
10.6%) in terms of the total effects. Similar probabilities for father‟s schooling are about 
4.5% (and 7.4%) respectively. For mental health, these probabilities are about 5.6% and 
8.8% for mother‟s schooling, and 3.3% and 5.1% for father‟s schooling respectively. The 
non-monetary effects of parental schooling are about four-fifths of these total effects 
and are much larger than the combined monetary effects of income and health 
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insurance attributable to parental schooling. In case of the households with single 
mother, the beneficial effects of mother‟s schooling are however marginally greater on 
mental health than on physical health. Beneficial effects of parental schooling can be 
observed across most of the subgroups with varying degree. For instance, the effects of 
parental schooling on child health are particularly highest for the Hispanic, followed by 
Black and White. 
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